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Abstract 
E-campaigning refers to the utilisation of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs), predominantly the Internet, and related applications for 
election campaigning. At present, scholarly research in this social phenomenon 
chiefly focuses on how e-campaigning is utilised by political parties or candidates. 
Also, there is growing research interest in factors that influence e-campaigning 
utilisation. However, political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation is 
largely unexplored and unexplained. This is attributable to several factors, notably, 
restricted access to the phenomenon, the narrow and geographical concentration 
of existing e-campaigning research, the accessibility of political parties’ or 
candidates’ campaign teams as research participants, and a dearth of 
multidisciplinary research. To that end, this study empirically explores and 
explains e-campaigning utilisation with a multidisciplinary, multiple-case 
research approach. Further, this study is situated in the 2008 New Zealand general 
election, involving six of eight parliamentary parties. Based on existing e-
campaigning research, this study proposes a new theoretical framework to 
understand, describe, and compare e-campaigning utilisation. This e-campaigning 
framework has been empirically applied. Notably, the findings suggest that 
political parties’ e-campaigning utilisation varied markedly beyond information 
dissemination; although social media was introduced in most parties’ e-
campaigning, its interactive nature was barely exploited; and innovative e-
campaigning appeared to be the exception rather than the norm. From political 
science and information systems literature, this study identifies ten factors, 
encompassing both external and internal aspects as well as various perspectives, 
to explain e-campaigning utilisation. The findings suggest that those factors in 
general are empirically relevant, accurate, and adequate. This study concludes 
that e-campaigning is a complex, contextual, diverse, and dynamic phenomenon. 
As such, it is difficult, if not impossible, to generalise or predict e-campaigning 
utilisation; also, a multidisciplinary approach is pivotal to investigating the 
phenomenon. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the introduction of this thesis. It proceeds as 
follows: section 1.2 pertains to the research motivation; section 1.3 articulates the 
research objectives and questions in light of the research motivation; section 1.4 
defines the key terms in this study; section 1.5 indicates the scope of this study; 
and last, section 1.6 outlines the structure of the remainder of this thesis. 
1.2 Research motivation 
Political elections, especially at the national level, are a core component of 
representative democracies, as governments are born as a result of securing 
sufficient votes cast by legitimate voters (LeDuc, Niemi, & Norris, 2014). Moreover, 
the outcome of an election determines different governmental policies, which 
ultimately affect the future of society and the lives of citizens (Brady & Stewart, 
1991; Nogee, 1991; Powell, 2014). For this reason, elections are regarded as a key 
indicator of a nation’s democratic health or vital instruments of democracy (LeDuc 
et al., 2014; Powell, 2014). 
In every election cycle a long-standing ritual commonly occurs that sees campaign 
teams representing political parties or candidates ‘wage battles for votes and 
political office’ (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002, p. 2). Farrell and Schmitt-Beck refer 
to that as election campaigning. Norris (2002, p. 128) further defines it as 
‘organised efforts to inform, persuade and mobilise’. 
Traditionally, election campaigning had been associated with in-person 
engagement with voters, television advertising, newspaper coverage, radio talks, 
campaign billboards, and printed materials – such as pamphlets and letters 
(Bimber & Davis, 2003; Denver & Hands, 2002; Norris, 2002; Wlezien, 2014). In 
1992, former US President Bill Clinton and his campaign team deployed a website 
for Clinton’s first presidential election campaigning, which is considered as the 
genesis of a new form of election campaigning, also referred to as e-campaigning 
(Owen & Davis, 2008). Shortly after Clinton, an increasing number of parties or 
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candidates started to adopt e-campaigning and take it to a new level by integrating 
various ICTs, applications, and electioneering practices (D'Alessio, 2000; Gibson, 
Ward, & Lusoli, 2002). This has eventuated in a global phenomenon (e.g., Copeland 
& Rommele, 2014; Dezelan, Vobic, & Maksuti, 2014; Gibson & McAllister, 2008; 
Koc-Michalska, Gibson, & Vedel, 2014; Mirandilla, 2007; Tekwani & Shetty, 2007; 
Vergeer & Hermans, 2013). 
The e-campaigning phenomenon has also captured political scientists’ attention. 
Scholarly research in e-campaigning started soon after its debut in practice. The 
early wave of e-campaigning research chiefly pertains to debating the potential 
consequences of e-campaigning or e-democracy – the utilisation of ICTs, 
particularly the Internet, in democratic processes, resulting in mixed views 
(Bimber, 1998, 2001; Gibson & Ward, 2000a; Margolis, Resnick, & Levy, 2003; 
Norris, 2001; Sunstein, 2002). 
While the debates continue (e.g., Gibson & McAllister, 2014; Schweitzer, 2008b; 
Sunstein, 2007), Norris (2002, p. 143) responds to those with a negative view of 
e-campaigning by contending that e-campaigning, or election campaigning in 
general, is not to blame for ‘more deep-rooted ills of the body politic’. Further, it is 
increasingly pointed out that the consequences of utilising ICTs in democratic 
processes are contextual, complex, and often not immediately observable; 
therefore, assessments and conclusions should not be made on the basis of limited 
observations and contexts (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002; Gibson, Nixon, & Ward, 
2003; Gibson, Rommele, & Ward, 2004; Schmitt-Beck, 2004). It is further argued 
that the consequences of e-campaigning are contingent on how it is utilised by 
political parties and candidates (Smith, 1998). Another wave of e-campaigning 
research has since commenced and become dominant in the literature, which 
focuses on exploring e-campaigning utilisation (e.g., Bentivegna, 2008; Bimber, 
2014; Dader, 2008; Gibson, Margolis, Resnick, & Ward, 2003; Hameed, 2007; 
Hooghe & Vissers, 2008; Koc-Michalska et al., 2014; Schweitzer, 2008a; Small, 
Taras, & Danchuk, 2008; Strandberg, 2009; Vergeer, Hermans, & Sams, 2013; 
Voerman & Boogers, 2008; Ward, Gibson, & Lusoli, 2008). However, it is 
recognised that knowledge relating to how e-campaigning is utilised by political 
parties or candidates is limited, despite an increase of research engagement in the 
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area (Ward, Owen, Davis, & Taras, 2008). Some political scientists point out that 
the quickening pace of technological advancement, and the narrow and 
geographical concentration of e-campaigning studies are the main contributing 
factors (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). Restricted access to the e-campaigning 
phenomenon can also be considered as another important factor. More specifically, 
e-campaigning is contingent on elections; they occur only periodically with 
considerably long intervals in between. For instance, in the US a presidential 
election occurs every four years and in the UK the interval between general 
elections is set at five years. 
From observing and comparing political parties’ or candidates’ utilisation of e-
campaigning within elections or across democracies, it is found that e-
campaigning utilisation varies markedly despite the underlying technologies and 
applications being largely identical (Gibson, Margolis, et al., 2003; Jankowski, Foot, 
Kluver, & Schneider, 2005; Small, 2008; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). Further, the 
potential of ICTs and related applications has not been fully exploited (Anstead & 
Chadwick, 2009; Gibson & McAllister, 2008). These together have led to a new 
stream in e-campaigning research that pertains to explaining e-campaigning 
utilisation by uncovering factors that influence political parties’ or candidates’ e-
campaigning utilisation (e.g., Anstead & Chadwick, 2009; Lilleker & Vedel, 2013; 
Marcinkowski & Metag, 2014; Small, 2008; Tkach-Kawasaki, 2007; Ward, Owen, 
et al., 2008). This research stream is still in its infancy and is mostly theoretically-
based only. 
Thus far, e-campaigning research has been almost solely conducted by political 
scientists. It is suggested in the political science discipline that cross-disciplinary 
collaboration is extremely beneficial to research in the political use of ICTs and 
information systems (IS) is a recommended discipline (Norris, 2001). Some IS 
scholars concur (e.g., McGrath, Elbanna, Hercheui, Panagiotopoulos, & Saad, 2012; 
Wattal, Schuff, Mandviwalla, & Williams, 2010). However, there is an 
overwhelming lack of enthusiasm and participation from the IS community in 
research pertaining to the political use of ICTs, or e-politics (McGrath et al., 2012; 
Wattal et al., 2010). Wattal et al. are particularly concerned. By using US President 
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Barack Obama’s e-campaigning in the 2008 presidential election as an example in 
their feature article in MIS Quarterly, Wattal et al. (2010, p. 680) stress that  
the field of Information Systems can move beyond the traditional focus on 
business and the organisation and tackle larger societal issues. 
Political science is one area in which IS’s deep understanding of the effect 
of technological systems, and information creation, use, and management 
can be of great value. 
Put succinctly, political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation is largely 
unexplored and unexplained. Further, calls for multidisciplinary research from the 
political science and IS disciplines remain unanswered. 
1.3 Research objectives and research questions 
1.3.1 Research objectives 
Four main objectives are defined for this study. First, this study intends to respond 
to calls from both the political science and IS disciplines to employ a 
multidisciplinary approach. More specifically, this study intends to draw on 
political science and IS perspectives. Second, this study intends to deliver a 
comprehensive empirical understanding of e-campaigning utilisation within an 
election. Third, this study intends to provide an empirical understanding of factors 
that influence e-campaigning utilisation within an election. 
Last, albeit limited, there are a few empirical studies of e-campaigning utilisation 
in New Zealand, take Pedersen’s (2005) and Chen’s (2009) studies, for instance. 
Pedersen (2005, p. 107) explores both parliamentary and non-parliamentary 
parties’ e-campaigning in the 2005 New Zealand general election, which 
‘contributes to an increased understanding of how parties apply the new 
information and communication technology [to election campaigning]’. However, 
e-campaigning in an election is contextual and also, in e-campaigning, technology 
is constantly evolving, and political parties and candidates are continuously 
learning, experimenting, and innovating (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). This 
accordingly jeopardises the applicability of the findings and conclusions of 
Pedersen’s study to a subsequent New Zealand general election; in other words, 
the landscape of New Zealand political parties’ e-campaigning in the 2005 election 
 5 
as observed by Pedersen is anticipated to differ considerably from that in a 
subsequent election. Although part of Chen’s study pertains to some 
parliamentary parties’ e-campaigning in the 2008 New Zealand general election, 
it chiefly focuses on the two major parties. Since MMP (mixed member 
proportional) replaced FPP (first past the post) in 1996 as the electoral system for 
New Zealand general elections, New Zealand’s political landscape has become 
increasingly diverse (Miller, 2010; Mulgan, 2004). Yet, this characteristic is not 
reflected in Chen’s study due to the primary focus on the major parties; thus, the 
representativeness and comprehensiveness of the empirical understanding 
offered by Chen’s study is restricted. Moreover, little research is present in the 
literature that attempts to empirically explain New Zealand political parties’ e-
campaigning utilisation. Taken together, the present empirical understanding of 
New Zealand political parties’ e-campaigning utilisation and factors that influence 
the utilisation is insufficient, warranting the need for further empirical research. 
To that end, this study intends to be situated in a New Zealand context. 
1.3.2 Research questions 
Based on the research objectives, two questions are to be answered in this study: 
1. How do political parties’ campaign teams utilise ICTs for election 
campaigning in New Zealand? 
2. What are the factors that influence those campaign teams’ utilisation of e-
campaigning and why? 
1.4 Definition of key terms 
Three terms feature prominently in this study, namely, election campaigning, e-
campaigning, and campaign team. They are defined as follows. 
Election campaigning. Based on the views of Farrell and Schmitt-Beck (2002), 
Norris (2002), and Wlezien (2014), election campaigning in this study is defined 
as collective, orchestrated efforts in a political election in order to influence voting 
preferences and the election outcome. 
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E-campaigning. Consistent with the views of Bentivegna (2008), Lilleker and 
Vedel (2013), and Schweitzer (2008b), e-campaigning in this study is defined as 
the utilisation of ICTs, predominantly the Internet, and related applications for 
election campaigning. In the literature, e-campaigning is also referred to as online 
campaigning (e.g., Small et al., 2008; Strandberg, 2009), Internet campaigning (e.g., 
Gibson, Rommele, & Ward, 2003), or cyber campaigning (e.g., Gibson & McAllister, 
2006). 
Campaign team. It is pointed out that a political party’s or candidate’s election 
campaigning is often conducted by a team that usually consists of party members 
(in party campaigning), the candidate (in candidate campaigning), permanent or 
temporary campaign staff, external campaign consultants, and volunteers (Farrell 
& Schmitt-Beck, 2002; Wlezien, 2014). Also, campaign teams focus on only short-
term goals, they dissolve at the conclusion of the election (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 
2002). 
1.5 Delimitations 
The main boundaries of this study are defined as follows. First, this study focuses 
on campaign teams’ perspectives only, it does not incorporate voters’ perspectives. 
Second, this study is situated in a New Zealand general election, which is party-led. 
Therefore, this study focuses on political parties’ e-campaigning instead of 
electoral candidates’. Third, this study is not concerned with e-campaigning 
conducted by citizens as noted by Gibson (2015). Fourth, this study focuses on 
parliamentary parties only; that is, it does not consider e-campaigning of parties 
that were not represented in the 48th New Zealand Parliament and participated in 
the 2008 general election. Last, this study investigates e-campaigning to the voting 
public only, it does not include e-campaigning within a political party as noted by 
Anstead and Chadwick (2009). 
1.6 Thesis outline 
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews both political 
science and IS literature in order to establish a theoretical lens for each research 
question. Chapter 3 details the design of this empirical study. Chapter 4-9 relate 
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to the main empirical findings from the case studies. Then, Chapter 10 presents a 
cross-case analysis. Following that, Chapter 11 provides a discussion based on the 
findings from academic literature and the empirical data. Last, Chapter 12 
concludes this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 Literature review 
2.1  Chapter introduction 
This chapter reviews academic literature in relation to the research questions. It 
proceeds as follows: section 2.2 presents an overview of e-campaigning in both 
practice and the literature; section 2.3 pertains to the theorisation of e-
campaigning utilisation; section 2.4 is concerned with factors that influence e-
campaigning utilisation; and last, section 2.5 summarises this chapter. 
2.2 An overview of e-campaigning in practice and 
the literature 
2.2.1 E-campaigning in practice 
The debut of e-campaigning can be traced back to the 1992 US presidential 
election, when the first-time presidential candidate Clinton and his campaign team 
deployed a website containing some basic information of Clinton’s candidacy. 
Although the website was static and simple, it started to attract public attention 
(Gibson, 2004; Owen & Davis, 2008). 
By the end of the 1990s, the continuous development of e-campaigning in practice 
was observed, reflected in three main areas, namely, the increase in e-
campaigning adoption; the increase in the breadth and depth of campaign 
information provided through e-campaigning; and the utilisation of e-mail 
technology for direct-mailing in order to reach and communicate with voters 
(D'Alessio, 2000; Gibson, 2004; Gibson et al., 2002). 
From the year 2000 onwards, e-campaigning has significantly increased in 
prominence. This is reflected in three areas. First, e-campaigning has expanded 
beyond the US and eventuated in a widespread global phenomenon (e.g., Copeland 
& Rommele, 2014; D. T. Hill, 2008; Kim & Park, 2007; Lilleker & Jackson, 2013; van 
Os, Hagemann, Voerman, & Jankowski, 2007). Second, e-campaigning is no longer 
associated with a single form of ICT, such as email or the World Wide Web; instead, 
it has become increasingly integrative of various ICTs and applications (Gibson, 
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2012; Gibson & Cantijoch, 2011; Gibson, Rommele, & Williamson, 2014; Vergeer, 
2012). Third, e-campaigning is no longer confined to merely disseminating 
campaign information; rather, it has evolved from an information kiosk in 
cyberspace to a vehicle facilitating different electioneering practices as a 
supplement to, and overcoming barriers in, traditional election campaigning (Foot 
& Schneider, 2006; Gibson et al., 2014; Lilleker et al., 2011). Also note that the 
development of e-campaigning has entered a new phase since the late 2000s with 
the advent of social media, such as YouTube (Ceron & d'Adda, 2015; Gibson, 2012; 
Lilleker & Jackson, 2013; Macnamara & Kenning, 2014; Vergeer & Hermans, 2013). 
It is clear that e-campaigning in practice has been undergoing a maturing process 
– from narrowly focusing on a single ICT and electioneering practice to seamlessly 
integrating a myriad of technologies and practices. This is largely expected from 
an IS perspective. On the basis of his empirical observations, Nolan (1979) 
identifies that IT utilisation within an organisation generally experiences a 
process of growth – from being isolated and ad hoc towards becoming 
organisation-wide, cross-functional, and highly standardised and integrated. 
Nevertheless, e-campaigning utilisation across democracies is markedly uneven. 
Most instances of advanced, creative e-campaigning utilisation are situated in the 
US (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). Other democracies, including developed 
democracies – such as the UK, are found to be trailing far behind their US 
counterpart in e-campaigning utilisation (e.g., Anstead & Chadwick, 2009; 
Bentivegna, 2008; Gibson & McAllister, 2008). Accordingly, e-campaigning in the 
US is considered to be the exception rather than the rule (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). 
It is also found that uneven e-campaigning utilisation occurs within the same 
election (e.g., Small, 2008). Furthermore, scholars observe that the full potential 
of e-campaigning is largely unfulfilled in practice (Gibson & McAllister, 2008; 
Larsson, 2013). This is echoed by practitioners. For instance, Joe Trippi, a well-
known US campaign consultant, claims that ‘the 2008 US presidential election is 
the first real [emphasis added] Internet campaign … [because] there are all these 
amazing ways for people [voters] to connect with a campaign, to follow it, or create 
their own mini-campaigns, things that didn’t exist or barely existed [emphasis 
added] last time.’ (as cited in Cone, 2007, para. 1) However, Trippi further asserts 
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that despite Obama’s remarkable e-campaign, in general, the practice of e-
campaigning is still far from its pinnacle. 
2.2.2 E-campaigning in the literature 
Shortly after the inception of e-campaigning, scholarly research dedicated to the 
phenomenon began. Three major streams can be identified in present e-
campaigning research. They pertain to assessing the consequences of e-
campaigning, exploring the utilisation of e-campaigning, and explaining the 
utilisation of e-campaigning. Those streams focus on different aspects of e-
campaigning but are interconnected. Also note that e-campaigning research is 
almost solely conducted by political scientists. 
The first wave of e-campaigning research chiefly focuses on assessing as well as 
debating the consequences of e-campaigning or e-democracy in various aspects, 
notably, political parties or candidates themselves, democratic structures and 
processes, and civil society at large (e.g., Bimber, 1998, 2001; Gibson & Rommele, 
2005; Norris, 2001; Sunstein, 2002). Two distinctive types of claim, optimistic and 
sceptical, are generated as a result. 
Optimistic claims hold that the utilisation of ICTs in democratic activities, such as 
election campaigning, can yield positive impacts. And such impacts can be 
reflected on two levels: organisational and societal. For instance, at the 
organisational level, ICTs are regarded as a catalyst for the evolution of election 
campaigning. The technologies will provide political parties and candidates with 
a new platform to reach more or new voters, renew the interaction and 
engagement with voters, mobilise voter support and, for small parties and 
candidates in particular, increase exposure (Bimber, 1998; Gibson et al., 2004; 
Gibson & Ward, 2000a). At the societal level, it is believed that e-campaigning is 
able to strengthen civic engagement and improve voters’ decision-making process, 
resulting in empowered and more informed voters (Bimber, 2001; Owen, 2006). 
Sceptical claims, on the other hand, argue that utilising ICTs in democratic 
activities will lead to potentially chaotic political and social environments, 
reinforce the current political structures and practices, or create a digital divide 
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within society. More specifically, the Internet environment is highly unregulated, 
any person is able to circulate rumours and conduct smear campaigns, thereby 
leading to potentially chaotic political and social environments (Sunstein, 2002, 
2007). Also, e-campaigning increasingly requires a considerable amount of scarce 
resources, small parties or candidates are inevitably disadvantaged compared to 
their large counterparts. As a result, the current political structures and practices, 
and the divide concerning resources between small and large parties or 
candidates will be reinforced; in other words, ‘politics as usual’ (Greer & LaPointe, 
2004; Margolis et al., 2003). Besides, e-campaigning requires voters to have access 
to technologies, such as the Internet or mobile phones. This means that those 
without access to the required technologies will be neglected. Consequently, a 
divide between those with access to ICTs and those without will be created and 
likely deepen as e-campaigning becomes more prominent (Norris, 2001; van Dijk, 
2009). Further, compared to the technologies in traditional democratic activities, 
such as radio or television, new ICTs, particularly the Internet and mobile phones, 
provide people with greater power of information personalisation; in other words, 
retrieving information that is only in consensus with one’s own ideology and 
establishing relationships only with the like-minded. This therefore will mainly 
result in preaching to the converted (Norris, 2003; Norris & Curtice, 2006) and 
group polarisation in cyberspace (Sunstein, 2002, 2007) respectively. 
Amid the assessment and debates of the consequences of e-campaigning or e-
democracy, Norris (2002, p. 143) contends that e-campaigning or election 
campaigning in general is not to blame for ‘more deep-rooted ills of the body 
politic’. Also, it is increasingly pointed out that the consequences of e-campaigning 
are highly complex, contextual, and often not immediately observable, it is 
therefore rather simplistic to assess or debate them primarily based on 
speculation with limited empirical evidence (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002; Gibson, 
Nixon, et al., 2003; Gibson et al., 2004; Gibson & Ward, 2012; Schmitt-Beck, 2004). 
It is further suggested that the potential impacts of e-campaigning are contingent 
on how it is utilised (Smith, 1998). Another stream of e-campaigning research has 
since commenced while assessing and debating the consequences of e-
campaigning continues in the literature (e.g., Gibson & McAllister, 2014; Gibson & 
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Rommele, 2005). This research stream pertains to exploring, analysing, and 
comparing e-campaigning utilisation within an election or across democracies 
(e.g., Anstead & Chadwick, 2009; Bentivegna, 2008; Bimber, 2014; Gibson, 
Margolis, et al., 2003; Kluver, Jankowski, Foot, & Schneider, 2007). It is currently 
prominent in the literature. Seven characteristics are noteworthy. First, national 
or federal is the most common level of elections being studied (e.g., Bimber, 2014; 
Boas, 2008; Dezelan et al., 2014; Gibson & Cantijoch, 2011; Gibson & McAllister, 
2008; Macnamara & Kenning, 2014; Small et al., 2008; Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008). 
Second, most studies are based on a single election (e.g., Dezelan et al., 2014; 
Vergeer & Hermans, 2013; Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008). Third, almost all studies 
focus on e-campaigning conducted by political parties or candidates as opposed to 
citizens (e.g., Gibson & McAllister, 2008; Hooghe & Vissers, 2008; Macnamara & 
Kenning, 2014; Small et al., 2008; Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008). Fourth, the narrow 
and geographical concentration is apparent; more specifically, many studies 
exploring e-campaigning utilisation are situated in the US and Europe (Ward, 
Owen, et al., 2008). Fifth, political parties’ or candidates’ official campaign 
websites are the primary empirical object of investigation (Dougherty & Foot, 
2007; Gibson & Ward, 2000b; Lilleker & Vedel, 2013). Sixth, both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches are employed (Gibson & Rommele, 2005; Lilleker & Vedel, 
2013), Gibson and Rommele favour a qualitative approach in particular. And last, 
web content analysis is the main method of data analysis (Dougherty & Foot, 2007; 
Lilleker & Vedel, 2013). 
It is noted that knowledge relating to political parties’ or candidates’ e-
campaigning utilisation is limited, despite a strong focus on this area in the 
literature at present. Three main factors are considered to be attributable (Ward, 
Owen, et al., 2008): first, the quickening pace of technological advancement; 
second, ‘political parties, interest groups, and of course citizens are still learning, 
experimenting and innovating;’ (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008, p. x) and third, the 
narrow and geographical concentration in many e-campaigning studies. It can also 
be contended that restricted access to the e-campaigning phenomenon forms 
another salient factor. More specifically, e-campaigning is contingent on elections. 
They occur only periodically with a considerably wide interval in between. For 
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instance, US presidential elections occur every four years and in the UK, the 
interval between general elections is set at five years. 
From observing and comparing political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning 
utilisation within elections or across democracies, it is found that e-campaigning 
utilisation varies markedly despite the underlying technologies and applications 
being largely similar (e.g., Gibson, Margolis, et al., 2003; Jankowski et al., 2005; 
Small, 2008; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). Further, the potential of e-campaigning 
technologies and applications has not been fully exploited (Gibson & McAllister, 
2008; Larsson, 2013). These have collectively prompted a new research stream 
that pertains to explaining political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning 
utilisation by identifying factors that influence e-campaigning utilisation (e.g., 
Anstead & Chadwick, 2009; Metag & Marcinkowski, 2012; Tkach-Kawasaki, 2007; 
Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). This research steam is still in its infancy and primarily 
theoretically-based only. 
In short, e-campaigning research is evolutionary. It presently comprises three 
different yet interrelated research streams. Each of them consists of knowledge 
gaps. Two streams are reflected in this study: one pertains to exploring the 
utilisation of e-campaigning and the other explaining e-campaigning utilisation. 
2.3 Theorising e-campaigning utilisation 
2.3.1 How e-campaigning is theorised in the literature 
E-campaigning first emerged as merely an information kiosk in cyberspace (Owen 
& Davis, 2008). As political parties and candidates continuously engage in e-
campaigning, it has become increasingly professionalised and sophisticated 
(Gibson, 2012; Vergeer, 2012; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). Because each campaign 
is unique and discrete, technology is constantly evolving, and political parties and 
candidates are continuously learning, experimenting, and innovating (Ward, 
Owen, et al., 2008), the changing landscape of e-campaigning is therefore 
comparable to the aphorism that one can never step into the same river twice. 
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The rapidly changing landscape of e-campaigning has also increased the 
complexity of understanding, describing, and comparing political parties’ or 
candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation in academic research (Schneider & Foot, 
2004). In response, scholars commonly deploy frameworks to assist their 
empirical research, which also represent their theorisations of e-campaigning 
utilisation (Dougherty & Foot, 2007; Foot & Schneider, 2006; Lilleker & Vedel, 
2013). An example of an e-campaigning framework is provided in Appendix 1. 
In general, those e-campaigning frameworks are theorised with a practice-based 
approach that transforms a series of practices observed in a social phenomenon 
into contemporary theory (Foot & Schneider, 2006). In other words, practice-
based theorisations are empirically grounded and extensible. 
Theorising e-campaigning utilisation with a practice-based approach entails two 
sequential steps: identification and subsumption (Foot & Schneider, 2006; Lilleker 
& Vedel, 2013). More specifically, scholars first identify various observable 
content elements that are ICT-embedded from parties’ or candidates’ campaign 
websites. These content elements are then subsumed under different abstract 
categories, referred to as campaign practices or campaign activities. Put differently, 
in the context of e-campaigning, political parties’ or candidates’ electioneering 
practices are operationalised in a series of content elements on the parties’ or 
candidates’ campaign websites. Such elements serve as direct observables of 
parties’ or candidates’ electioneering practices. Accordingly, e-campaigning 
utilisation consists of at least one campaign practice and each practice entails at 
least one content element. 
2.3.2 Issues with existing theoretical frameworks in the 
literature 
Although scholarly research on political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning 
utilisation is still relatively young, there are already multiple differing e-
campaigning frameworks in the literature (e.g., Hooghe & Vissers, 2008; Lilleker 
& Jackson, 2007; Schweitzer, 2008a). Three main issues can be identified from 
them, concerning a lack of academic rigour, the orientation of campaign practices, 
and variation in the coverage of campaign practices. 
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A lack of academic rigour. A scientific theory relating to an observable 
phenomenon – be it derived from another theory, a confirmed hypothesis, or an 
empirical observation – must include constructs within the phenomenon and the 
relationship between the constructs, so that the theory can be falsifiable or 
enables understanding about the phenomenon (Dubin, 1978; Gregor, 2006; van 
Fraassen, 1980). Under this principle, to theorise e-campaigning utilisation, not 
only should the key constructs but also the relationship between the constructs be 
articulated. Most existing e-campaigning frameworks have clearly stated the key 
constructs involved, namely, content elements, campaign practices, and election 
campaigning. Those frameworks also establish the relationship between content 
elements and campaign practices. However, hardly any frameworks in the 
literature articulate the relationship between campaign practices and election 
campaigning (e.g., Gibson & McAllister, 2008; Lilleker & Jackson, 2007; Owen & 
Davis, 2008; Schweitzer, 2008a; The Bivings Group, 2006); in other words, it is 
unclear what rational purpose that a campaign practice within those frameworks 
serves in relation to election campaigning. The absent relationship between 
campaign practices and campaigning is a major weakness in existing theorisations 
of e-campaigning utilisation. 
The orientation of campaign practices. The campaign practices within some e-
campaigning frameworks are mainly orientated by the latest available 
technologies or applications, such as RSS (really simple syndication) feeds, 
interactive opinion polls, and podcasts (e.g., Lilleker & Jackson, 2007; The Bivings 
Group, 2006). The campaign practices in other frameworks are orientated by 
wider campaign practices such as resource generation (e.g., Hooghe & Vissers, 
2008; Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008). These contrasting orientations of campaign 
practices in essence reflect opposite views relating to technological determinism; 
that is, it is technology that dictates e-campaigning utilisation or it is wider 
campaign practices that shape e-campaigning utilisation. However, there is little 
discussion or debate in relation to that in the literature (Karlsen, 2010). 
Variation in the coverage of campaign practices. Some e-campaigning studies 
focus on very limited campaign practices (e.g., Dader, 2008; D. T. Hill, 2008), 
whereas others cover a wide array of practices (e.g., Gibson & McAllister, 2008; 
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Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008). A possible explanation for this variation is that most 
frameworks are constructed on the basis of a single election. Since the nature of e-
campaigning is evolutionary and contextual, it is likely that changes will happen 
to e-campaigning utilisation within a specific institutional context as well as across 
time. Further, studies situated in countries where ICT adoption and utilisation is 
relatively advanced tend to exhibit broader coverage of campaign practices (e.g., 
Gibson & McAllister, 2008; Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008), compared to studies in 
countries with low levels of ICT adoption and utilisation (e.g., Dader, 2008; D. T. 
Hill, 2008). Generally, with the focus on a single election, many e-campaigning 
studies have limited themselves to ICT-enabled practices in that particular 
campaign. 
Put succinctly, as political parties’ and candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation 
becomes increasingly sophisticated, an e-campaigning framework is essential to 
empirically explore and acquire knowledge of the phenomenon. Existing e-
campaigning frameworks in general exhibit three main issues, namely, a lack of 
academic rigour, the orientation of campaign practices, and variation in the 
coverage of campaign practices. These issues undermine research and knowledge 
relating to parties’ and candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation. 
2.3.3 Towards a new theoretical framework 
This study proposes a new theoretical framework for better exploring and 
understanding e-campaigning utilisation, given the three issues with existing 
frameworks. The proposed framework is based on an extensive literature review 
and follows the basic principle underpinning most frameworks in the literature, 
namely the inclusion of two interrelated components: campaign practices and 
their associated content elements. The following first states how the three issues 
with existing e-campaigning frameworks are tackled by the proposed framework. 
A lack of academic rigour. It is noted that the relationship between campaign 
practices and the purposes of election campaigning has not been articulated in 
existing studies. The relationship between each campaign practice in the proposed 
framework and election campaigning is explored and established based on e-
 18 
campaigning or political science literature. This strengthens the rigour of the 
proposed framework. 
The orientation of campaign practices. With the proliferation of new ICTs for 
organisations to adopt and utilise, some IS scholars warn that it is paramount for 
organisations to beware of technocratic utopianism, and, instead, to practice 
technological realism. More specifically, organisations should not be dictated by 
emerging technologies as technologies per se rarely yield miracles or a sustainable 
competitive edge; rather, organisations should hold a realistic view and focus on 
organisational practices and goals (Carr, 2003; Davenport, Eccles, & Prusak, 1992). 
This study argues that technological realism should also be fostered in academic 
research in ICT-related phenomena. Thus, this study posits that it is the wider 
campaign practices, rather than the latest available ICTs or applications, that 
shape e-campaigning utilisation. This view is consistent with some political 
scientists’ (e.g., Lofgren & Smith, 2003; Vaccari, 2010). To that end, the campaign 
practices in the proposed framework are related to wider election campaign 
practices. It is worth noting that this does not diminish the role and involvement 
of technologies and applications in e-campaigning but acknowledges their 
enabling role. 
Variation in the coverage of campaign practices. The campaign practices and 
their associated content elements in the proposed framework are drawn from 
existing e-campaigning studies situated in different elections and democracies. 
This consequently provides the widest possible range of campaign practices, their 
associated content elements, and a solid empirical base for the proposed 
framework. 
In light of this study’s response to the three issues with existing e-campaigning 
frameworks, five campaign practices are included in the proposed framework, 
based on existing e-campaigning studies. They are information dissemination (e.g., 
Bentivegna, 2008; Boas, 2008; Foot & Schneider, 2006; Foot, Schneider, Kluver, 
Xenos, & Jankowski, 2007; Gibson & McAllister, 2008; Hooghe & Vissers, 2008; 
Lilleker et al., 2011; Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008), voter interaction and engagement 
(e.g., Aquilia, 2007; Bentivegna, 2008; Foot & Schneider, 2006; Foot et al., 2007; 
 19 
Gibson & McAllister, 2008; Hooghe & Vissers, 2008; Lilleker et al., 2011; Ward, 
Gibson, et al., 2008), support mobilisation (e.g., Bentivegna, 2008; Boas, 2008; Foot 
& Schneider, 2006; Foot et al., 2007; Lilleker et al., 2011; Owen & Davis, 2008), 
targeted campaigning (e.g., Ceron & d'Adda, 2015; Druckman, Kifer, & Parkin, 
2010; Gibson & Ward, 2000b; Gibson et al., 2002; S. Hill, 2009; Karlsen, 2009; 
Voerman & Boogers, 2008; Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008), and resource generation 
(e.g., Anstead, 2008; Bimber, 2014; Gibson, 2012; Gibson & Ward, 2000b; Hooghe 
& Vissers, 2008; Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008). The remainder discusses each 
campaign practice in depth, concerning its relationship with election campaigning 
and its operationalisation. The proposed framework is presented following that. 
2.3.3.1 Information dissemination 
Disseminating campaign information is considered to be the most long-standing, 
fundamental campaign practice (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002; Foot & Schneider, 
2006; Lilleker et al., 2011). Ultimately, election campaigning aims to influence 
voters’ decision-making process and, with that, tries to maximise votes. Campaign 
information plays a critical role. As Zaller (as cited in Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002, 
p. 183) explains, ‘every opinion is a marriage of information and predisposition: 
information to form a mental picture of the given issue, and predisposition to 
motivate some conclusion about it’. This is confirmed by empirical research, which 
suggests that voting behaviour is strongly affected by the awareness and 
knowledge of political parties or candidates, and, more importantly, their causes. 
Such awareness and knowledge is formed by the availability and quality of 
information about political parties or candidates from sources such as election 
campaigns (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002; Hoff, 2012; Schmitt-Beck, 2004). Thus, 
in order to shape voters’ awareness, opinions, knowledge, and, most importantly, 
decisions, campaign teams benefit from producing, disseminating, and reinforcing 
campaign information in a timely fashion (Bimber, 2001; Hoff, 2012; Holbrook, 
2002; Schmitt-Beck, 2004). 
McAllister’s (2002) research on voting decision and behaviour during national 
elections in the US, Australia, and the UK between the late 1940s and 2000 points 
out that the number of swing voters increased, especially in Australia and the UK. 
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Swing voters are the ones whom most parties and candidates endeavour to woo 
throughout an election period, and they are most responsive to campaign 
information (Lachat & Sciarini, 2002). Lachat and Sciarini further suggest that 
although some voters have formed their voting decisions before the campaign 
period, their decisions are still subject to change as a result of increased campaign 
information. 
Voters’ active political participation is crucial to election campaigning and 
campaign information serves as a vital stimulus (Bimber, 2001; Ward, Owen, et al., 
2008). In other words, the greater amount of campaign information being 
disseminated, the more stimulated voters could become to get involved in 
different campaign activities. 
Generally, information dissemination is undertaken through a one-way, top-down 
approach – from political parties or candidates to voters. That is, no feedback or 
information from voters is expected (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002). This 
important characteristic distinguishes information dissemination from another 
campaign practice, namely voter interaction and engagement. 
In traditional election campaigning, campaign information is mainly disseminated 
through political news or talk shows on television or radio; campaign 
advertisements on television, radio, or newspapers; direct mails; and 
interpersonal interactions with voters such as rallies, telephone, or door-to-door 
canvassing (Anstead & Chadwick, 2009; Denver & Hands, 2002; Norris, 2002). 
However, those traditional means of information dissemination present various 
obstacles or issues to political parties or candidates. Notably, they not only 
consume a substantial amount of campaign resources but also constrain parties’ 
or candidates’ control over what campaign information is disseminated, as well as 
when and how (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). 
It is believed that ICTs are able to alleviate those typical obstacles associated with 
information dissemination in traditional campaigning. More specifically, it is held 
that ICTs provide a relatively cost-effective platform or channel for parties and 
candidates to disseminate information; more importantly, ICTs provide parties or 
candidates with greater autonomy to determine what campaign information is 
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disseminated, as well as when and how (Foot & Schneider, 2006; Gibson & Ward, 
2000a, 2000b; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). 
Content elements associated with information dissemination. The following 
content elements are commonly associated with information dissemination: 
political party’s information; candidate biography; press releases; policy 
statements; campaign news; campaign events; speeches; contact information; and 
information relating to the political party’s other online presence, if any (e.g., Foot 
& Schneider, 2006; Foot et al., 2007; Gibson & McAllister, 2008; Gibson & Ward, 
2000b; Hooghe & Vissers, 2008; Schweitzer, 2011; Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008). 
Generally, the practice of information dissemination is considered to be highly 
standardised due to its long existence (Lilleker et al., 2011). However, 
technological advancement enables parties and candidates to innovate the 
dissemination of campaign information in order to generate and sustain voters’ 
interest (Lilleker et al., 2011). Two instances are noteworthy, the first pertains to 
campaign blogs and the other the use of Internet multimedia technology. 
Originating from web blogs, campaign blogs are online journal entries posted by 
political parties or candidates to communicate with voters (Graf, 2008; Karpf, 
2008; Maguire, 2008). In contrast to campaign information disseminated in 
campaign websites, information disseminated through campaign blogs is succinct 
and focused, which typically pertains to political views and issues, and campaign 
news and events (Graf, 2008). It is worth noting that campaign blogs can be static 
or interactive, depending on the authors’ intention (Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008). 
That is, if a campaign blog is utilised for the sole purpose of providing static 
information, it is considered to be an element of information dissemination; if a 
campaign blog is utilised for generating feedback from voters in addition to 
information dissemination, it is accordingly considered to be an element of voter 
interaction and engagement. 
It is found that most parties’ and candidates’ campaign blogs are static as opposed 
to interactive, owing to their concern over attracting undesired feedback, such as 
attacking comments from their political rivals and supporters of their rivals (Ward, 
Gibson, et al., 2008). Also, campaign blogs are often text-based (Ward, Owen, et al., 
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2008). An alternative to text-based blogs is video blogs, which disseminate the 
same type of campaign information in a different form – video as opposed to text 
(Anstead & Chadwick, 2009). 
Since the increasing penetration of broadband Internet from the early 2000s, 
information dissemination in e-campaigning has started to move beyond the text-
based format. More specifically, campaign teams utilise Internet multimedia 
technology to disseminate campaign information in order to enhance the 
sophistication of this campaign practice (Hooghe & Vissers, 2008; Schweitzer, 
2008a); for instance, images are used for depicting campaign events, audio or 
video for campaign speeches, or campaign advertisements on television or radio. 
2.3.3.2 Voter interaction and engagement 
This practice is also referred to as involving by Foot and Schneider (2006). Its 
underpinning rationale is twofold: interacting with voters for campaign feedback, 
and engaging voters for building trust and relationships. 
It is argued that voters’ constant feedback on an election campaign is critical, as it 
forms a basis on which the campaign team evaluates the campaign effects on 
voters. Feedback also provides the campaign team with an opportunity to take 
necessary actions to enhance or rectify its campaign practices in a timely manner 
(Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002). 
It is also suggested that voters, especially swing voters, are more likely to cast their 
votes for a political party or candidate whom they trust or feel more closely 
connected with (Norris, 2001). Often, trust and connectedness are developed as a 
result of continuous efforts by a political party or candidate to interact and engage 
with voters (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002; Foot & Schneider, 2006). 
In traditional election campaigning, voter interaction and engagement is often 
conducted in town hall meetings, dinner meetings, and talk shows or debates on 
television or radio (Norris, 2002). This means that it is common for political 
parties and candidates to travel extensively in order to interact and engage with 
voters. There are two main challenges associated with voter interaction and 
engagement in traditional campaigning. First, it is found that citizens’ engagement 
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with political affairs in general has been continuously decreasing since the 1960s 
(Denver & Hands, 2002; Norris, 2002). Second, traditional voter interaction and 
engagement is constrained by parties’ or candidates’ campaign resources, 
geographical and time boundaries, and the number of voters to interact with in 
each engagement (Denver & Hands, 2002; Norris, 2002). 
It is argued that ICTs enable political parties and candidates to interact and engage 
with a wider group of voters, particularly those who are disengaged with 
technologies utilised in traditional voter interaction and engagement, namely 
television and radio (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). It is also suggested that ICTs enable 
parties and candidates to establish a new form of interaction and engagement with 
voters that erodes the barriers in physical interaction (Gibson, Nixon, et al., 2003). 
Content elements associated with voter interaction and engagement. Offline 
interaction and engagement can be classified into two forms: synchronous and 
asynchronous (Gallaugher & Ransbotham, 2010). The former refers to real-time 
interaction, such as face-to-face interaction, and the latter denotes delayed 
interaction, such as postal mail. Both forms of interaction and engagement can be 
simulated in e-campaigning (Schweitzer, 2011). 
Synchronous voter interaction and engagement can be observed in instant chat or 
messaging; instant opinion polls; instant surveys; applications for interacting with 
election policies; and an interactive calendar of campaign events (e.g., Gibson & 
McAllister, 2008; Hooghe & Vissers, 2008; Lilleker et al., 2011; Schweitzer, 2008a, 
2011; Small et al., 2008; Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008). Asynchronous voter 
interaction and engagement, on the other hand, can be observed in means to 
contact the political party, such as email; discussion forums; interactive campaign 
blogs – blogs that enable voters to post feedback or comments; and means for 
voters to provide feedback (e.g., Gibson & McAllister, 2008; Hooghe & Vissers, 
2008; Lilleker et al., 2011; Schweitzer, 2008a, 2011; Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008). 
It is found that political parties’ or candidates’ online interaction and engagement 
in e-campaigning in general is highly cautious and conservative (Ward, Owen, et 
al., 2008). It is also noted that although social media, such as YouTube, increasingly 
features in parties’ and candidates’ e-campaigns, its interactive nature is barely 
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exploited (Gibson & Cantijoch, 2011; Karlsson, Clerwall, & Buskqvist, 2013). As 
Ward, Owen, et al. (2008, p. 260) put it, ‘Overall, interactivity is less common than 
we would have thought given the features of the Internet.’ This is due to many 
parties’ and candidates’ concern over opening a ‘Pandora’s box’, unleashing 
unexpected and undesired consequences, such as attacks from their opponents, 
that could dictate or derail their campaign agendas (Coleman, 2001; Ward, Gibson, 
et al., 2008). Ward, Owen, et al. (2008, p. 260) further comment that 
Admittedly, two-way communication is natural to the medium [the 
Internet]. Indeed, the original uses of the Internet were to facilitate 
multidirectional communication among the researchers and/or the U.S. 
military. But such an expectation is not natural in a viable electoral 
campaign. It is as if one expected a candidate giving a speech to repeatedly 
give part of their allotted time to the opposition or someone in the crowd 
who wants to have their say as well. 
Furthermore, Boas (2008) asserts that when a party’s or candidate’s online 
interaction and engagement with voters is carefully framed and managed so that 
it is closely aligned with the party’s or candidate’s own political ideology and 
causes, such interaction and engagement lacks genuine openness and is in fact 
propaganda in disguise. 
2.3.3.3 Support mobilisation 
It is held that political parties’ or candidates’ efforts to maximise their votes or 
seats are reliant on voters’ support (Foot & Schneider, 2006; Gibson et al., 2004; 
Norris, 2002). Such support is reflected in different forms, such as organising and 
participating in campaign events – political rallies for instance, and, most 
importantly, casting their votes for the parties or candidates on election day. Thus, 
it is vital for parties or candidates to identify potential supporters, particularly 
those who are disengaged from traditional campaigning, and translate support 
sentiment from them and the existing faithful into tangible support actions 
(Gibson et al., 2004; Norris, 2002; Owen & Davis, 2008). 
It is indicated that support mobilisation is increasingly challenging for political 
parties and candidates because voters have become increasingly passive since 
television became the main election campaign technology, they also spend less 
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time participating in events supporting their parties or candidates (Owen & Davis, 
2008). 
Another rising challenge in support mobilisation pertains to political 
disengagement of young voters (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). Those voters represent 
the fastest growing population. They are the least likely to vote on election day 
and also account for the largest segment of voters who are least interested in 
conventional politics. 
In traditional campaigning, political parties’ or candidates’ support mobilisation 
typically focuses on supporters who have already been identified by the parties or 
candidates and ensuring that those supporters have voted on election day (Denver 
& Hands, 2002). For instance, on election day, campaign team members spread 
across voting stations to record and track whether the identified supporters have 
voted; those who have not yet voted would be sought after and are often offered a 
lift to a voting station nearby. This, however, is resource-intensive and focuses 
solely on existing loyalists, leading to the situation of mobilising the mobilised 
(Denver & Hands, 2002). 
It is suggested that ICTs enable political parties and candidates to alleviate those 
challenges in support mobilisation in different ways (Foot & Schneider, 2006; 
Gibson, 2012; Gibson et al., 2004; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). For instance, with an 
increasing number of people, especially youth, connected to the Internet across 
the globe, it is anticipated that e-campaigning enables political parties and 
candidates to identify and seek new supporters, particularly those who are 
disengaged from conventional politics (Hoff, 2011; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). 
Loader’s (2007) assertion concerning youth and political participation is 
noteworthy. According to him, there is a misconception widely held in both 
academia and practice that young citizens are politically disengaged or disaffected. 
They are in fact passionate about political affairs. The primary reason for their 
apparent political disengagement lies within political parties’ or politicians’ lack 
of understanding and empathy relating to the new, different medium used by most 
young citizens, namely the Internet. Loader refers to that as cultural displacement. 
It is also suggested that the networking capabilities of the Internet enable parties 
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and candidates to build online communities, eradicating time and geographical 
constraints, in order to organise, collaborate, and expand both online and offline 
supporting activities (Gibson, 2012; Gibson et al., 2004). As Owen and Davis (2008, 
p. 98) put it, ‘the Internet has provided a means for the supporters to play more 
than a spectator role in the campaign.’ 
Content elements associated with support mobilisation. In e-campaigning, 
support mobilisation is generally observable in the following content elements: 
means for voters to invite their peers to participate in campaign events; means to 
inform voters of electoral information; means for voters to receive campaign 
information and updates; means for voters to connect with supporter groups; 
means for voters to download campaign material; and means for voters to forward 
campaign material to others (e.g., Bimber, 2014; Foot & Schneider, 2006; Foot et 
al., 2007; Gibson & McAllister, 2008; Owen & Davis, 2008; Schweitzer, 2011; Ward, 
Gibson, et al., 2008). 
There are two instances of support mobilisation in e-campaigning that attract 
scholars’ attention. They pertain to Howard Dean’s and Obama’s e-campaigning. 
Before Obama, Dean, a candidate in the 2004 US Democratic primaries, was 
considered as a pioneer in e-campaigning chiefly because of his innovative 
support mobilisation at the time, referred to as ‘the Dean phenomenon’ in the 
literature (Bimber, 2014; Gibson, 2012; Gibson & Rommele, 2005; Graf, 2008). 
Dean was not one of the early adopters of e-campaigning in the election, his e-
campaigning came much later than his rivals’. In the early phase of the election, 
Dean was not as widely known as his other competitors and consequently, he was 
sidelined by the mainstream media. This put Dean in an unfavourable situation. In 
order to catch up in the race, Dean and his campaign team tapped into the Internet 
and its related applications to solicit and mobilise support. Instead of merely 
providing a link to receive campaign news on his website and waiting for site 
visitors to sign up, Dean actively used the Internet to reach out to grass-roots 
citizens and political activists. More specifically, two main websites were used in 
order for Dean to achieve that goal. Dean first utilised his official campaign blog, 
‘Howard Dean 2004 Call to Action Weblog’, to engage the attention of voters by 
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disseminating his views on different issues particularly concerning American 
voters, such as war against Iraq. Once his blog had started to gain sufficient public 
interest and support, Dean encouraged his supporters to register on a web page 
of his campaign site called ‘Meetup’, which served the purposes of a centralised 
community for fragmented supporter groups as well as organising and 
implementing offline support events – such as a series of rallies that captured 
significant attention from both the mass media and political scientists. As a result 
of his innovative utilisation of ICTs to mobilise support, Dean rose from a 
candidate who was marginalised by traditional media and barely known to the US 
public to a candidate who was frequently mentioned in the US mainstream media 
and academic literature (Bimber, 2014; Gibson, 2012; Gibson & Rommele, 2005; 
Graf, 2008). 
A main feature of Obama’s widely-publicised e-campaigning in the 2008 US 
presidential election pertains to support mobilisation (Bimber, 2014; Gibson, 
2012; S. Hill, 2009). At the early stage of his campaign, knowing that most young 
American voters frequently visited social networking sites such as Myspace, 
YouTube, and Facebook, Obama established his presence across those websites 
and focused on issues of particular interest to young American voters. Moreover, 
Obama made a music video together with ‘The Black Eyed Peas’, a popular music 
group in the US. The video contained Obama’s campaign message and was 
published on YouTube to attract youth support (S. Hill, 2009). Obama mobilised 
support among voters in other age groups by using the networking capabilities of 
the Internet to build a large virtual community of supporters. Members of this 
community were encouraged to organise both online and offline campaign events, 
and recruit new members. Furthermore, Obama used both the Internet and SMS 
(short message service) to remind his supporters, together with their friends and 
family members, to vote for him on election day. For instance, on the day of the 
election, voters who had signed up for Obama’s SMS alerts received at least three 
text messages urging them to cast their vote for Obama (S. Hill, 2009). 
Nevertheless, Gibson (2012) indicates that ICT-mediated support mobilisation in 
general produces mixed results. According to her, some studies claim that there is 
a strong association between e-campaigning and a higher vote share while others 
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hardly discern any mobilisation effects induced by e-campaigning. Overall, says 
Gibson, political scientists remain sceptical. 
2.3.3.4 Targeted campaigning 
This campaign practice consists of two distinctive forms. The first refers to 
political parties’ or candidates’ election campaigns targeted at their rivals. It can 
be the rivals in general or their specific views or policies. It is argued that in order 
to sway voters’ opinions and decisions, a political party or candidate can consider 
an alternative practice to information dissemination, which aims at attacking or 
criticising political opponents’ personality traits or election policies (Ceron & 
d'Adda, 2015; Fridkin & Kenney, 2012; Walter, 2014). Due to its nature, this form 
of targeted campaigning is also referred to as negative campaigning. Walter (2014, 
p. 45) suggests that ‘Negative campaigning as a campaign practice fits better with 
an offensive campaign than a defensive campaign. The first is aimed at volatile 
voters and the opponent’s adherents and the latter at mobilising a party’s own 
adherents.’ It is also indicated that negative campaigning ‘may be responsible for 
depressing voter turnout’ (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002, p. 18). 
The other form of targeted campaigning pertains to election campaigning targeted 
at specific voter segments, also referred to as narrowcasting (Voerman & Boogers, 
2008; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). It is suggested that the needs and wants across 
the voter population markedly differ. Thus, an effective campaign depends on not 
only increasing information, but also, more importantly, disseminating the right 
information to the right addresses (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). In contrast to 
information dissemination that focuses on mass communication and assumes 
voters in general are more or less homogeneous, this form of targeted 
campaigning emphasises the heterogeneity of the voting public, in other words, 
tailored campaign information based on the unique characteristics of each voter 
segment. 
It is suggested that ICTs are able to not only facilitate but also enhance the practice 
of negative campaigning due to the increased speed of communication (Gibson & 
Ward, 2000b). For narrowcasting, it is indicated that ICTs and related applications 
enable political parties and candidates to gather and analyse data on voters in 
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order to segment voters and personalise campaign information for each voter 
segment based on its unique characteristics (Gibson & Ward, 2000b; Ward, Owen, 
et al., 2008). 
Content elements associated with targeted campaigning. Negative 
campaigning is observable in the following elements: campaign content targeted 
at political opponents and campaign content targeted at political opponents’ 
policies (e.g., Ceron & d'Adda, 2015; Druckman et al., 2010; Gibson & Ward, 2000b; 
Hooghe & Vissers, 2008; Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008). Narrowcasting is observable 
in campaign content targeted at specific voter segments (e.g., Bimber, 2014; 
Hooghe & Vissers, 2008; Voerman & Boogers, 2008; Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008). 
A notable example of ICT-enabled negative campaigning pertains to the 2008 US 
presidential race between the Republican candidate John McCain and the 
Democrat candidate Obama (Stirland, 2008). During the campaign period, in order 
to convince American voters that Obama’s credibility was questionable, McCain’s 
campaign team utilised an automated online tracking service called ‘Versionista’ 
to crawl Obama’s campaign website and track precise word changes, in some cases 
as frequently as every hour. 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the paragraphs highlighted in pink were the words deleted 
from Obama’s campaign site and those in green were the words inserted. These 
highlighted changes were used to demonstrate Obama’s changing stance relating 
to the Bush administration’s policy on the war in Iraq. For instance, on 11 July 
2008, the following statement could be found on Obama’s website: ‘at great cost, 
our troops have helped reduce violence in some areas of Iraq, but even those 
reductions do not get us below the unsustainable levels of violence of mid-2006.’ 
(Stirland, 2008, para. 11) Within three days, however, that statement was replaced 
by the following words: ‘Our troops have heroically helped reduce civilian 
casualties in Iraq to early 2006 levels. This is a testament to our military’s hard 
work, improved counterinsurgency tactics, and enormous sacrifice by our troops 
and military families.’ (Stirland, 2008, para. 12) These recorded changes formed 
an important factual basis on which McCain and his campaign team attacked 
Obama’s credibility. 
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Figure 2.1 McCain's e-campaign targeted at Obama (Stirland, 2008) 
Obama’s 2008 e-campaign targeted at different voter segments is a notable 
instance of ICT-enabled narrowcasting. More specifically, Obama’s campaign team 
made use of what it referred to as ‘online behaviour targeting’. When someone 
visited Obama’s official campaign website, a cookie, a small text file recording 
websites and web pages that the person visited, was stored on the person’s 
browser. The cookie recorded the websites that the person had subsequently 
visited, which informed Obama’s campaign team of the particular campaign 
message to display on the particular visitor’s return to Obama’s campaign website 
(S. Hill, 2009). 
2.3.3.5 Resource generation 
Often, election campaigning is strongly dependent on scarce resources (Anstead 
& Chadwick, 2009; Margolis et al., 2003; Small, 2008; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). 
Ever since election campaigning entered the era of modernism, characterised by 
television being the predominant technological platform for election campaigning, 
televised campaign advertising has become the norm in many democracies 
(Norris, 2002; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). This often consumes the largest share of 
political parties’ and candidates’ financial resources (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). In 
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addition to televised campaign advertising, parties and candidates need to finance 
other electioneering activities such as direct mailing, in-person engagement with 
voters, telephone and door-to-door canvassing (Simpson, 2013). Furthermore, 
human resources are in high demand in order to plan, organise, and conduct 
different campaign activities (Simpson, 2013). Given parties’ and candidates’ 
strong reliance on instant campaign resources, resource generation is an essential 
practice for them (Simpson, 2013; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). This campaign 
practice is not directly associated with influencing voting preferences or the 
election outcome, it, however, affects the overall sustainability and continuity of 
election campaigning. 
Traditionally, campaign resources are generated from recruiting party members 
and campaign volunteers as well as various forms of fundraising (Anstead & 
Chadwick, 2009; Gibson & Ward, 2000b). 
ICTs per se do not generate campaign resources for parties or candidates. The 
technologies, however, are able to reduce the transaction costs associated with the 
practice of resource generation, and provide parties and candidates with new 
channels and a broader reach of campaign resources (Anstead & Chadwick, 2009; 
Gibson & Ward, 2000b). It is also suggested that the widespread popularity of 
online financial transactions enables parties and candidates to solicit monetary 
donations online (Anstead & Chadwick, 2009; Gibson & Ward, 2000b). 
Content elements associated with resource generation. In e-campaigning, 
resource generation is commonly observable in the following elements: means to 
make donations; online merchandise shop; means to become a party member; and 
means to become a campaign volunteer (e.g., Foot et al., 2007; Gibson & Ward, 
2000b; Hooghe & Vissers, 2008; Schweitzer, 2011; Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008). 
A notable example of ICT-enabled resource generation pertains to John Edwards’ 
online fundraising as noted by Tumulty (2007). Edwards was a candidate in the 
2008 US Democratic primaries. In the election, Edwards’ campaign strategist and 
advisor, Trippi, made a video on YouTube to raise funds for the candidate. The 
video featured both Edwards and Trippi making Edwards’ favourite pecan pie. 
Viewers of the video were able to obtain the pie recipe with a minimum donation 
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of $6.10. The online video generated nearly $300,000 within a week and the cost 
of producing the pie was merely about $20. Trippi (as cited in Tumulty, 2007) 
points out that using the Internet creatively for fundraising is highly efficient 
compared to traditional fundraising, such as direct mailing. According to Trippi 
(as cited in Tumulty, 2007, para. 8), direct mailing for campaign donations ‘can 
easily run into hundreds or thousands of dollars once a campaign has paid for the 
cost of buying a mailing list, high-quality paper stock, personalised laser printing, 
and postage’. 
2.3.3.6 Summary 
The discussion relating to the new theorisation of e-campaigning utilisation is 
encapsulated in Table 2.1. It also represents the theoretical framework of e-
campaigning utilisation proposed in this study. The framework consists of five 
campaign practices, namely information dissemination, voter interaction and 
engagement, support mobilisation, targeted campaigning, and resource 
generation. Each campaign practice is observable in various content elements. The 
framework is based on existing e-campaigning studies. However, it addresses the 
three issues with existing e-campaigning frameworks. More specifically, the 
relationship between each campaign practice and election campaigning is 
articulated; all campaign practices in the framework are in accordance with wider 
campaign practices as opposed to the latest available technologies; and the 
coverage of campaign practices as well as content elements in the framework is 
based on multiple elections and countries. 
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Table 2.1 The proposed e-campaigning framework 
Campaign practice Content elements 
Information dissemination 
Political party's information 
Candidate biography 
Press releases 
Policy statements 
Campaign news 
Campaign events 
Speeches 
Contact information 
Information relating to the political party's other online presence 
Campaign blog without visitor comments allowed 
Voter interaction and 
engagement 
Instant chat or messaging 
Instant opinion polls 
Instant surveys 
Applications for interacting with the political party's policies 
Interactive calendar of campaign events 
Means to contact the political party 
Discussion forums 
Campaign blog with visitor comments allowed 
Means to provide feedback 
Support mobilisation 
Means for voters to invite their peers to participate in campaign 
events 
Means to inform voters of electoral information 
Means for voters to receive campaign information and updates 
Means for voters to connect with supporter groups 
Means for voters to download campaign material 
Means for voters to forward campaign material to others 
Targeted campaigning 
Content targeted at political opponents 
Content targeted at political opponents' policies 
Content targeted at specific voter segments 
Resource generation 
Means to make donations 
Online merchandise shop 
Means to become a party member 
Means to become a volunteer 
 
2.4 Factors influencing e-campaigning utilisation 
2.4.1 Prevalent factors in e-campaigning research 
As noted, it is found that political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation 
varies markedly within elections or across democracies, despite the underlying 
technologies and applications being largely similar (e.g., Anstead & Chadwick, 
2009; Margolis et al., 2003; Small, 2008; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). It is also found 
that the potential of e-campaigning has not been fully exploited (e.g., Bentivegna, 
2008; Gibson & Cantijoch, 2011; Gibson & McAllister, 2008; Karlsson et al., 2013). 
This has prompted a new wave of e-campaigning research that pertains to 
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explaining political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation by 
uncovering factors that influence e-campaigning utilisation. Four factors are 
commonly noted: election type, electoral regulations, voters’ technology access, and 
the availability of campaign resources. 
2.4.1.1 Election type 
Generally, two distinctive types of election can be identified in representative 
democracies, namely party-led and candidate-led (Anstead & Chadwick, 2009; 
Carlson & Strandberg, 2007; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008; Wlezien, 2010). 
An election is considered party-led when it is dominated by political parties 
(Anstead & Chadwick, 2009; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008; Wlezien, 2010). More 
specifically, in a party-led election, voters choose parties to form a government; 
‘parties control the main material of the campaign – manifestos, the campaign staff 
and organisation, the use of media, campaign events, and voter targeting and 
mobilisation. Things there are highly centralised.’ (Wlezien, 2010, p. 101) A 
candidate-led election is the opposite of a party-led election. It revolves around 
individual political candidates, the influence or assistance from political parties is 
highly limited (Anstead & Chadwick, 2009; Carlson & Strandberg, 2007; Ward, 
Owen, et al., 2008; Wlezien, 2010). 
Accordingly, general elections in countries such as the UK, Australia, and New 
Zealand are party-led, and federal elections in countries such as the US and Chile 
are candidate-led. 
From cross-national comparisons, it is widely noticed that campaign teams’ e-
campaigning utilisation varies according to election type (e.g., Anstead & 
Chadwick, 2009; Gibson & Ward, 2012; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). More specifically, 
it appears that in candidate-led elections, especially US primary and presidential 
elections, campaign teams tend to embrace diverse campaign practices in their e-
campaigning, such as voter interaction and engagement, support mobilisation, 
targeted campaigning, and resource generation; in party-led elections, however, 
campaign teams tend to chiefly focus on information dissemination, irrespective 
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of the advancement and potential of technologies. Accordingly, it is theorised that 
election type influences campaign teams’ e-campaigning utilisation. 
This thesis is supported and further elaborated by Anstead and Chadwick (2009) 
with general elections in the UK and presidential elections in the US, including 
primary elections, as examples of party-led and candidate-led elections 
respectively. 
As Anstead and Chadwick (2009) explain, although it is common for a political 
candidate to be affiliated with a political party in a candidate-led election, such 
party affiliation is usually weak; therefore, the influence or assistance from the 
candidate’s party during the election is limited. This means that in a candidate-led 
election, it is the candidates who are solely responsible for raising their profiles, 
establishing their campaign networks both within their own parties, referred to 
as vertical communication networks, and with voters, referred to as horizontal 
communication networks, and garnering voter support. Furthermore, a lack of 
permanent membership incentivises candidates to aggressively recruit and solicit 
resources in order to sustain their campaigning. Such circumstances catalyse 
innovative, expansive, and extensive Internet campaigning because the 
technology is perceived by candidates as a powerful tool, enabling them to rapidly 
increase the exposure of their profiles, establish both vertical and horizontal 
communication networks, connect with the grass roots and garner support, and 
generate resources for election campaigning. 
In stark contrast to individual candidates in candidate-led elections, political 
parties in party-led elections often possess a long-established public profile, 
communication networks, loyalists, and stable resources, particularly through 
permanent membership (Anstead & Chadwick, 2009). These serve as anti-
catalysts for embracing any new form of election campaigning innovatively, 
expansively, and extensively. 
In short, candidate-led elections tend to propel while party-led elections 
discourage e-campaigning utilisation. It can therefore be inferred that the impact 
of election type on e-campaigning utilisation consists of two facets: positive and 
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negative. It is worth noting that election type as a factor influencing e-campaigning 
utilisation is only theoretical; that is, it has not been empirically investigated. 
2.4.1.2 Electoral regulations 
Electoral regulations are widely considered as a major factor affecting campaign 
teams’ intention to conduct e-campaigning (e.g., Anstead, 2008; Anstead & 
Chadwick, 2008; Kluver, 2008; Tkach-Kawasaki, 2007; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). 
For instance, it is held that voting in federal elections is mandatory under 
Australian electoral law, which consequently diminishes Australian campaign 
teams’ incentive to embrace support mobilisation in their e-campaigning (Gibson, 
Lusoli, & Ward, 2008; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). The following further illustrates 
the thesis that e-campaigning utilisation is shaped by electoral regulations. 
Anstead (2008) indicates that online fundraising during a federal election is 
generally more aggressive and innovative in the US than in the UK, which can be 
explained by electoral regulations. More specifically, US electoral regulations 
reject institutional campaign donations; that is, political parties or candidates are 
forbidden from soliciting financial contributions for election campaigning from 
corporations, banks, or unions. It is lawful for political parties or candidates to 
appeal to individuals for campaign donations; however, tight limits are imposed 
on each individual donation and the total amount of electoral donations made by 
an individual per annum. Candidates are permitted to spend their personal wealth 
on their own election campaigning, there is a legal limit, however. Spending on 
election campaigning is unrestricted, provided that it is outside of public financing 
of presidential campaigns. Anstead (2008, p. 286) argues that these circumstances 
collectively propel parties or candidates in the US to aggressively and creatively 
exploit various technologies and applications, especially those that are Internet-
based, in order to rapidly appeal to ‘vast numbers of contributors, each donating 
comparatively small sums of money’. In the UK, by contrast, electoral regulations 
accept institutional campaign donations. Neither institutional nor individual 
donations are capped, although anonymous donations are restricted. Further, 
strict spending caps are imposed on election campaigning. Such circumstances, 
Anstead suggests, collectively prompt British political parties to approach a small 
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number of institutional donors for a large campaign contribution from each, 
thereby negating any incentive for energetic and innovative online campaign 
fundraising. Ward, Owen, et al. (2008, p. 267) concur with Anstead and further 
stress that the imposition of campaign expenditure limits forces political parties 
or candidates ‘to choose between traditional and new modes of campaigning in 
the allocation of resources’ and e-campaigning often ranks ‘relatively low in the 
priority list’. 
The provision of free exposure on traditional media for election campaigning 
forms another aspect to theorise the causality between electoral legislation and e-
campaigning utilisation. More specifically, Ward, Owen, et al. (2008) argue that 
electoral regulations in countries such as Australia, Chile, and most European 
nations provide political parties or candidates with a certain amount of publicly-
funded exposure on traditional media such as television and radio for election 
campaigning. Accordingly, to those parties or candidates, ‘the Internet becomes 
less essential as a tool … when [they] can rely on free traditional broadcast media’ 
for election campaigning (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008, p. 267). In the US, according to 
Ward, Owen, et al., electoral regulations demand impartiality from traditional 
broadcast media when offering to sell time for election campaigning. However, 
traditional media in the US is not required to allocate free slots for election 
campaigning to political parties or candidates. Consequently, Ward, Owen, et al. 
(2008, p. 267) contend, ‘candidates seek methods to reach voters that will reduce 
the financial cost; hence the attractiveness of the Internet as such an alternative.’ 
In all, it is argued that electoral regulations can incentivise as well as diminish e-
campaigning utilisation. This suggests that the impact of electoral regulations is 
twofold: positive and negative. Also note that electoral regulations as a factor 
influencing e-campaigning utilisation is only theoretical; that is, it has not yet been 
empirically investigated. 
2.4.1.3 Voters’ technology access 
It is commonly perceived that e-campaigning utilisation is dependent on voters’ 
access to e-campaigning technologies and applications, particularly those that are 
Internet-related (e.g., Dader, 2008; Hameed, 2007; D. T. Hill, 2008; Ward, Owen, et 
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al., 2008; Wlezien, 2014). As Ward, Owen, et al. (2008, p. 264) put it, ‘The logic is 
clear: parties and candidates are reluctant to invest in a medium that has limited 
reach.’ The following further illustrates this factor. 
It is noted that e-campaigning utilisation is highly constrained in countries where 
the diffusion of PC, the Internet, or broadband Internet is low. For instance, in 
Indonesia, the infrastructure and diffusion of ICTs is very poor (D. T. Hill, 2008): 
in mid-2000, the entire country had 7.5 million telephone connections shared by 
a population of 210 million. Of those telephone connections, 3 million were within 
the capital. In addition, Internet access in the country is described as costly, slow, 
and unreliable. Furthermore, the ratio of PC ownership to the country’s 
inhabitants was roughly 1 to 100, indicating an extremely low level of PC 
ownership. Consequently, although e-campaigning has been long and widely 
adopted in Indonesia, practices beyond information dissemination are barely 
present (Hameed, 2007; D. T. Hill, 2008). 
E-campaigning utilisation is also restricted in countries such as Spain and Italy 
where ICT access is moderate (Bentivegna, 2008; Dader, 2008). Chile is a notable 
exception. More specifically, ICT access in Chile is not only comparable to that in 
Spain and Italy but also highly unequal among voters (Boas, 2008); however, e-
campaigning utilisation in Chile is comparably expansive and extensive (Ward, 
Owen, et al., 2008). This, according to Ward, Owen, et al., is due to federal elections 
in Chile being candidate-led. It can be inferred that the impact of voters’ 
technology access can be moderated by another factor, election type in this 
instance. 
Ward, Owen, et al. (2008) argue that e-campaigning utilisation tends to be 
relatively advanced, expansive, and extensive in countries where ICT access is at 
the high end of the spectrum. Such countries include the UK, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, the US, Canada, and Australia. Singapore is a notable 
exception. More specifically, Singapore ‘has an advanced technological 
infrastructure and a strong commitment from the government to increase the role 
of information technologies in the life of citizens’ (Kluver, 2008, p. 61). Despite 
that, Internet content and activities are extensively and tightly regulated in 
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Singapore, this in turn depresses e-campaigning utilisation (Kluver, 2008; Ward, 
Owen, et al., 2008). This also suggests that the impact of voters’ technology access 
can be moderated by another factor, electoral regulations in this instance. 
In all, it is contended that voters’ technology access can motivate as well as 
dampen e-campaigning utilisation. This suggests that the impact of this factor 
consists of two sides: positive and negative. Further, it is suggested that the impact 
of voters’ technology access can be moderated by another factor. Also note that 
voters’ technology access as a factor influencing e-campaigning utilisation is 
theoretical; that is, this factor has not yet been empirically investigated. 
2.4.1.4 Resource availability 
It is widely accepted in e-campaigning research that the amount of campaign 
resources possessed by political parties or candidates serves as a prominent factor 
influencing their e-campaigning utilisation (e.g., Gibson & Ward, 2012; Lilleker & 
Vedel, 2013; Margolis et al., 2003; Small, 2008; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). As noted, 
those campaign resources typically pertain to money, time, and campaign staff. 
There are two main theses in the literature relating to the impact of resource 
availability on e-campaigning utilisation: equalisation and normalisation. 
The equalisation thesis was formed at the very early phase of e-campaigning 
research. A key part of it holds that political parties or candidates with limited 
campaign resources, typically minor parties or candidates, are more incentivised 
to embrace e-campaigning than their counterparts with vast campaign resources 
(Gibson & McAllister, 2014; Gibson & Ward, 2012; Small, 2008). More specifically, 
traditional campaigning, ranging from door-to-door canvassing to televised 
advertising, is immensely and increasingly costly, thus, it is almost an exclusive 
playing field for parties or candidates who possess vast campaign resources, 
parties or candidates with tiny resources, on the other hand, are frequently 
marginalised. In stark contrast, e-campaigning requires considerably lower start-
up costs than its traditional counterpart and it is just as capable in many aspects, 
such as reaching a wide, diverse audience. Such circumstances especially motivate 
parties or candidates with limited campaign resources to embrace e-campaigning. 
From comparing various parties’ and candidates’ campaign websites, early studies 
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tend to support the equalisation thesis (Gibson & McAllister, 2014; Gibson & Ward, 
2012; Small, 2008). 
Subsequent and antithetical to its counterpart, the normalisation thesis asserts 
that well-resourced political parties or candidates tend to outperform their under-
resourced counterparts in e-campaigning (Gibson & McAllister, 2014; Gibson & 
Ward, 2012; Margolis et al., 2003; Margolis, Resnick, & Wolfe, 1999; Small, 2008; 
Strandberg, 2009). More specifically, as e-campaigning gains wider appreciation 
and evolves rapidly and constantly, its present form differs substantially from its 
initial one, becoming more diversified, expansive, extensive, professionalised, and 
sophisticated. Accordingly, e-campaigning is increasingly resource-hungry. Ward, 
Owen, et al. (2008) note that despite its relatively low entry costs, e-campaigning 
is demanding more money, more skills, and advanced applications. Those scholars 
continue to point out that ‘if parties or candidates can afford to employ specialist 
web staff, journalists to write website copy and staff to answer email and 
moderate online discussion they are more likely to produce more sophisticated 
online campaigns.’ (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008, p. 10) Thus, well-resourced parties 
or candidates tend to exhibit more extensive, expansive, professionalised, and 
sophisticated e-campaigning utilisation than their under-resourced counterparts. 
On that note, it is asserted that major parties or candidates tend to outperform 
their minor counterparts in e-campaigning utilisation because of their inherent 
resource advantages, which mirrors traditional campaigning (Gibson & McAllister, 
2014; Gibson & Ward, 2012; Margolis et al., 2003; Margolis et al., 1999; Small, 
2008; Strandberg, 2009; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). Based on comparing various 
political parties’ and candidates’ campaign websites or a few interviews with 
campaign teams, a number of studies, especially recent ones, support the 
normalisation thesis (Gibson & McAllister, 2014; Gibson & Ward, 2012; Margolis 
et al., 2003; Small, 2008; Strandberg, 2009). 
According to Small (2008), some political scientists suggest that the equalisation 
thesis tends to be visible in party-led elections while the normalisation thesis in 
candidate-led elections. This suggestion is not observed in Small’s empirical study 
of political parties’ e-campaigning utilisation in a Canadian general election, which 
is party-led. 
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In short, resource availability affects e-campaigning utilisation. There are two 
rival theses in the literature concerning the impact of this factor. Notwithstanding 
this, it can be inferred that the impact of resource availability consists of two facets: 
positive and negative; that is, resource availability can motivate as well as 
undermine e-campaigning utilisation. 
2.4.2 Issues with the prevalent factors 
The four prevalent factors, namely, election type, electoral regulations, voters’ 
technology access, and resource availability, offer different perspectives to explain 
political parties’ and candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation. There are, however, 
two main issues with the factors. 
First, among the four factors, only resource availability is an internal factor and 
the rest are external. While those factors may be adequate to explain e-
campaigning utilisation across democracies with different voting systems, 
electoral regulations, and levels of technology access, they are inadequate to 
explain e-campaigning utilisation within the same election where the voting 
system, electoral regulations, and voters’ technology access are constant. This is 
echoed by Marcinkowski and Metag (2014). According to them (2014, p. 153), 
there are several studies explaining e-campaigning utilisation in the literature; 
however, ‘These studies all share the basic assumption that to best explain 
patterns of Web campaigning, one should seek to identify the environmental 
[factors] and personal resources’. This assumption, Marcinkowski and Metag 
argue, is insufficient to explain the usage of e-campaigning. They further suggest 
that political parties’ or candidates’ internal predisposition or motivation 
pertaining to e-campaigning utilisation in particular is crucial and should be 
included. 
Second, most of the four factors, namely, election type, electoral regulations, and 
voters’ technology access, are theoretical only. In other words, those factors have 
not been empirically applied. Even the empirical application of resource 
availability is highly limited. More specifically, studies that involve resource 
availability are chiefly based on analysing and comparing political parties’ and 
candidates’ campaign websites, in other words, web content analysis (Gibson & 
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McAllister, 2014); studies such as Margolis et al.’s (2003) that move beyond 
campaign websites and involve political parties’ or candidates’ campaign teams as 
research participants are rare. Further, the impact of resource availability remains 
somewhat inconclusive (Gibson & McAllister, 2014; Gibson & Ward, 2012). Taken 
together, it suggests that the explanatory power of the four factors widely noted 
in the literature is highly limited. 
In short, the four prevalent factors explaining e-campaigning utilisation are 
mainly external to political parties or candidates, they are therefore insufficient to 
explain e-campaigning utilisation within the same election. Further, those factors 
are chiefly theoretical; in other words, their empirical application is highly limited. 
These two issues form major knowledge gaps in e-campaigning research that 
pertains to explaining e-campaigning utilisation, rendering e-campaigning 
utilisation largely unexplained. 
2.4.3 Factors influencing e-campaigning utilisation: an IS 
perspective 
The IS discipline is appropriate for e-campaigning research and, more importantly, 
can provide fresh and further insights (Wattal et al., 2010). The discipline, as 
former Editor-in-Chief of MIS Quarterly A. S. Lee (2001, p. iii) elegantly puts, 
‘examines more than just the technological system, or just the social system, or 
even the two side by side; in addition, it investigates the phenomena that emerge 
when the two interact [emphasis added]’. While IS research is active in the role of 
the Internet in business, e-business in other words, it is ‘generally silent on the role 
of the Internet in politics’ (Wattal et al., 2010, p. 669). 
Little, if any, research is present in IS literature that explains e-campaigning 
utilisation. Nevertheless, e-campaigning in essence is a form of technology or 
system utilisation. Explaining technology and system utilisation is a core, long-
established, and mature research domain in IS literature (Davis, 1989; King & He, 
2006; Legris, Ingham, & Collerette, 2003; Venkatesh & Davis, 2000; Venkatesh, 
Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003), which began as early as the 1970s (Legris et al., 
2003). And the technology acceptance model (TAM), including its extension TAM2, 
is one of the most influential and widely adopted IS perspectives (King & He, 2006; 
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Y. Lee, Kozar, & Larsen, 2003; Legris et al., 2003; Schepers & Wetzels, 2007; 
Venkatesh & Davis, 2000; Yousafzai, Foxall, & Pallister, 2007a). More specifically, 
numerous empirical studies in IS literature have employed TAM to explain 
technology or system utilisation and a large number of them are published in 
leading IS journals or conferences, such as MIS Quarterly, Information Systems 
Research, International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS), and Hawaii 
International Conference on Systems Sciences (HICSS) (King & He, 2006; Y. Lee et 
al., 2003; Legris et al., 2003; Yousafzai, Foxall, & Pallister, 2007b). TAM has been 
empirically studied at various levels, namely, individual, group, organisational, 
and national; also, it has been applied to diverse technologies or systems, ranging 
from specialised systems, such as expert support systems, to general-purpose 
systems, such as e-business systems (Y. Lee et al., 2003; Legris et al., 2003; 
Schepers & Wetzels, 2007; Yousafzai et al., 2007a). That said, TAM has not been 
applied in e-campaigning research. Yousafzai et al. (2007a, p. 264) summarise it 
well, three factors contribute to the widespread popularity of TAM: first, it is 
‘parsimonious, IT-specific, and is designed to provide an adequate explanation and 
prediction of a diverse user population’s acceptance of a wide range of systems 
and technologies within varying organisational and cultural contexts and 
expertise levels’; second, it ‘has a strong theoretical base’; and third, it ‘has 
accumulated strong empirical support for its overall explanatory power and has 
emerged as a pre-eminent model of users acceptance of technology’. 
Conceived by Davis in the 1980s and inspired by social psychologists Fishbein and 
Ajzen’s theory of reasoned action (TRA), TAM posits that technology or system 
utilisation is influenced by two independent variables, namely perceived usefulness 
and perceived ease of use, through the user’s behavioural intention (Davis, 1989; 
Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989; King & He, 2006; Y. Lee et al., 2003; Legris et al., 
2003; Yousafzai et al., 2007a). Perceived usefulness denotes the extent to which a 
user perceives that utilising a particular technology, application, or system will 
enhance the user’s job performance, and perceived ease of use refers to the extent 
to which a user perceives that utilising a particular technology, application, or 
system will be free of effort (Davis, 1989). Thus, incorporating a TAM perspective 
in this study tackles the issue that the prevalent factors in e-campaigning research 
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theorised to influence e-campaigning utilisation are mostly external to political 
parties or candidates and hence inadequate to explain e-campaigning utilisation 
within the same election; it also addresses Marcinkowski and Metag’s (2014) 
suggestion that political parties’ or candidates’ internal predisposition or 
motivation pertaining to e-campaigning utilisation is crucial and should be 
considered in empirical research that seeks to explain e-campaigning utilisation. 
In 2000, more than a decade since its birth, TAM has received a significant 
theoretical extension from Venkatesh and Davis, referred to as TAM2. Most 
notably, in TAM2 perceived usefulness, an independent variable of technology or 
system utilisation in the original TAM, is influenced by five new independent 
variables, namely, subjective norm, image, job relevance, output quality, and result 
demonstrability (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). In other words, TAM2 propounds that 
technology or system utilisation is influenced by six independent variables, 
namely the five factors influencing perceived usefulness, and perceived ease of use. 
Based on their longitudinal field studies, Venkatesh and Davis claim that TAM2 is 
empirically grounded and, more importantly, the explanatory power of TAM has 
been significantly improved. Further, references to two factors influencing 
perceived usefulness, namely subjective norm and image, are found in some 
existing e-campaigning studies. For those reasons, the six independent variables 
of technology or system utilisation in TAM2 are incorporated in this study as 
additional internal factors to explain e-campaigning utilisation. The remainder of 
this section is concerned with those factors. 
2.4.3.1 Subjective norm 
Consistent with TRA, subjective norm pertains to social pressure, more 
specifically, one’s perception that relates to the behaviour and opinions 
concerning if the person should or should not act in a certain way, and the 
behaviour or opinions are of those whom the person considers significant 
(Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). TAM2 suggests that how a technology or system is 
utilised is influenced by subjective norm. This implies that the factor can stimulate 
as well as discourage technology or system utilisation; in other words, the impact 
of the factor consists of two facets: positive and negative. 
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In the context of e-campaigning, TAM2 suggests that how a campaign team utilises 
e-campaigning for the political party or candidate is shaped by the team’s 
perception relating to the e-campaigning or opinions of those whom the team 
considers significant. In other words, subjective norm can stimulate as well as 
discourage a campaign team’s e-campaigning. 
As mentioned, references to subjective norm are found in existing e-campaigning 
research. For instance, Dezelan et al. (2014) theorise that due to peer pressure, 
political parties or candidates tend to emulate their rivals’ e-campaigning in their 
own. This is termed the ‘me too effect’ by Selnow (as cited in Dezelan et al., 2014) 
or a ‘domino effect’ by Gibson (2012). The role of peer pressure in e-campaigning 
utilisation is also suggested by Farrell and Schmitt-Beck (2002, p. 12), who argue 
that 
political actors – not unlike antagonistic nation states enmeshed in an 
inescapable ‘security dilemma’ (Hertz 1950; Buzan and Herring 1998) – 
operate under the same assumption that their opponents will at all times 
seek to maximise their power potential by taking advantage of any 
innovative tool available to them, in order to prevail in the contest. Under 
such circumstances, the competitive pressures inherent in elections and 
referendums create an autonomous dynamic towards an ‘arms race’ 
between ‘campaign warriors’ (Thurber and Nelson 2000). As no party or 
candidate campaign organisation can ever expect that its competitors will 
deliberately abstain from using the newest material and latest technologies 
of influence, strong incentives are built in to do the same, if only not to fall 
behind in terms of ‘firepower’, and to avoid giving anyone else a 
competitive edge. A spiralling arms race is set in motion, constantly 
infusing innovative methods into the conduct of campaigns, thus driving 
campaigning to ever higher levels of sophistication, and cost. 
Venkatesh and Davis (2000) further note that the impact of subjective norm is 
moderated by other variables. More specifically, the impact of subjective norm can 
be amplified or diminished by voluntariness; that is, if the utilisation of a particular 
technology or system is perceived to be mandatory by the user, the impact of 
subjective norm will be intensified, and the opposite is true. Also, the impact of 
subjective norm will be weakened by experience; that is, continuous utilisation of 
a particular technology or system will reduce the impact of subjective norm, 
irrespective of the voluntariness of such utilisation. 
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2.4.3.2 Image 
Drawn from diffusion of innovations research, this factor is self-explanatory; it 
denotes the image and reputation of a user within the user’s social system 
(Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). TAM2 holds that how a technology or system is utilised 
is affected by the resulting impact on the user’s image as perceived by the user. 
This implies that image can foster as well as depress technology or system 
utilisation. In other words, the impact of image consists of two facets: positive and 
negative. 
In the context of e-campaigning, TAM2 suggests that how e-campaigning is 
conducted by a campaign team is prompted by the team’s perception relating to 
the party’s or candidate’s political image. In other words, image can foster as well 
as depress a campaign team’s e-campaigning. 
As mentioned, there are references to image in existing e-campaigning research. 
More specifically, some political scientists suggest that consideration of political 
image forms a driver in political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation, 
particularly in the professionalisation and sophistication of e-campaigning (e.g., 
Bimber, 2014; Dezelan et al., 2014; Schweitzer, 2008a). 
Venkatesh and Davis (2000) also indicate that image is directly and positively 
influenced by subjective norm. As they explain, ‘if important members of a 
person’s social group at work believe that he or she should perform a behaviour 
(e.g., using a system), then performing it will tend to elevate his or her standing 
within the group.’ (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000, p. 189) 
2.4.3.3 Job relevance 
Job relevance refers to a user’s perception pertaining to the applicability of a 
particular technology or system in relation to the user’s work goals or 
requirements (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). Venkatesh and Davis further indicate 
that this factor is similar to the variable job-determined importance in Leonard-
Barton and Deschamps’ research, involvement in Hartwick and Barki’s, task-
technology fit in Goodhue’s, and cognitive fit in Vessey’s. TAM2 postulates that how 
a technology or system is utilised is informed by job relevance. This implies that 
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job relevance can encourage as well as dissuade technology or system utilisation. 
In other words, the impact of job relevance consists of two facets: positive and 
negative. 
In the context of e-campaigning, TAM2 suggests that how e-campaigning is 
conducted by a campaign team depends on how it is aligned with the team’s 
campaign goals or requirements as perceived by the team. In other words, job 
relevance can encourage as well as dissuade a campaign team’s e-campaigning. 
2.4.3.4 Output quality 
Output quality denotes a user’s judgement relating to the task performance of a 
particular technology or system (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). TAM2 posits that how 
a technology or system is utilised is guided by output quality. This implies that 
output quality can motivate as well as hinder technology or system utilisation. In 
other words, the impact of output quality consists of two facets: positive and 
negative. 
In the context of e-campaigning research, TAM2 suggests that how e-campaigning 
is conducted by a campaign team pivots on the team’s judgement of the outcome. 
In other words, output quality can motivate as well as hinder a campaign team’s 
e-campaigning. 
Venkatesh and Davis (2000) add that the impact of job relevance is moderated by 
output quality. More specifically, when there are multiple options that are 
considered to be relevant to a user’s work goals or requirements, the option that 
is judged by the user to deliver the best quality tends to be chosen. 
2.4.3.5 Result demonstrability 
Result demonstrability is also drawn from diffusion of innovations research, it 
refers to the tangibility of the outcomes of utilising a particular technology or 
system (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). TAM2 propounds that how a technology or 
system is utilised is orientated by result demonstrability. This implies that result 
demonstrability can incentivise as well as dampen technology or system 
utilisation. In other words, the impact of result demonstrability comprises two 
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facets: positive and negative. Venkatesh and Davis (2000, p. 192) further indicate 
that the impact of result demonstrability suggested in TAM2 is consistent with the 
job characteristics model, which stresses ‘knowledge of the actual results of work 
activities as a key psychological state underlying work motivation’. 
In the context of e-campaigning, TAM2 suggests that how e-campaigning is 
conducted by a campaign team is prompted by its ability to convey tangible results 
to the campaign team. In other words, result demonstrability can incentivise as 
well as dampen a campaign team’s e-campaigning utilisation. 
2.4.3.6 Perceived ease of use 
As noted, perceived ease of use refers to the extent to which a user perceives that 
utilising a particular technology, application, or system would be free of effort 
(Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). Davis (1989) indicates that this factor is noted in the 
self-efficacy theory, the cost-benefit paradigm from behavioural decision theory, 
and the diffusion of innovations theory. TAM2 holds that how a technology or 
system is utilised depends on perceived ease of use. This implies that perceived 
ease of use can promote as well as withhold technology or system utilisation. In 
other words, the impact of perceived ease of use comprises two facets: positive 
and negative. 
In the context of e-campaigning, TAM2 suggests that how e-campaigning is 
conducted by a campaign team depends on the amount of effort that is required 
as perceived by the team. In other words, perceived ease of use can promote as 
well as withhold a campaign team’s e-campaigning utilisation. 
It is worth noting that TAM research is divided on the relevance of perceived ease 
of use when the target technology, application, or system is Internet-based. More 
specifically, some assert that Internet-based technologies, applications, or systems 
are general-purpose and therefore inherently relatively easy to use; accordingly, 
perceived ease of use is inconsequential (Y. Lee et al., 2003). Others disagree, 
contending that perceived ease of use remains relevant in the Internet context 
when specialist tasks, such as online purchasing, are being performed (Y. Lee et al., 
2003). 
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2.4.4 Summary 
Despite the underlying technologies and applications being largely similar, 
political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation varies markedly within 
elections or across nations. Further, the potential of e-campaigning technologies 
and applications has not been fully exploited by parties or candidates. These 
accordingly have led to an e-campaigning research agenda that intends to uncover 
factors that influence political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation; in 
other words, explain political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation. 
There are four prevalent factors in e-campaigning research theorised to influence 
political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation, namely, election type, 
electoral regulations, voters’ technology access, and resource availability. Those 
factors are chiefly external to parties or candidates. Therefore, they are 
inadequate to explain parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation within the 
same election. It is also suggested that research seeking to explain parties’ or 
candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation should incorporate their associated internal 
predisposition or motivation. To that end, this study incorporates a TAM 
perspective from the IS discipline. More specifically, this study considers the six 
independent variables of technology or system utilisation in TAM2 as additional 
internal factors to explain e-campaigning utilisation, namely, subjective norm, 
image, job relevance, output quality, result demonstrability, and perceived ease of 
use. In other words, this study considers ten factors in total, three external and 
seven internal, to explain e-campaigning utilisation. 
The impact of any given factor considered in this study comprises two facets: 
positive and negative. This means that any of the ten factors can motivate as well 
as retard e-campaigning utilisation. It also means that each factor can serve as an 
enabler as well as an inhibitor of e-campaigning utilisation. Further, it is suggested 
that the impacts of some factors, namely, voters’ technology access, subjective 
norm, and job relevance, on political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning 
utilisation are subject to the moderation of other factors; for instance, the impact 
of voters’ technology access can be moderated by election type. It is also worth 
noting that except resource availability, all factors have not been empirically 
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applied or applied in the context of e-campaigning specifically. This suggests that 
the explanatory power of the ten factors in the e-campaigning domain is highly 
limited. Thus, empirical application is the only way to tackle this issue. 
Table 2.2 depicts the ten factors considered in this study, including the aspect, 
empirical application, and reference discipline of each factor. 
Table 2.2 The factors influencing e-campaigning utilisation considered in this study 
Aspect Factor Empirical application Reference discipline 
External 
Election type   Political science 
Electoral regulations   Political science 
Voters' technology access   Political science 
Internal 
Resource availability ● Political science 
Subjective norm   IS* 
Image   IS* 
Job relevance   IS 
Output quality   IS 
Result demonstrability   IS 
Perceived ease of use   IS 
Note: * Also referenced in some e-campaigning studies 
 
2.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has reviewed scholarly literature pertinent to this study. More 
specifically, it has presented an overview of e-campaigning in both practice and 
academic research. Following this, it has addressed the theorisation of e-
campaigning and proposed an alternative e-campaigning framework integrative 
of existing e-campaigning research. The new framework consists of five campaign 
practices, namely, information dissemination, voter interaction and engagement, 
support mobilisation, targeted campaigning, and resource generation. Each 
practice is associated with various content elements, enabling the practice to be 
observable. Then, this chapter has focused on factors that influence political 
parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation by involving both the political 
science and IS disciplines. A total of ten factors encompassing different aspects 
have been considered, namely, election type, electoral regulations, voters’ 
technology access, resource availability, subjective norm, image, job relevance, 
output quality, result demonstrability, and perceived ease of use. 
 
 51 
Chapter 3 Research design 
3.1 Chapter introduction 
Research design is a core constituent of empirical research (de Vaus, 2001; Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2005; Yin, 2009). As Yin (2009, p. 26) puts it, ‘Every type of empirical 
research has an implicit, if not explicit, research design.’ 
The term research design can be generally understood as ‘a logical structure of the 
inquiry’ (de Vaus, 2001, p. 9). More precisely, it is a plan that logically joins the 
steps, such as collecting and analysing empirical evidence, from research 
questions to inferences or conclusions (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1976; Yin, 2009); 
it ‘situates the researcher in the empirical world and connects him or her to 
specific sites, persons, groups, institutions, and bodies of relevant interpretive 
material, including documents and archives’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 25); and 
it also ‘defines the domain of generalisability’ (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1976, p. 29). 
Therefore, the primary purpose of research design is to ensure that the collected 
empirical evidence enables the researcher to properly and unambiguously answer 
the research questions (de Vaus, 2001; Yin, 2009). Yin (2009, p. 27) stresses that 
research design ‘deals with a logical problem and not a logistical problem’. 
Research design is often confused with and treated as research method (de Vaus, 
2001). According to de Vaus, the latter is specifically concerned with the practical 
processes of collecting and analysing empirical evidence within research design. 
In other words, research method is a subset of research design. Failing to 
recognise that, de Vaus argues, often jeopardises the evaluation of research 
designs. More specifically, when equating a research design with a research 
method, quantitative survey, for example, the design is then evaluated primarily 
against the strengths and weaknesses related to the method instead of the ability 
to derive proper and unambiguous inferences or conclusions. 
Research design commonly involves the research questions, research paradigm, 
research approach, research method, procedures for data collection and analysis, 
and tactics to address research rigour (de Vaus, 2001; Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; 
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Myers, 1997; Yin, 2009). Accordingly, this chapter proceeds as follows: section 3.2 
states the research questions; section 3.3 discusses the prevalent research 
paradigms and indicates the one endorsed in this study; section 3.4 considers 
common research approaches and specifies the one adopted in this study and its 
impact on the roles of the researcher; with the selected approach, section 3.5 
chooses and justifies the research method for this study; section 3.6 outlines the 
specific design pertaining to the research method; section 3.7 describes the data 
collection procedures; section 3.8 describes the data analysis procedures; section 
3.9 indicates the tactics employed to address research rigour; and last, section 
3.10 summarises this chapter. 
3.2 Research questions 
Two questions are defined in this empirical study: 
1. How do political parties’ campaign teams utilise ICTs for election 
campaigning in New Zealand? 
2. What are the factors that influence those campaign teams’ utilisation of e-
campaigning and why? 
3.3 Research paradigm 
Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p. 22) assert that ‘all research is interpretive’, 
irrespective of the research approach, method, and data because ultimately, 
inferences or conclusions drawn by researchers are distilled through their 
interpretation. This interpretation is governed by a collection of premises 
pertaining to ontology – the nature of existence or the world at large, epistemology 
– the nature of knowledge and the relationship between the knower and the 
known, and methodology – the practical means and procedures for discovering 
the known (Creswell, 2002; Guba & Lincoln, 2005; McKenzie, Powell, & Usher, 
1997; Nachmias & Nachmias, 1976; Silverman, 2000). Collectively, those premises 
are referred to as a research paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Guba & Lincoln, 
2005; McKenzie, et al., 1997). Both epistemology and methodology are concerned 
with the acquisition of knowledge. The notable distinction between the two is the 
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level at which each is situated – the former resides at an abstract level and the 
latter at a specific, practical level (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). 
According to Denzin and Lincoln (2005), research paradigms are located at an 
abstract level, they are not always visible to, and are often taken for granted by, 
researchers. Yet, the scholars stress that it is salient and logical to first address this 
in any research design, because researchers are ‘bound within a net of 
epistemological and ontological premises which – regardless of ultimate truth or 
falsity – become partially self-validating’ (Bateson, as cited in Denzin & Lincoln, 
2005, p. 22). 
3.3.1 Prevalent research paradigms 
In general, four paradigms are distinguished and promulgated: positivism, 
postpositivism, constructivism – also known as interpretivism, and critical theory 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Guba & Lincoln, 2005; McKenzie, et al., 1997). 
3.3.1.1 Positivism 
Stemming from the natural sciences, positivism operates under the dominance of 
a naïve realist ontology and an objective epistemology, and, as a consequence, 
solely relies on laboratory experiment and manipulation or quantitative survey as 
the research method to verify knowledge (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). 
More specifically, positivism claims that the world exists independently of the 
knower and social practices, and is deterministic – the world is governed by 
absolute, indiscriminating, and logical truth in relation to cause and effect (A. S. 
Lee, 1991). In positivism, the purpose of inquiry is to establish and, more 
importantly, verify theories or hypotheses about the fundamental structure of the 
world, in other words, truth, through scientifically structured methods so that the 
world can be apprehended, controlled, and predicted (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; 
McKenzie, et al., 1997). In order to obtain universal truth, positivism reinforces 
that researchers must be unimpassioned so that the research is not impaired by 
any forms of subjectivity, such as their values and any sensory experiences that 
are irrational. Furthermore, positivism holds that knowledge exists only if it is 
directly quantifiable (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; McKenzie, et al., 1997). 
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Consequently, positivism in research design primarily focuses on scientific, 
mechanical methods for gathering and analysing data (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; 
Guba & Lincoln, 2005; McKenzie, et al., 1997). 
3.3.1.2 Postpositivism 
Although positivism has dominated scientific inquiry for a considerable period of 
time, its fundamental discourse has attracted criticism, particularly against the 
naïve realist ontology and the limited focus of methods for collecting and analysing 
empirical evidence (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 2005; McKenzie, et 
al., 1997). In response, positivism has received minor revisions, referred to as 
postpositivism (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). It is worth noting that due to the close 
relationship between positivism and postpositivism, some scholars treat the two 
paradigms as one (e.g., A. S. Lee, 1991; Myers, 1997; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). 
The main characteristics differentiating postpositivism from positivism lie within 
the modified ontological and methodological premises. More specifically, 
postpositivism holds a critical realist ontology and an objective epistemology, and 
employs laboratory experiment and manipulation or quantitative survey as the 
primary research method; on occasions, postpositivism may accept qualitative 
methods, but only with demonstrable scientific rigour and, more importantly, for 
data triangulation (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 2005). That is, while 
still maintaining that the world is deterministic, postpositivism accepts that the 
universal laws governing the world can only be apprehended imperfectly and 
probabilistically (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). To that end, all theories or hypotheses 
about the fundamental structure of the world are inevitably subject to falsification. 
Therefore, researchers must be critical about the certainty of their knowledge – 
the central discourse of critical realism (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 
2005). In postpositivism, the aim of inquiry is to falsify the established hypotheses 
or theories about truth. In addition, postpositivism acknowledges that no 
observation or measurement is completely free from errors. Consequently, it 
vigorously suggests that researchers employ multiple observations and 
measurements, and, on some occasions, non-quantitative methods to triangulate 
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the collected empirical evidence and reduce errors that could jeopardise 
inferences or conclusions (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 2005). 
3.3.1.3 Constructivism 
As noted, some scholars treat positivism and postpositivism as a single paradigm. 
Constructivism, by contrast, is considered by Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p. 22) as 
working ‘against and alongside (and some within)’ positivism and postpositivism. 
Developed in 1967, constructivism holds a relativist ontology, a subjective 
epistemology, and a naturalistic set of interpretive, hermeneutical, and dialectical 
methodological procedures (Creswell, 2002; Guba & Lincoln, 2005). 
More specifically, constructivism repudiates the ontological claims held by both 
positivism and postpositivism about the nature of existence of the world. It 
contends that the known does not exist externally or independently (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Rather, it represents the construction of 
multiple realities as perceived by individuals, based on their unique values, 
backgrounds, and experiences, and, consequently, absolute, universal truth is 
absent (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 2005). In other words, knowledge 
resides within each individual in society and is subjective in nature. In order to 
gain a further understanding of the known, the aim of inquiry in constructivism is 
to observe and interact with various members of society involved in the 
phenomenon being investigated, and interpret their views (Creswell, 2002). In 
addition, constructivism vehemently encourages the research to be conducted in 
a natural setting (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Further, 
constructivism rejects the advocacy maintained by both positivism and 
postpositivism that researchers must be unimpassioned when conducting the 
research. In stark contrast, constructivism recognises the subjectivity inherent in 
researchers and promotes that researchers should equally appreciate the 
subjectivity of research participants (Creswell, 2002; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; 
Guba & Lincoln, 2005). As mentioned, constructivism is also referred to as 
interpretivism by some scholars (Creswell, 2002), especially those from the IS 
discipline (e.g., A. S. Lee, 1991; Myers, 1997; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). This 
reference, however, is not widely accepted by scholars of social science or 
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pedagogy, as it only reflects the epistemological and methodological premises of 
constructivism (e.g., Creswell, 2002; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 
2005). 
3.3.1.4 Critical theory 
First defined by Horkheimer, the Frankfurt School theorist, with inspiration from 
other scholars, critical theory in essence assumes a historical realist ontology, a 
subjective epistemology, and dialogic, dialectical research methods (Guba & 
Lincoln, 2005; Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005). 
More specifically, the paradigm believes in an independent existence of reality. 
However, the reality is virtual – compared to the ‘real’ reality held by both 
positivism and postpositivism – and is moulded by social, political, cultural, 
economic, ethnic, and gender values (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Critical theory is 
underpinned by several unique assumptions; notably, ‘all thought is 
fundamentally mediated by power relations that are socially and historically 
constituted’ (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005, p. 304), and ‘facts can never be isolated 
from the domain of values or removed from some form of ideological inscription’ 
(Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005, p. 304). This paradigm further contends that 
researchers need to be critical about existing thought and knowledge because 
‘mainstream research practices are generally, although most unwittingly, 
implicated in the reproduction of systems of class, race, and gender oppression 
(Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1997)’ (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005, p. 304). As a result, 
critical theory is not satisfied with the mere accumulation of knowledge, the main 
aim of inquiry in this paradigm is to critique and rectify ‘the injustices found in the 
field site or constructed in the very act of research itself’ (Kincheloe & McLaren, 
2005, p. 305). Consequently, in critical theory, knowledge is increased by 
historical revisionism and generalisation by similarity (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). 
Due to its epistemological nature, critical theory solely employs qualitative 
methods for collecting, analysing, and communicating empirical evidence (Guba & 
Lincoln, 2005). It is worth noting that critical theory primarily gains support from 
studies of culture, anthropology, politics, and history (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; 
Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005). 
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3.3.2 The research paradigm endorsed in this study 
The four prevalent paradigms differ from each other, most notably their 
embedded premises, assumptions about the nature of knowledge, and inquiry 
aims. Considering that and the context of this study, constructivism is endorsed as 
the research paradigm. 
Specifically, this study posits that the e-campaigning phenomenon is not 
deterministic; in other words, it is not governed by a single set of absolute, 
universal laws. Rather, e-campaigning is a complex social phenomenon that 
consists of multiple realities and contexts. The social phenomenon can be inquired 
in its natural setting only, without any manipulation and intrusion by the 
researcher. Further, the associated knowledge and understanding resides within 
individuals who are involved in the phenomenon. Thus, empirical knowledge and 
understanding relating to e-campaigning is acquired, developed, accumulated, 
and reconstructed from the researcher interacting with multiple participants in 
the phenomenon, gathering their underlying assumptions, values, beliefs, and 
experiences as empirical evidence, and interpreting the evidence through the 
researcher’s subjectivity. Meanings derived from this study are therefore 
subjective, contextual, and socially negotiated, and when joined with others they 
form a panoramic perspective of the e-campaigning phenomenon. 
3.4 Research approach 
3.4.1 Prevalent research approaches 
Broadly speaking, two distinctive, predominant research approaches are 
discussed in social science: quantitative, and qualitative. Conventionally, it is 
considered that the choice of research approach is largely dominated by the 
research paradigm (Creswell, 2002). This dominance is referred to as 
paradigmatic hegemony (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). For instance, the quantitative 
approach is often aligned with the positivist or postpositivist tradition, the 
qualitative approach, on the other hand, is usually associated with the 
constructivist or criticalist tradition. While the distinction between quantitative 
and qualitative approaches remains, paradigmatic hegemony has become 
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increasingly weakened over the past decade – as evidenced by more positivists or 
postpositivists taking a qualitative approach to their empirical research – chiefly 
due to the proliferation of scholars conducting interdisciplinary studies and the 
emergence of new research paradigms as a result of the pedigrees of various 
paradigms themselves ‘beginning to interbreed’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 184). 
Thus, rather than assuming a particular approach based on paradigmatic 
hegemony, the research design in this study first considers the notable 
characteristics and impediments of each approach. 
It is worth noting another research approach – mixed-methods, which is a hybrid 
of quantitative and qualitative approaches (Creswell, 2002). In Denzin and 
Lincoln’s (2005) view, the mixed-methods approach is a direct descendent of 
classical experimentalism exclusively connected with the quantitative approach. 
Howe (as cited in Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 10) is cautious about the development 
of mixed-methods: 
It is just not the methodological fundamentalists who have brought into 
this approach. A sizable number of rather influential … educational 
researchers … have also signed on. This might be a compromise to the 
current political climate; it might be a backlash against the perceived 
excess of postmodernism; it might be both. It is an ominous development, 
whatever the explanation. 
Considering the nature of the mixed-methods approach, it suffices to discuss the 
two predominant approaches, quantitative and qualitative, in the research design 
of this study. 
3.4.1.1 Quantitative approach 
As described by Creswell (2002), de Vaus (2001), and Silverman (2000), the 
quantitative approach, in principal, is influenced by the positivist or postpositivist 
tradition. This approach primarily employs true experiment, quasi-experiment – 
a less rigorous experiment, and social survey as methods of collecting and 
analysing empirical evidence, which subsequently leads to verification or 
falsification of knowledge. The quantitative approach excludes subjective values 
from the research and is chiefly evaluated against traditional scientific rigour such 
as structured, often statistical, analysis, internal and external validity, reliability 
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and computer-assisted analyses that permit frequency counts and tabulations. 
Furthermore, the quantitative researcher is an impartial observer and reporter of 
objective empirical evidence and results (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Silverman, 
2000). 
Although the quantitative approach is supported by scholars from various 
academic disciplines, it attracts criticism, especially from scholars of social science 
and political science, mainly centring the omission of variables that represent 
subjective values (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Silverman, 2000). 
3.4.1.2 Qualitative approach 
As found by Denzin and Lincoln (2005), the attempt to clearly conceptualise the 
qualitative approach has become enormously challenging, as it is not only 
associated with constructivism, but also other emergent research paradigms that 
assume subjective, interpretive epistemology and methodology. Generically, the 
qualitative approach is defined as: 
A situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set 
of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These 
practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of 
representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, 
photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative 
research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This 
means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them. 
Qualitative research involves the studied use and collection of a variety of 
empirical materials – case study; personal experience, introspection; life 
story; interview; artifacts; cultural texts and productions; observational, 
historical, interactional, and visual texts – that describe routine and 
problematic moments and meanings in individuals’ lives. Accordingly, 
qualitative researchers deploy a wide range of interconnected interpretive 
practices, hoping always to get a better understanding of the subject matter 
at hand. It is understood, however, that each practice makes the world 
visible in a different way. Hence there is frequently a commitment to using 
more than one interpretive practice in any study (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, 
p. 3). 
The qualitative approach attracts criticism from quantitative researchers mainly 
on two counts. First, most, if not all, empirical evidence collected in qualitative 
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research is filled with biases. Consequently, from a natural scientist’s perspective, 
the qualitative approach can hardly be considered as scientific and, at best, only 
serves the purpose of immersing the researcher in the phenomenon under study 
(Silverman, 2000). Some positivists or postpositivists accuse qualitative research 
of being fictional, which ultimately is an assault on the scientific tradition (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2003). Second, any explanation of a subject or phenomenon inevitably 
involves causality between observable variables. However, qualitative research 
discounts statistical validation of causality and therefore, the explanatory power 
of qualitative research, especially when focusing on a single incident, is highly 
contentious to quantitatively-orientated scholars (Silverman, 2000). 
3.4.2 The research approach adopted in this study and 
the roles of the researcher 
As indicated by Creswell (2002) and Silverman (2000), each research approach 
attracts proponents as well as opponents. In considering a specific approach to 
adopt, as suggested by those scholars, the researcher should particularly focus on 
the research questions, the nature of the subject or phenomenon under study, and 
the research purpose. 
With consideration of the above suggestions, a qualitative approach is adopted in 
this study. This is justified from four perspectives. First, the existing empirical 
understanding of the social, contextual phenomenon, campaign teams’ utilisation 
of e-campaigning, is limited, particularly concerning factors that influence the 
utilisation of e-campaigning. To that end, this empirical study is largely 
exploratory in nature. Second, as noted, the phenomenon can only be studied in 
its natural setting. More importantly, the understanding and knowledge of e-
campaigning resides within individuals involved in this social phenomenon and 
therefore can only be acquired, developed, and constructed through interaction 
with them. Third, the empirical evidence to be collected in this study consists of 
participants’ beliefs, perceptions, and assumptions. In other words, this study 
holds that it is the qualitative data that makes it meaningful and relevant. And last, 
this study does not intend to verify or falsify any facts or realities in relation to 
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campaign teams’ utilisation of e-campaigning, because, as mentioned, it considers 
that the phenomenon comprises multiple meanings and realities. 
In general, a qualitative researcher is described as a bricoleur by Denzin and 
Lincoln (2005). As they (2005, p. 4) explain, 
A bricoleur makes do by “adapting the bricoles of the world. Bricolage is ‘the 
poetic making do’” (de Certeau, 1984, p. xv) with “such bricoles – the odds 
and ends, the bits left over” (Harper, 1987, p. 74). … 
The interpretive bricoleur produces a bricolage – that is, a pieced-together 
set of representations that is fitted to the specifics of a complex situation. 
“The solution (bricolage) which is the result of the bricoleur’s method is an 
[emergent] construction” (Weinstein & Weinstein, 1991, p. 161) that 
changes and takes new forms as the bricoleur adds different tools, methods, 
and techniques of representation and interpretation to the puzzle. … 
Also, in the definition of qualitative approach offered by Denzin and Lincoln 
(2005), there are a few indications concerning the roles of a qualitative researcher. 
For instance, Denzin and Lincoln suggest that qualitative researchers are 
transformers – who turn the world into a series of representations, sense-makers 
– who interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings participants bring to them, 
and knowledge co-producers – who produce knowledge with participants. 
Given the various roles associated with, and expected of, a qualitative researcher, 
the roles specifically emphasised in this qualitative study are outside observer, 
facilitator, and interpreter. More precisely, the researcher of this study observes 
an emerging, complex, social phenomenon in its natural setting without any 
intrusion or manipulation; the researcher also facilitates the production of 
empirical knowledge and understanding in relation to the phenomenon under 
study by involving, and interacting with, multiple participants; moreover, the 
researcher assigns meanings to the empirical observations and evidence, guided 
by the researcher’s subjectivity. 
3.5 Research method 
Research method, also referred to as strategy of inquiry, is concerned with the 
practical, specific processes of collecting, analysing, and reporting or interpreting 
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empirical evidence (Creswell, 2002; de Vaus, 2001; Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). In 
essence, research methods describe 
the skills, assumptions, enactments, and material practices that 
researchers-as-methodological-bricoleurs use when they move from a 
paradigm and a research design to the collection of empirical materials. … 
[They] connect researchers to specific approaches and methods for 
collecting and analysing empirical materials. [They] locate researchers and 
paradigms in specific empirical, material sites and in specific 
methodological practices … (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 379). 
3.5.1 Prevalent research methods 
A key feature of qualitative research lies within the variety of research methods 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Silverman, 2000). In general, four different methods are 
frequently discussed in qualitative research: ethnography, grounded theory, case 
study research, and action research (Creswell, 2002; Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; 
Myers, 2009; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
3.5.1.1 Ethnography 
Stemming from the discipline of social and cultural anthropology, ethnography, in 
its broad sense, refers to the task of describing a specific culture, organisation, or 
person, with reference to the particular customs and characteristics, within a 
society in its own natural setting over a prolonged period (Alexander, 2005; Myers, 
2009). Tedlock (2005) further draws distinctions within ethnographic research. 
According to the scholar, ethnography is dualistic in two realms of experience: 
public versus private, and objective versus subjective. Public ethnography is 
referred to as monograph while private ethnography is referred to as memoir; 
objective ethnography is referred to as ethnography while subjective ethnography 
is referred to as autobiography. 
Due to the nature of ethnography, ethnographers are often required to devote a 
sizable amount of time in the field to observe. Furthermore, ‘Ethnographers 
immerse themselves in the life of people they study (Lewis, 1985) and seek to 
place the phenomena studied in their social and cultural context.’ (Myers, 2009, p. 
93) Ethnographic research often provides depth yet a highly limited breadth of 
knowledge (Myers, 2009). 
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3.5.1.2 Grounded theory 
Grounded theory refers to ‘an inductive, theory discovery methodology that 
allows the researcher to develop a theoretical account of the general features of a 
topic while simultaneously grounding the account in empirical observations or 
data’ (Martin & Turner, as cited in Orlikowski, 1993, p. 311). 
Grounded theory consists of two main characteristics differentiating itself from 
other qualitative methods, according to Strauss and Corbin (1998). First, 
researchers employing this method start their empirical research without any 
theoretical assumptions relating to the subject or phenomenon under study. 
Second, in this method, the theory of the subject or phenomenon emerges from 
the empirical evidence collected by the researcher. Therefore, the theory is ‘more 
likely to resemble the “reality” than is theory derived by putting together a series 
of concepts based on experience or solely through speculation (how one thinks 
things ought to work)’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 12). In other words, the research 
processes in grounded theory is contextual and processual (Orlikowski, 1993). 
3.5.1.3 Case study research 
Yin (2009) indicates that although the case study has existed as a scientific 
research method for a considerable time, it is still widely misunderstood, which 
can be observed from two perspectives. First, some scholars, including social 
scientists, still consider the case study as ‘the exploratory stage of some other type 
of research method’ (Yin, 2009, p. 17). Second, some scholars confuse the case 
study with ethnography since observation of participants is central in both 
methods. 
In response to the definitional issues relating to case study research, Yin (2009) 
conceptualises this method from two aspects: scope and technicality. From the 
aspect of scope, case study research is defined as a method of empirical research 
that ‘investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident’ (Yin, 2009, p. 18). From the technical aspect, case study 
research  
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copes with the technicality distinctive situation in which there will be many 
more variables of interest than data points, and as one result; relies on 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result; [and] benefits from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and 
analysis (Yin, 2009, p. 18). 
Gable’s (1994, p. 113) definition of case study research is elegant and bears noting: 
The case study approach seeks to understand the problem being 
investigated (where the word ‘understand’ is used in the 
phenomenological or hermeneutic sense, and where ‘understanding’ the 
meaning held by a subject or group is contrasted with the ‘explanation’ 
produced by a scientific observation …). The approach provides the 
opportunity to ask penetrating questions and to capture the richness of 
organisational behaviour, but the conclusions drawn may be specific to the 
particular organisations studied and may not be generalisable. 
3.5.1.4 Action research 
Emerging around World War II, action research is ‘an interventionist approach to 
the acquisition of scientific knowledge that has sound foundations in the 
postpositivist tradition’ (Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 1996, p. 236). 
Action research is a close collaboration between researchers and practitioners in 
which the researchers are often considered as a consultant (Baskerville & Wood-
Harper, 1996). It is typically considered as a cycle consisting of five iterative 
phases: diagnosing, action planning, action taking, evaluating, and specifying 
learning (Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 1996). In the first phase, the researchers 
and practitioners identify the primary, underlying problems to be changed or 
tackled. In the second, the researchers and practitioners specify a series of actions 
to tackle or treat the problems previously identified. In the third, the researchers 
and practitioners intervene in the subject or phenomenon under study, and 
execute the actions or treatments. In the fourth, the researchers and practitioners 
evaluate the outcomes of the applied actions or treatments. This is followed by the 
last phase, which involves undertaking an ongoing, formal process of specifying 
the knowledge gained during the action research (Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 
1996). The cycle of action research can continue after the last phase until the 
researchers and practitioners are fully satisfied with the knowledge developed in 
the research. 
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3.5.2 The research method employed in this study 
Yin (2009, p. 8) advises that the researcher should consider four aspects when 
choosing a particular method: the form of research question, ‘the extent of control 
the investigator has over actual behavioural events’, ‘the degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events’, and the existence of theoretical 
assumptions prior to data collection. 
In this study, the research questions are primarily concerned with ‘how’ and ‘why’, 
the researcher cannot manipulate any campaign team’s e-campaigning utilisation, 
the research focus is on a contemporary event, and theoretical assumptions have 
been made before data collection. Under such circumstances, says Yin (2009), case 
study research is justified as the research method. Accordingly, this study employs 
case study research. 
3.6 Case research design 
Many scholars stress that after choosing case study research as the research 
method and before data collection and analysis, the researcher needs to carefully 
consider case research design from three aspects: unit of analysis, single- or 
multiple-case research, and case selection (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 2002; Yin, 
2009). Failing to do so, say those scholars, will undermine the quality of data 
collection and analysis, subsequent inferences and conclusions, and the validity 
and reliability of the research. 
3.6.1 Unit of analysis 
The first aspect to consider in designing case study research pertains to unit of 
analysis. It denotes the research focus and therefore can be individuals, small 
groups, or organisations; in some circumstances, it can also be relationships or 
decisions (Benbasat et al., 2002; Yin, 2009). Guest, Namey, and Mitchell (2013, p. 
26) add that unit of analysis ‘is the level of abstraction at which you look for 
variability’. The research questions are central in defining the unit of analysis 
(Benbasat et al., 2002; Yin, 2009). 
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The unit of analysis in this study is defined as political parties’ campaign teams, in 
other words, small groups, because this entire study is concerned with political 
parties’ e-campaigning conducted by their campaign teams in the 2008 New 
Zealand general election. 
3.6.2 Single-case or multiple-case research 
Another important aspect of case research design is the number of cases to be 
conducted or studied; in other words, the researcher needs to decide if the 
empirical research should be based on only one case or multiple cases (Benbasat, 
et al., 2002; Yin, 2009). 
A single case design is justified when the case ‘represents the critical case in 
testing a well-formulated theory’ that ‘has specified a clear set of propositions as 
well as the circumstances within which the propositions are believed to be true’ 
(Yin, 2009, p. 47); represents an extreme case or a unique case that ‘commonly 
occurs in clinical psychology, where a specific injury or disorder may be so rare 
that any single case is worth documenting’ (Yin, 2009, p. 47); is ‘the representative 
or typical case’ and ‘the objective is to capture the circumstances and conditions 
of an everyday or commonplace situation’ (Yin, 2009, p. 48); is ‘the revelatory case’ 
that ‘exists when an investigator has an opportunity to observe and analyse a 
phenomenon previously inaccessible to social science inquiry’ (Yin, 2009, p. 48); 
or is ‘the longitudinal case: studying the same single case at two or more different 
points in time’ (Yin, 2009, p. 49). 
A multiple-case design is advised when the rationale for single-case research 
cannot be satisfied; that is, the case is not critical, extreme, representative, 
revelatory, or longitudinal (Benbasat et al., 2002; Yin 2009). Yin remarks that a 
case is analogous to an experiment in quantitative research. Thus, ‘the evidence 
from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is 
therefore regarded as being more robust’ (Herriott & Firestone, as cited in Yin, 
2009, p. 53). Benbasat et al. (2002, p. 84) agree and add that a multiple-case design 
allows for ‘cross-case analysis and the extension of theory’. Yin (2009, p. 54) 
further indicates that a multiple-case design enables the researcher to replicate 
the same analytic logic – as opposed to sampling logic in quantitative surveys – as 
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in the first case, in order to predict similar results (a literal replication) or predict 
‘contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons (a theoretical replication)’. Yin 
(2009, p. 53), however, warns that ‘the conduct of a multiple-case study can 
require extensive resources and time beyond the means of a single student or 
independent research investigator’. 
This study opts for a multiple-case design because the rationale for a single-case 
design cannot be fulfilled. Further, multiple case studies enable more compelling 
empirical evidence, a cross-case analysis for further insights, and theoretical 
extension and replication. 
3.6.3 Case selection 
Case selection is central in any case research design (Benbasat et al., 2002; 
Seawright & Gerring, 2008; Yin, 2009). However, specific advice concerning this 
aspect is sparse in research methods literature (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). 
Benbasat et al. (2002, p. 85) stress that case selection ‘should be carefully thought 
out rather than being opportunistic’. Yin suggests that in multiple-case designs, 
researchers should consider two or three cases for literal replications and four to 
six cases for theoretical replications. Seawright and Gerring point out that in 
multiple-case designs researchers base their case selections on various 
considerations. For instance, some researchers choose cases primarily for 
pragmatic reasons, ‘such as time, money, expertise, and access’ (Seawright & 
Gerring, 2008, p. 295); some choose cases based on random sampling; and some 
choose cases because of diversity. 
In this study, case selection is based on three main criteria. First, the cases should 
reflect diversity; in other words, they should not focus on only the major parties’ 
or minor parties’ e-campaigning utilisation. Diversity is also a main characteristic 
of New Zealand’s political landscape, especially after MMP replacing FPP as the 
electoral system for general elections in 1996 (Miller, 2010; Mulgan, 2004). 
Second, the cases should be concerned with only the parliamentary parties 
because they had a more realistic chance of being elected and thus had more 
meaningful election campaigns in general. It is worth noting that most existing e-
campaigning studies based on party-led elections solely or chiefly focus on 
 68 
parliamentary parties (e.g., Gibson & McAllister, 2008; Schweitzer, 2008a; Small 
et al., 2008; Voerman & Boogers, 2008). And third, the cases should each feature 
e-campaigning utilisation or it would render this study meaningless. 
Eight parliamentary parties participated in the 2008 New Zealand general election: 
the New Zealand National Party (referred to as ‘National’ henceforth), the New 
Zealand Labour Party (referred to as ‘Labour’ henceforth), the Green Party of 
Aotearoa (referred to as ‘the Greens’ henceforth), the New Zealand First Party, 
ACT New Zealand (referred to as ‘ACT’ henceforth), the Maori Party, Jim 
Anderton’s Progressive Party (referred to as ‘the Progressives’ henceforth), and 
United Future New Zealand (referred to as ‘United Future’ henceforth). Those 
parties all conducted e-campaigning in the election. Thus, there were eight cases 
satisfying the three criteria for case selection. 
The researcher contacted all case organisations, inviting their campaign teams to 
participate in this study. Seven accepted, including the major parties; one minor 
party, however, indicated that the person solely responsible for its e-campaigning 
passed away at the early phase of the campaign period and the party’s e-
campaigning had remained mostly unattended since. Accordingly, this study 
investigated the e-campaigning utilisation of six parliamentary parties, namely, 
National, Labour, the Greens, ACT, the Progressives, and United Future. Although 
the e-campaigning of two minor parties are not included in this study, the included 
cases still highly reflect diversity. 
3.7 Procedures for data collection 
Each research question in this study involves a different data collection procedure. 
For clarity, this section describes the data collection procedures according to the 
research questions. 
3.7.1 Data collection for the first research question 
The first question relates to exploring the six parliamentary parties’ e-
campaigning utilisation in the 2008 New Zealand general election. To investigate 
political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation, existing studies solely 
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or primarily draw on the content of their campaign websites (Lilleker & Vedel, 
2013). It is, however, worth noting that obtaining empirical evidence from 
multiple sources to explore e-campaigning utilisation, such as the studies by 
Gibson, Margolis, et al. (2003) and van Os et al. (2007), is not common in e-
campaigning research. 
This study collected empirical evidence from multiple sources to answer the first 
research question. Primary data was derived from the content of the six parties’ e-
campaigns, comprising text, images, links, applications, video files, discussions, 
comments, documents, and blog entries. Primary data was obtained daily between 
12 September 2008, when the 2008 New Zealand general election was announced 
by the then Prime Minister Helen Clark, and 8 November 2008, the date of the 
general election. 
Secondary data, for triangulation and further insights, was derived from the 
following sources: 
 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with members of the six parties’ 
campaign teams after the election (The interviews focused on factors that 
influenced the six parties’ e-campaigning utilisation – the second research 
question; however, they inevitably involved discussions relating to the 
parties’ e-campaigning utilisation, which both triangulated and 
supplemented the primary data. Further details about the interviews are 
presented in section 3.7.2.) 
 newspaper articles about the parties’ e-campaigns or election campaigns 
in general 
 news and programmes on television about the parties’ e-campaigns or 
election campaigns in general 
 public presentations by the parties of their election campaigns 
 studies and blogs by scholars pertaining to the parties’ election campaigns 
3.7.2 Data collection for the second research question 
The second research question is concerned with identifying factors that influenced 
the six parties’ e-campaigning utilisation and the underlying reasons. Put 
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differently, the question pertains to explaining the parties’ e-campaigning 
utilisation. 
Among the studies in the literature that attempt to explain e-campaigning 
utilisation, only few involve empirical evidence derived from interviews with 
campaign team members (e.g., Margolis et al., 2003; Vaccari, 2010). 
This study gathered empirical evidence from multiple sources in order to answer 
the second research question. Primary data was derived from multiple in-depth 
interviews with individuals and small groups representing the campaign teams of 
the six parliamentary parties included in this study, namely, National, Labour, the 
Greens, ACT, the Progressives, and United Future. The interviews, which lasted 
between 60 and 90 minutes, were conducted after the election. Each interview 
followed the interview protocol designed for this study and took place at a time 
and location convenient for the participant or participants. More specifically, the 
researcher invited members of the six parties’ campaign teams to participate in 
semi-structured interviews focusing on factors that influenced the parties’ e-
campaigning utilisation in the election. An information sheet was attached to each 
invitation, consisting of a summary of the study, the purpose of the interview, 
general questions to be raised, and measures to address the participant’s 
anonymity and confidentiality. The invitation also encouraged the participant to 
raise any questions relating to the interview or the study. Before commencing 
each interview, informed consent was obtained from each participant. The 
consent allowed the participant to withdraw from the study at any time before a 
specific date. In each interview, the researcher encouraged the participant or 
participants to openly and candidly discuss factors that influenced the party’s e-
campaigning utilisation with specific examples. Questions asked by the researcher 
were interactive and generally open-ended. At the end of each interview, the 
researcher asked the participant or participants for corroborative evidence and 
any other individuals whom were believed to be suitable for the study. All 
interviews were recorded. The researcher also took plenty of notes in the 
interviews. Given that the interviews were conducted after the election and, as 
noted, election campaigning in fact reflects collective, orchestrated efforts, all 
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participants of a campaign team shared a consensus view on how the party’s e-
campaigning was conducted in the election. 
Secondary data, for triangulation or further insights, was derived from the 
following sources: 
 the six parties’ official e-campaigns 
 newspaper articles about the parties’ e-campaigns or election campaigns 
in general 
 news and programmes on television about the parties’ e-campaigns or 
election campaigns in general 
 public presentations by the parties of their election campaigns 
 studies and blogs by scholars pertaining to the parties’ election campaigns 
3.8 Procedures for data analysis 
Each research question in this study involves a different data analysis procedure. 
For clarity, this section describes the data analysis procedures according to the 
research questions. 
3.8.1 Data analysis for the first research question 
Most studies in the literature employ content analysis in order to understand, 
describe, and compare political parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation 
within an election or across elections (Lilleker & Vedel, 2013). This analytic 
technique, according to Lilleker and Vedel (2013, p. 405), is ‘highly objective and 
transparent’ and ‘provides the basis of much academic understanding of Internet 
use in politics’. Further, it ‘has a long and established pedigree’ (Gibson & Ward, 
2000b, p. 303) and is applicable to both quantitative and qualitative approaches 
(Berg, 2001; Gibson & Ward, 2000b). In e-campaigning research, content analysis 
involves observing the presence or absence of content elements on a party’s or 
candidate’s campaign website, and from which charting the themes, patterns, and 
extent of the party’s or candidate’s e-campaigning utilisation as each element is 
associated with a practice (Dougherty & Foot, 2007; Foot & Schneider, 2006; 
Gibson & Ward, 2000b). 
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A coding framework is central to content analysis and represents a theorisation of 
e-campaigning utilisation (Dougherty & Foot, 2007; Foot & Schneider, 2006; 
Gibson & Ward, 2000b). It can be developed prior to or during data analysis; 
however, the former is advised (Dougherty & Foot, 2007; Foot & Schneider, 2006; 
Gibson & Ward, 2000b). It is worth noting that a coding framework serves as a 
heuristic tool in content analysis. 
The content analysis in this study adapted the practices of Dougherty and Foot 
(2007), Foot and Schneider (2006), and Gibson and Ward (2000b). The e-
campaigning framework developed in this study, Table 2.1, was employed as the 
coding framework; that is, the coding framework was constructed prior to data 
analysis. Content analysis of each case was conducted after the primary data was 
collected, in other words, daily and concurrently with data collection. It began 
with the researcher organising the empirical data for analysis. Following that, the 
researcher observed the presence or absence of the content elements within the 
party’s e-campaign, assisted by the coding framework. The researcher also 
created analytic memos relating to any noteworthy features of the e-campaign. 
When a new content element emerged, the researcher determined if the element 
was a manifestation of a practice in the framework, such as information 
dissemination, or a new practice, based on the explanations of the practices in 
Chapter 2. And the framework was revised accordingly. This demonstrated the 
heuristic nature of the coding framework and that the researcher was inclusive 
towards any new perspectives from empirical evidence. After all content elements 
within the e-campaign were observed and with the memos taken previously, the 
researcher described the themes, patterns, and extent of the party’s e-
campaigning utilisation. These were triangulated with secondary data and 
compared to those in the previous analysis and existing studies. Matrices were 
used to present the primary data. Finally, conclusions relating to the party’s e-
campaigning utilisation were drawn. 
As illustrated, the content analysis in this study was a structured and iterative 
process. Cross-case analysis was performed to uncover further patterns, trends, 
and insights pertaining to the parties’ e-campaigning utilisation. 
 73 
3.8.2 Data analysis for the second research question 
Discussions about qualitative data analysis are rich in research methods literature, 
some focus on the phases and activities involved (e.g., Yin, 2011) while others the 
techniques (e.g., Myers, 2009). This study incorporated Yin’s view of analysing 
empirical data for the second research question; in other words, five sequential 
phases were involved, namely compiling, disassembling, reassembling, interpreting, 
and concluding, and each phase consisted of different activities. 
The activities in the compiling phase were chiefly administrative. The main 
objective of this phase was to organise all empirical data properly and 
systematically before formal analysis. More specifically, the researcher listened to 
and transcribed all interview recordings, the primary data for the research 
question. Each interview transcript was verified for accuracy and sorted. Notes 
taken during the interviews were typed, reviewed, and arranged. All secondary 
data was also organised. 
After properly organising empirical data for analysis, the researcher entered the 
disassembling phase. In this phase, the researcher carefully and repeatedly read 
through all interview transcripts in order to be intimate with the data and develop 
ideas about what was discussed, what was relevant, what was similar, what was 
different, what was emphasised, and what was noteworthy. These ideas were 
captured by a series of analytic memos. Then, the researcher segmented the 
interview data into smaller portions for coding in the next phase, chiefly based on 
the ideas previously developed. This was not straightforward and often involved 
re-reading the transcripts, re-assessing and, sometimes, modifying the initial ideas. 
In the reassembling phase, the researcher began coding the interview data 
disassembled in the previous phase. As Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 56) explain, 
in qualitative research codes denote ‘tags or labels for assigning units of meaning 
to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study’; they 
‘usually are attached to “chunks” of varying size-words, phrases, sentences, or 
whole paragraphs, connected or unconnected to a specific setting’. It is widely 
accepted that researchers create initial codes from their prior theoretical 
assumptions; that is, a priori codes (Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Maxwell, 2013; 
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Miles & Huberman, 1994; Walsham, 2002). Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 58) in 
particular ‘prefer’ this method of code creation. A risk, according to Walsham 
(2002, p. 105), is that researchers only see what their initial theoretical 
assumptions illuminate and fail to notice ‘potential new issues and avenues of 
exploration’. To counter that, Walsham (2002, p. 105) advises researchers to 
‘preserve a considerable degree of openness to the field data, and a willingness to 
modify initial assumptions and theories’. 
In this study, the initial codes were derived from the ten factors discussed in 
Chapter 2: election type, electoral regulations, voters’ technology access, resource 
availability, subjective norm, image, job relevance, output quality, result 
demonstrability, and perceived ease of use. Table 3.1 exhibits the initial code list. 
Table 3.1 Initial code list 
Category Subcategory Code 
External factors 
Election type EF-ET 
Electoral regulations EF-ER 
Voters' technology access EF-VTA 
Internal factors 
Resource availability IF-RA 
Subjective norm IF-SN 
Image IF-IMG 
Job relevance IF-JR 
Output quality IF-OQ 
Result demonstrability IF-RD 
Perceived ease of use IF-PEU 
 
As coding progressed, the researcher recognised that the impact of a factor could 
be positive or negative to e-campaigning utilisation, it could also be moderated by 
another factor. These different outcomes were valuable to the study yet not 
reflected in the initial codes as they were only descriptive. To address that, the 
researcher inserted a subcategory under the subcategory in the initial code list; 
that is, a sub-subcategory. The sub-subcategory was initially based on prior 
theoretical assumptions and was expanded multiple times as a result of new 
patterns emerging from the empirical data. Table 3.2 exhibits the final code list 
with data-driven codes being highlighted. The addition of a sub-subcategory to the 
initial code list meant that refreshing the initial codes was necessary. 
Consequently, data that had been previously coded was recoded for consistency. 
Put differently, modification of any existing codes resulted in recoding. During the 
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coding process, the researcher reassessed data segmentation on several occasions, 
which sometimes led to recoding or coding new segments. Many analytic memos 
were taken while coding, they were substantive, conceptual, theoretical, and 
personal. The coding process concluded when all data segments had been coded 
or recoded. 
Table 3.2 Final code list 
Category Subcategory Sub-subcategory Code 
External factors 
Election type 
Positive EF-ET-P 
Negative EF-ET-N 
Moderated EF-ET-M 
Electoral regulations 
Positive EF-ER-P 
Negative EF-ER-N 
Moderated EF-ER-M 
Voters' technology access 
Positive EF-VTA-P 
Negative EF-VTA-N 
Moderated EF-VTA-M 
Internal factors 
Resource availability 
Positive IF-RA-P 
Negative IF-RA-N 
Moderated IF-RA-M 
Subjective norm 
Positive IF-SN-P 
Negative IF-SN-N 
Moderated IF-SN-M 
Image 
Positive IF-IMG-P 
Negative IF-IMG-N 
Moderated IF-IMG-M 
Job relevance 
Positive IF-JR-P 
Negative IF-JR-N 
Moderated IF-JR-M 
Output quality 
Positive IF-OQ-P 
Negative IF-OQ-N 
Moderated IF-OQ-M 
Result demonstrability 
Positive IF-RD-P 
Negative IF-RD-N 
Moderated IF-RD-M 
Perceived ease of use 
Positive IF-PEU-P 
Negative IF-PEU-N 
Note: Data-driven codes are highlighted 
 
During and after the coding process, the researcher organised the coded data in 
matrices according to the interview participants, the cases, the factors, and the 
impacts of the factors; in other words, data reassembly. Diagrams were also used 
to depict the coded data. The objectives of data reassembly and depiction were to 
constantly compare and interrogate the coded data from various aspects, identify 
and address alternative explanations for specific instances of e-campaigning 
utilisation provided by the campaign teams, sharpen and deepen the 
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understanding of the data, and elicit insights and patterns. There was constant 
interplay between data coding and data reassembly and depiction. 
Subsequent to data reassembly, the researcher began interpreting. The focus was 
not on any particular data; rather, it was on forming a comprehensive view based 
on all empirical findings. Yin (2011) suggests three forms of interpreting: 
description, description plus a call for action, and explanation. The third was 
applicable; that is, the researcher provided an interpretation by explaining the six 
parliamentary parties’ conduct of e-campaigning in the 2008 New Zealand general 
election. To achieve that, the researcher revisited the main findings and insights 
elicited in the previous phase several times; the researcher also particularly 
considered five aspects of the interpretation: generalisability, context, and 
empirical accuracy, adequacy, and relevancy. 
In the last phase the focus was on drawing a conclusion for the research question. 
As Yin (2011, p. 220) puts it, ‘A conclusion is some kind of overarching statement 
or series of statements that raises the findings of a study to a higher conceptual 
level or broader set of ideas.’ To reach that, the researcher revisited the 
interpretation made in the previous phase as well as the main findings produced 
in the reassembling phase. Particular attention was paid to the significance, 
limitations, and implications of the findings. 
As illustrated, both the phases and activities of data analysis for the second 
research question were highly iterative. The expansion of the code list due to the 
emergence of new patterns from empirical data demonstrated that the researcher 
was open to perspectives beyond prior theoretical assumptions. It is worth noting 
that cross-case analysis was performed to uncover further insights and patterns. 
3.9 Addressing research rigour 
Central to any empirical study is its rigour – in other words, the quality of the 
research design and findings; it often encompasses four aspects: construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity, and reliability (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 
2009). Lincoln and Guba (1985) contend that rigour, internal validity, external 
validity, and reliability should be respectively referred to as trustworthiness, 
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credibility, transferability, and dependability in qualitative research. Yin suggests 
various tactics specifically for case study researchers to address the different 
aspects of research rigour. However, say Miles and Huberman, problems of 
research rigour in any qualitative study cannot be eliminated. Thus, it is 
‘unworkable’ to ‘get it all right’; instead, researchers should aim to ‘not get it all 
wrong’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 277). The following indicates the techniques 
suggested by Yin and employed in this study to address the four aspects of 
research rigour. 
Construct validity refers to ‘identifying correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied’ (Yin, 2009, p. 40). Three tactics were employed. First, the 
researcher collected empirical evidence from multiple sources, which is detailed 
in the data collection procedures. Second, the researcher maintained a chain of 
evidence; that is, any conclusions drawn in this study can be traced back to the 
research questions and vice versa. Third, feedback on the main empirical findings 
was sought from the research participants and was incorporated. 
Internal validity refers to ‘seeking to establish a causal relationship, whereby 
certain conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from 
spurious relationships’ (Yin, 2009, p. 40). Yin further indicates that this aspect 
should be addressed during data analysis and by explanatory or causal case 
studies only. Two tactics were employed. First, this study employed pattern 
matching; that is, empirically-based patterns were compared to their 
theoretically-based counterparts. Second, this study explored and assessed 
alternative explanations for instances of e-campaigning utilisation provided by 
the research participants. More specifically, the researcher identified possible 
explanations for a given instance of e-campaigning utilisation and argued for each 
of them. The researcher then decided on the most cogent one. It is worth noting 
that the researcher’s academic colleagues frequently participated in the process 
of assessing rival explanations. 
External validity refers to ‘defining the domain to which a study’s findings can be 
generalised’ (Yin, 2009, p. 40). Replication logic, as opposed to sampling logic, was 
employed in case selection to address external validity; that is, the researcher 
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selected cases that were expected to produce contrasting results for anticipatable 
reasons. It is worth noting the views of Creswell (2002) and Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) on generalisability of empirical findings in qualitative research. Crewell 
(2002, p. 195) indicates that generalisability plays ‘a minor role in qualitative 
inquiry’. Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 316) suggest that qualitative researchers 
‘cannot specify the external validity of an inquiry; [they] can provide only the thick 
description necessary to enable someone interested in making a transfer to reach 
a conclusion about whether transfer can be contemplated as a possibility’. Lincoln 
and Guba’s suggestion was employed in this study; that is, the researcher used rich, 
thick description to convey the research design and findings as an additional tactic. 
Reliability refers to ‘demonstrating that the operations of a study – such as the 
data collection procedures – can be repeated, with the same results’ (Yin, 2009, p. 
40). Yin indicates that this aspect pertains to data collection. Two tactics were 
employed. First, the researcher established a case study protocol and followed it 
in the study. It is worth noting that a case study protocol differs from an interview 
protocol in that a case study protocol entails more elements, such as the research 
background, objectives, questions, theoretical assumptions, data collection 
procedures, and the structure of findings (Yin, 2009). Second, the researcher 
established a database for storing and retrieving any material relating to the cases, 
such as interview transcripts, memos, and case narratives. 
Also, the researcher triangulated the empirical findings with secondary data for 
accuracy during data analysis, a tactic suggested by Creswell (2002). 
3.10 Chapter summary 
This chapter has comprehensively described the design of this empirical study. 
More specifically, it has specified the research paradigm, approach, method, data 
collection and analysis procedures, and tactics to address research rigour. 
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Chapter 4 National’s e-campaigning utilisation 
4.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter presents the key findings from the first case study: National’s e-
campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election. This chapter proceeds as 
follows: section 4.2 outlines the case background; then, section 4.3 and 4.4 answer 
the first and second research questions respectively; and last, section 8.5 
summarises this chapter. 
4.2 Case background 
Formed in 1936 as a result of a merger between the United Party and the Reform 
Party, National has been the political party with the largest membership in New 
Zealand for many decades. The party’s political stance is positioned as centre-right. 
Before the 2008 election, National held 48 of 121 seats in Parliament. It had been 
the largest opposition party since the 1999 general election. During that time, 
National had seen several changes of party leadership. In 2006 John Key was 
elected as the party leader, who first entered New Zealand politics in 2002 as an 
elected MP and led National in the 2008 general election. 
Following a landslide defeat to Labour in the 2002 general election, Don Brash, the 
then leader of National, started an initiative called ‘the digital strategy for the 
National Party’ in 2005 to envisage the use of ICTs, particularly the Internet, in 
order to invigorate and innovate the party’s engagement with the general public. 
An important avenue within this initiative was election campaigning. Although 
Brash was succeeded by Key, National continued the initiative. 
In the 2008 election, National’s overarching campaign message was a change for 
a new leader and a new government, and a brighter future for New Zealand. 
National’s campaign team wanted its e-campaign to be perceived as modern and 
contemporary, but also at the same time, daring and aggressive. National’s 
campaign team explained that in the context of the party’s e-campaign ‘aggressive’ 
meant incorporating ‘more campaign functions and activities beyond a simple 
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electronic brochure’. Also, according to the campaign team, National’s e-
campaigning not only focused on securing traditional support from the party 
loyalists but also reaching out to young voters between the age of 18 and 25. 
Furthermore, the party’s e-campaigning aimed at achieving a balance between 
formality and informality. In this light, the campaign team perceived the need to 
not just move offline campaign material to the campaign site but to develop new 
forms and ways of campaigning to the general public. A major mission in 
National’s e-campaigning, according to the team, was to market its relatively new 
party leader, Key, who was largely unknown to many voters. 
Personnel dedicated to the party’s e-campaigning were recruited, such as a 
webmaster, and a web editor, along with the party’s volunteers. Despite being a 
large political organisation, National did not have an IT unit. Staff directing 
National’s e-campaign were part of the party’s centralised campaign team and 
reported to the chair of the team. Initially, the party considered developing a 
campaign website specifically for the 2008 election. This idea was later dropped. 
Instead, the party opted to use the existing official party website 
(www.national.org.nz) as the primary platform for its e-campaigning. Figure 4.1 
and 4.2 depict the home page of National’s campaign website. 
 
Figure 4.1 The home page of National's campaign website (part 1) 
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Figure 4.2 The home page of National's campaign website (part 2) 
4.3 National’s e-campaigning utilisation and its 
extent 
On the basis of the proposed e-campaigning framework, National’s e-campaigning 
encompassed all five practices, namely, information dissemination, voter 
interaction and engagement, support mobilisation, targeted campaigning, and 
resource generation. Those practices were conducted to varying degrees. The 
analysis in this section is structured according to the practices. This section is 
concluded with a summary. 
4.3.1 Information dissemination 
National’s campaign website in general was dominated by blue, the colour 
representing the party, images of Key, and its campaign slogan: ‘Choose a Brighter 
Future’. It provided a wide array of comprehensive information to visitors and was 
organised under sections with an intuitive name and structure, allowing visitors 
to retrieve the required information relatively easily. For instance, under ‘About 
National’ and ‘News’, visitors could find general information about the party and 
the latest updates from the party respectively. Despite its large volume, campaign 
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information disseminated through the website could be readily discovered and 
retrieved with a search engine on the website. 
The website contained a large repository of policies, ranging from ‘Art and Culture’ 
to ‘Defence and Security’. National’s policies could be navigated through the 
‘About National’ page or a drop-down box labelled as ‘Our policies’ on each page 
of the website. Each policy statement was presented as a hypertext link, filed 
under its related portfolio, and was released by the shadow minister for the 
portfolio. In doing so, it also introduced the party’s allocation of shadow 
ministerial portfolios to visitors. Overall, media releases via the website were 
policy-orientated. They were either related to the policies championed by the 
party or attacking the policies of the party’s main opponent, Labour. Similar to the 
party’s policy releases, media releases were presented as hypertext links and filed 
under their related portfolios. Other campaign information disseminated through 
the website included an archive of speeches by key party members; contact 
information for the party leader and candidates; hyperlinks to other online 
presence of the party or its leader, such as Facebook, Flickr, and YouTube; and a 
text blog called ‘Key Notes’, authored by the party leader. The content of the blogs 
primarily aimed at further promoting the party’s policies and, sometimes, 
launching counter-attacks at the party’s largest rival, Labour. Permission for 
visitors leaving comments was disabled. 
In addition to text, National’s e-campaign frequently used multimedia for 
information dissemination. Most notably, the website contained a large collection 
of images depicting the party’s campaign trail, which primarily focused on the 
party leader. Information relating to National MPs and candidates could be 
accessed through two drop-down boxes, labelled as ‘National Party MPs’ and ‘Our 
Candidates’, respectively. A combination of image and text was used to introduce 
National MPs and candidates. A separate website (www.nationaltv.co.nz), ‘NTV’ 
(National TV), was linked to National’s campaign website, which in essence was a 
central hub of videos of National’s key party members. From there, visitors could 
access a wide variety of video clips, ranging from the party’s debates in Parliament 
to particular campaign events such as visiting schools or talking to workers. Figure 
4.3 depicts National’s NTV. 
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Figure 4.3 National's NTV 
4.3.2 Voter interaction and engagement 
National’s e-campaign exhibited some attempts to interact or engage with visitors. 
For instance, a clickable link was provided for visitors to email the party leader, 
party candidates, and the party office; and visitors were encouraged to submit 
feedback to the party by clicking on an email link (although there was no specific 
mention about the kind of feedback the party solicited). Also of note was an 
interactive calendar that not only centralised all campaign events organised by 
National throughout the country but also allowed visitors to filter campaign 
events based on their personal preferences. More specifically, with the interactive 
calendar, National’s campaign events could be filtered by selecting options in 
drop-down boxes relating to dates, regions, cities or towns, and event types. 
A key policy campaigned by National was on income tax reduction, which was in 
opposition to Labour’s stance on the same issue. Because of this, a web application 
called ‘National Party Tax Calculator’ was deployed to assist visitors to develop a 
personal experience of the party’s proposed income tax policy. The calculator 
prompted visitors to select options in two drop-down boxes relating to their own 
level of salary or wage, and whether they were receiving any social benefit. After 
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completing those steps, the calculator would inform visitors how much gain in 
after-tax income would be received under National’s personal tax policy. Figure 
4.4 exhibits National’s online tax calculator. 
 
Figure 4.4 National's tax calculator 
As noted, National’s website included links to other virtual presence of the party 
or party leader, such as Facebook, Flickr, and YouTube. Visitors to those social 
networking websites were able to interact with the party or its leader through 
leaving comments or participating in discussions. However, based on the content 
posted on those websites by National or its party leader, the primary focus leaned 
towards information dissemination, as opposed to voter interaction and 
engagement. More specifically, Facebook was mainly used for announcing the 
latest policy, speech, or Key’s blog post added to the party’s campaign website; 
Flickr for depicting the campaign trail of National MPs, particularly the party 
leader; and YouTube for broadcasting National’s televised campaign 
advertisements, select debates in Parliament, Key’s video journals, and Key’s 
personal pledge for financial support. These attracted only a few comments from 
visitors. Occasionally, some visitors initiated different topics for discussion, 
particularly on the party’s Facebook campaign page. Overall, on those social 
networking websites, National did not respond to each visitor comment or 
participate in any discussion initiated by visitors. National’s campaign team 
acknowledged that all visitors’ comments and discussions in National’s e-
campaign were carefully managed, meaning that each comment and discussion 
was subject to the party’s moderation. 
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4.3.3 Support mobilisation 
As noted, the overarching campaign message in National’s election campaign 
centred on the notion of change – a new government and new leadership. The 
campaign team indicated that in this election it was particularly crucial for 
National to continuously garner party support from voters, maintain the 
momentum of support, and mobilise the support. This desire was observed in 
National’s campaign website. 
In a couple of videos on both National’s campaign website and National’s YouTube 
page, the party leader expressed National’s vision for New Zealand and the 
criticality of voters’ support, especially their party votes, in helping the party to 
realise its vision for the country. 
Another noticeable element of mobilising support was National’s 2008 campaign 
anthem titled ‘Choose a Brighter Future’, which featured in National’s televised 
election campaign opening address. The song was presented on the home page of 
National’s campaign website as a clickable image link. Visitors were encouraged 
to click on the link to purchase a copy of the song on CD at a cost of $10, in order 
to show their party support. The campaign team explained that the idea behind 
this was entirely about ‘mobilising support in a fun and less formal way. The song 
could be played while driving or even be used as a mobile ringtone’. Although a 
small charge was attached to the song, the team stressed that it was only for 
covering some of the production costs. Based on that, this element is not 
considered as a means of generating financial resources in National’s e-campaign; 
instead, it represents a means for voters to endorse the party, which is not 
captured by the proposed e-campaigning framework. 
It is worth noting that National’s campaign website included campaigns targeted 
at two specific voter segments, namely overseas National supporters and senior 
National supporters (refer to section 4.3.4 for elaboration on National’s targeted 
campaigning). Some content elements in the two targeted campaigns pertained to 
support mobilisation. 
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Specifically, the campaign targeting overseas National supporters, also referred to 
as an ‘Internat’ by National, consisted of three elements suggesting support 
mobilisation. The first was a function called ‘Find an Internat’, which enabled an 
overseas National supporter to connect with other National supporters in either 
the person’s area or other parts of the world. The second was ‘Invite potential 
Internats’. As its name suggested, this function encouraged overseas National 
supporters to proactively assist the party to identify and expand its support base 
around the world. It, however, was in development in the campaign period. The 
last was ‘Vote Home’, which emphasised the importance of overseas National 
supporters registering and casting their votes for the party. ‘Vote Home’ also 
explained the eligibility of voting from overseas, how to correctly enrol as a voter 
and vote from overseas. 
The campaign targeting senior National supporters, referred to as ‘SuperBlues’ by 
National, included an element called ‘Send an Ecard’ for spreading party support 
among that particular voter segment. The electronic postcard featured an image 
of Key and the URL of the targeted campaign. In addition, senders could 
personalise the card by attaching their own messages. Figure 4.5 depicts 
National’s ‘Send an Ecard’. 
National’s campaign team especially stressed that the ultimate support it needed 
was that supporters would register as voters and, on polling day, cast their votes 
for National candidates, and, more importantly, the party. For that reason, 
National’s campaign website included a hyperlink to the Electoral Enrolment 
Centre where eligible people could register themselves as voters. Moreover, the 
campaign website included a drop-down box, listing the party’s various 
constituencies across the country and contact information for each local office. 
A hypertext link and a web form were provided in order to subscribe to electronic 
newsletters from National or the party leader sent on an almost daily basis during 
the campaign. 
Means for voters to invite others to participate in National’s offline campaign 
events and means for voters to forward National’s campaign material to others 
were both absent from the party’s e-campaign. 
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Figure 4.5 National's 'Send an Ecard' 
4.3.4 Targeted campaigning 
A targeted election campaign can be seen as one that is aimed at particular 
opponents or their policies in the race, or at particular voter segments. Both forms 
were observed in National’s e-campaign. 
On a few occasions, Labour’s policies and its cabinet ministers were targeted in 
National’s speeches. For example, National targeted Michael Cullen, the then 
Finance Minister in the Labour Government, in a speech promoting National’s 
policy on KiwiSaver. The speech was titled ‘Cullen Glosses Over KiwiSaver 
Concerns’. It first criticised Cullen for ‘deliberately ignoring serious concerns 
about the minimum contribution rates for KiwiSaver’, before explaining National’s 
own stance on the subject. Similarly, in another speech titled ‘Another Week – Still 
No Costings On Labour Promises’, National denounced Labour for offering voters 
vain election promises. The speech then directly attacked the capability and 
credibility of Clark, the then Prime Minister and leader of Labour, by accusing her 
of ‘[being] either incapable of producing reliable figures or deceptive’. Moreover, 
Labour’s policies were attacked in some of National’s campaign videos on both 
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NTV and YouTube. Overall, National’s campaign targeting its political opponents 
was confined to its speeches. The targeted opponents were Labour and its cabinet 
ministers. The targeted policies mainly centred on the economy and taxation. 
Four particular voter segments were targeted in National’s e-campaign, namely, 
overseas National supporters, senior National supporters, Asian voters, and 
National supporters with a strong interest in environmental issues. Each 
campaign targeting a particular voter segment was presented in a sub-site under 
National’s campaign website. 
National referred to its overseas supporters as Internats. The campaign website 
targeting Internats mainly focused on support mobilisation, such as online voter 
registration, obtaining and casting voting papers overseas, becoming an overseas 
National supporter, finding and socialising with other Internats in the same 
geographical area, and participating in overseas campaign events. Besides, the 
website provided the latest updates on the party’s policies, speeches, and 
campaign in general. It also included a list of hyperlinks to some New Zealand 
mainstream news media; a political blog penned by a well-known New Zealand 
political blogger and ardent National supporter; New Zealand social networking 
websites; New Zealand Electoral Commission; a New Zealand job seeking website; 
and organisations or businesses actively promoting New Zealand identity. 
National referred to its supporters aged 60 and above as SuperBlues. The 
SuperBlues website primarily focused on issues of particular importance to senior 
citizens, such as crime and aged care. It also provided a list of contact details of 
SuperBlues groups in different regions throughout the country. A function called 
‘Send an Ecard’ was available for spreading support to others. The website also 
featured ‘Bernie’s Blog’, authored by the founder of SuperBlues. The blog was non-
interactive and text-based. Its primarily focus was on promoting National’s 
policies on senior citizens and mobilising support for National among older New 
Zealanders. A web form was available for visitors to submit feedback. Differing 
from the feedback form for general voters, here, National specifically indicated the 
preferred areas for feedback, such as views on the SuperBlues and tips for 
establishing successful SuperBlues groups. In order to increase readability, a 
 89 
function was provided allowing the text size of the entire website to be scaled 
according to personal preference. 
National’s campaign website included an ‘Asian Language Section’, aimed at the 
growing population of Asian voters in New Zealand. The section was presented as 
a clickable image link on the home page. When clicked, a web page called ‘Asian 
Languages’ was rendered. There, visitors could download an electronic brochure 
in five Asian languages: Chinese (Mandarin), Korean, Indian (Hindi), Indian 
(Gujarati), and Indian (Punjabi). The brochure began with a personal message 
from Key, translated in one of the five languages. It urged voters to cast their party 
votes for National, make a campaign donation, join the party, or become a party 
member. It especially highlighted National’s policies on taxation, law and order, 
immigration, economic growth, education, aged care, health care, social welfare, 
and community. The section also provided contact information related to a sitting 
National MP and a National candidate, both of Asian ethnicity. 
National supporters with a strong interest in environmental issues, referred to as 
‘BlueGreens’, were also targeted in National’s e-campaign. The BlueGreens 
website was static; it predominantly focused on disseminating information 
relating to National’s vision, principles, and environmental policies. The website 
contained a large collection of policy and discussion documents, covering a wide 
range of environmental topics, such as environment governance, solid waste, and 
climate change. All documents were downloadable from the website. In addition, 
environmentally-related speeches and news were present. The website also 
introduced visitors to National’s BlueGreens executive team and regional 
coordinators, and provided their contact details. 
4.3.5 Resource generation 
National’s website exhibited a few attempts to generate resources for its election 
campaign, namely, pledging for financial donations, becoming a party member, 
and signing up as a volunteer. 
On the home page of National’s campaign website there was a red text button 
called ‘Donate to the Campaign’. Upon clicking, a secure page called ‘Donation’ was 
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rendered for making a financial donation towards National’s election campaign. 
The page started with a brief message outlining National’s future vision for New 
Zealanders. It then went on to stress the importance of each campaign donation in 
ensuring National realised its vision. The donation page also included a video clip 
in which Key personally appealed for campaign donations. To make a donation, a 
web form needed to be completed. The form solicited both personal and credit 
card details. It allowed donors to either select one of five predefined donation 
amounts, ranging from a minimum of $20 to a maximum of $1,000, or specify an 
amount. In order to complete the donation, two statements relating to legal 
compliance had to be selected. The web page also detailed the legal requirements 
for donating above $1,000 to National’s election campaign. 
To become a campaign volunteer or National member online simply required 
completing a web form. While the former gathered only personal information: 
name, address, email, and local electorate, the latter solicited further details 
relating to payment and credit card, due to National’s fee-based membership. 
4.3.6 Summary 
Table 4.1 summarises National’s e-campaigning utilisation and its extent with the 
proposed e-campaigning framework. It suggests that National’s e-campaigning 
utilisation was expansive and highly extensive; it focused most on information 
dissemination and targeted campaigning, and least on voter interaction and 
engagement. 
Five areas of National’s e-campaigning utilisation are worth highlighting. First, a 
substantial portion of National’s e-campaign focused on the party leader. Second, 
online videos featured prominently in National’s e-campaign. Third, the online 
interaction and engagement in National’s e-campaign chiefly focused on key 
election policies. Fourth, social media was introduced as part of National’s e-
campaign in this election; it, however, was primarily intended for information 
dissemination. That is, the interactive nature of social media was barely exploited. 
Last, National’s targeted campaigning at specific voter segments was diverse and 
sophisticated. Also note that two content elements are not captured by the 
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proposed e-campaigning framework, namely means for voters to endorse the 
political party and means to encourage votes. 
Table 4.1 National's e-campaigning utilisation and its extent 
Campaign practice Content elements Present 
Information 
dissemination 
Political party's information ● 
Candidate biography ● 
Press releases ● 
Policy statements ● 
Campaign news ● 
Campaign events ● 
Speeches ● 
Contact information ● 
Information relating to the political party's other online 
presence 
● 
Campaign blog without visitor comments allowed ● 
Voter interaction 
and engagement 
Instant chat or messaging  
Instant opinion polls  
Instant surveys  
Applications for interacting with the political party's policies ● 
Interactive calendar of campaign events ● 
Means to contact the political party ● 
Discussion forums  
Campaign blog with visitor comments allowed  
Means to provide feedback  ● 
Support 
mobilisation 
Means for voters to invite their peers to participate in 
campaign events 
 
Means to inform voters of electoral information ● 
Means for voters to receive campaign information and 
updates 
● 
Means for voters to connect with supporter groups ● 
Means for voters to download campaign material ● 
Means for voters to forward campaign material to others ● 
Means for voters to endorse the political party* ● 
Means to encourage votes* ● 
Targeted 
campaigning 
Content targeted at political opponents ● 
Content targeted at political opponents' policies ● 
Content targeted at specific voter segments ● 
Resource generation 
Means to make donations ● 
Online merchandise shop  
Means to become a party member ● 
Means to become a volunteer ● 
Note: * Not present in the proposed e-campaigning framework 
 
4.4 The factors influencing National’s e-
campaigning utilisation 
National’s e-campaigning utilisation was attributable to all factors in Table 2.2, 
namely, election type, electoral regulations, voters’ technology access, resource 
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availability, subjective norm, image, job relevance, output quality, result 
demonstrability, and perceived ease of use. The remainder of this section is 
structured according to those factors. This section is concluded with a summary. 
4.4.1 Election type 
The impact of party-led elections on e-campaigning utilisation was strongly felt by 
National’s campaign team. The team noted several instances where party-led 
elections at times meant battling with the senior hierarchy to gain acceptance of 
new ideas, more time spent on the internal decision-making process and less on 
external, actual campaigning, and even regression in e-campaigning. These, as a 
result, limited the party’s e-campaigning utilisation. 
National’s campaign team explained that e-campaigning for the party ‘is not a 
straightforward undertaking’. It involved a formal decision-making process and a 
number of members from the party hierarchy in the process. During the campaign 
period, weekly meetings were held between the decision makers and members 
from the campaign team who were in charge of National’s e-campaigning. The 
party’s e-campaigning utilisation as observed from National’s website was based 
on consensus among all members in the decision-making process. 
E-campaigning, according to National’s campaign team, had significantly evolved 
since its inception. More specifically, e-campaigning in the past was ‘simply about 
pulling all offline [campaign] material together and then transferring it to the 
website’. Nowadays, ‘you need to be more proactive, provide more campaign 
functions, and perform those functions quite differently [in e-campaigning] in 
order to maximise the benefits and effects.’ 
Some people in the decision-making process were technology savvy, they saw ‘the 
potential and power’ of e-campaigning and were willing to embrace those changes. 
They were referred to as ‘visionaries’ by the team. Others, however, were not 
‘heavy Internet users’; ‘they have long-standing ideas about what [National’s 
campaign website] should look like and provide,’ which ‘represent [National’s e-
campaigning] in the past’. Those people were referred to as ‘reactionaries’ by the 
team. The reactionaries were highly uncomfortable about new ideas or changes of 
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National’s e-campaigning as ‘they didn’t see or completely understand the need.’ 
Because campaigning in a party-led election meant for National’s campaign team 
that gaining consensus from all members in the decision-making process was 
essential, the reactionaries’ discomfort about new ideas or changes of e-
campaigning caused the campaign team to ‘scale down’ or ‘abandon’ some new or 
‘edgy’ ideas relating to National’s e-campaign, or, in some cases, to be confronted 
with a frustrating situation of ‘two steps forward and one step back’. 
For instance, the team believed that it was critical to feature RSS feeds in 
National’s e-campaign in order to get a subscriber base but could not get everyone 
in the decision-making process to agree. This idea was consequently withdrawn. 
The team also pointed out that the videos in National’s e-campaign were a new 
and important feature, and ‘proven to be hugely successful’. Initially, the idea of 
online campaign videos was rejected by some senior party members. It took ‘a few 
battles’ in order for the team to gain their acceptance. Then, those members 
strongly resisted the idea of focusing on personal aspects of the party leader in 
some online campaign videos. It was not until the team demonstrated some 
tangible results of similar ideas in overseas elections that the resistance was 
reversed; in other words, the negative impact of party-led elections was 
moderated by result demonstrability. 
National’s campaign team continued to indicate that in contrast to traditional 
campaigning, e-campaigning ‘is demand-driven in many ways’. An effective e-
campaign therefore ‘needs to be responsive to voters’ demands, which often 
requires new ideas and approaches’. ‘The fact that more people and processes 
being involved in a party campaign means [that] sometimes it takes longer to 
implement new [e-campaigning] ideas and approaches.’ This in turn reduced the 
responsiveness of the e-campaign. 
In all, to National’s campaign team, party-led elections involved more people and 
processes in decision-making, which at times negatively influenced the team’s e-
campaigning utilisation. It is worth noting the instance where the team reversed 
the resistance against focusing on personal aspects of the party leader in some 
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online campaign videos, as it suggests that the impact of election type was 
moderated by another factor – result demonstrability. 
4.4.2 Electoral regulations 
National’s campaign team was extremely critical of the Electoral Finance Act (EFA) 
2007, stating that it ‘severely limited’ the party’s e-campaigning utilisation. 
According to the team, the Act extended the regulated period for election 
campaigning from three months before polling day to the beginning of an election 
year. This meant that in the 2008 general election the regulated period was 
extended from three months to eleven. Since all expenditure on election 
campaigning, including e-campaigning, during the regulated period was capped 
and subject to strict legal scrutiny, the additional eight months of the regulated 
period meant that some of National’s ‘great’ yet ‘expensive’ e-campaigning ideas 
conceived before the Act had to be abandoned due to their implications on 
National’s overall campaign expenditure. Further, the team felt that the Act was 
‘rushed into law’ and inundated with ‘a lot of confusion and controversies’; 
accordingly, it was difficult for National’s campaign team to determine if certain e-
campaigning concepts were within the law. As a consequence, ‘some concepts had 
to be dropped because it’s very questionable they would not violate the EFA in 
some way and [the team] didn’t want to take the risk.’ 
The National’s campaign team noted a specific instance to further illustrate the 
impact of the EFA 2007 on the party’s e-campaigning utilisation. Prior to the Act, 
all parliamentary parties undertook e-campaigning on websites significantly 
funded by the Parliamentary Service. This considerably reduced their campaign 
expenses. After the Act became effective, e-campaigning practices on a website 
funded by the Parliamentary Service were highly restricted. Specifically, parties 
had to refrain from many e-campaigning practices, for instance, ‘you can’t ask 
[voters] for money or sign up new [party] members.’ Under the Act, if a party 
decided to pursue e-campaigning practices beyond those permitted on a 
parliament-funded website, the party was required to conduct those practices on 
a website entirely financed by itself. All associated expenses would be counted 
towards the party’s campaign expenditure limit. This new ruling put National’s 
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campaign team in a quandary: if the team decided to utilise the website funded by 
the Parliamentary Service, National’s e-campaigning utilisation would be 
profoundly impaired; if the team opted for a self-funded website, it would 
inevitably increase National’s campaign expenses and some initial e-campaigning 
ideas ‘would have to go’ in order to stay within the campaign expenditure limit. 
The team in the end decided on a fully self-funded website and had to forfeit some 
e-campaigning ideas. 
In short, electoral regulations discouraged National’s e-campaigning utilisation. In 
other words, the impact induced by the factor was negative. Among the electoral 
regulations, only the EFA 2007 was noted by National’s campaign team. The team 
added that the impact of the factor diminished as National’s campaign progressed. 
According to the team, the adversarial impact of the Act was not exclusive to 
National, yet it did not seem to withhold other parties campaigning aggressively – 
both online and offline – during the election. Consequently, the team quickly 
returned the focus to its upmost important task – campaigning. Put differently, the 
impact of electoral regulations on National’s e-campaigning utilisation was 
moderated by subjective norm. 
4.4.3 Voters’ technology access 
As noted, National’s campaign team considered the online videos in the party’s e-
campaign to be a new, significant, and successful feature, which renewed voters’ 
experience of election campaigning. A critical factor that made this significant 
feature possible in this election, said the team, was the rapid increase of 
broadband access in many parts of New Zealand just before the election. As the 
team put it, ‘If the majority of people were still having slow Internet connections 
like in 2006 or 2007, there wouldn’t have been any demand for Internet videos of 
our MPs and John Key’. The team continued, ‘And what’s the point of supplying 
something when there’s no demand for it?’ 
Despite the much-improved status of broadband penetration across New Zealand, 
in the election voters from certain regions or demographic segments were ‘still 
using very basic Internet connections [dial-up] – either by choice or because of the 
fact that they didn’t have broadband access’; these voters ‘were equally important’ 
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to National, according to National’s campaign team. Consequently, the team 
decided not to ‘push the use of rich media to the full scale’ in National’s e-
campaigning. 
The team also indicated that it had briefly considered incorporating mobile phone 
text messaging in its e-campaign, referred to as ‘text campaigning’, before the 
election because of high mobile phone access in New Zealand. The thought was 
quickly dropped because ‘it’s just too expensive and [the team] didn’t have plenty 
of money to play with.’ In other words, the impact of voters’ technology access was 
moderated by resource availability. 
In brief, voters’ technology access encouraged as well as withheld National’s e-
campaigning utilisation. Put differently, the impact of the factor on National’s e-
campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. It is worth noting the 
instance where the team initially considered deploying text campaigning in 
National’s e-campaigning for it suggests that the impact of voters’ technology 
access was moderated by another factor – resource availability. 
4.4.4 Resource availability 
National’s campaign team revealed that the decision to include YouTube and 
Flickr in the e-campaign was due to resource considerations. More specifically, 
despite considering its campaign videos to be a significant feature of its e-
campaign, National initially decided to employ YouTube as the only platform for 
hosting and broadcasting the videos; developing a sub-site for those videos with 
the party’s own resources, namely NTV, was not originally intended. As the team 
explained, contrary to popular belief, the resources available for National’s 
campaigning were ‘remarkably limited’ and ‘it hardly required any resources [of 
National]’, namely, ‘time, labour, and money’, to employ YouTube for National’s 
online campaign videos. Flickr was utilised for National’s campaign photos for the 
same reason. 
It is worth noting that National’s campaign team eventually developed NTV for the 
party’s online campaign videos in addition to YouTube because soon after 
deploying the online campaign videos, it became clear to the team that the videos 
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were ‘a phenomenal success’ and ‘a strategic differentiator’; further, National’s 
senior members and focus groups unanimously suggested that the videos feature 
on the campaign website. In other words, the team’s earlier intention not to 
implement NTV because of resource availability was moderated by result 
demonstrability as well as subjective norm. 
As National’s campaign team further utilised e-campaigning or conceived 
innovative e-campaigning ideas, it realised, on a number of occasions, that e-
campaigning was not always ‘resource-friendly’; quite the contrary, the increasing 
utilisation and professionalisation of e-campaigning accordingly demanded more 
resources that the team struggled to meet. This consequently confined the party’s 
e-campaigning utilisation. 
National’s campaign team asserted that when its US, UK, and Canadian 
counterparts ‘decide to work on a solution [pertaining to e-campaigning], they 
always have unlimited resources so they can always produce a more elegant 
product [e-campaign]’. This, however, was not applicable to the team; that is, the 
team ‘didn’t have the wealth of resources to make some of [its] ambitious ideas a 
reality’. A specific instance was noted by the team to further illustrate that. 
A ‘brilliant’ e-campaigning idea was conceived before the election. It pertained to 
online consultation, which entailed ‘large datasets, raw material and making them 
available online, discussion mechanisms with and among voters, inviting people 
to join and collaborate, and generating very large response sets which would serve 
as a foundation of National’s online interaction and policy developments’. ‘The 
idea would also allow people to go in and see comments from other people on 
specific things, and people would also be able to see how major threads in policy 
developments were handled in the final policy,’ the team continued. ‘It’s an all-in-
one process and it’s complicated and very ambitious. We just didn’t have the time 
and other resources to do it.’ The team added, 
That’s the thing about online campaigning: if you are simply doing basic 
things, such as putting policies and speeches online, it is true [that] it 
doesn’t need a lot of resources; but if you want to take it further, more often 
than not, it requires an enormous amount of time and resources, which we 
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didn’t have. So there’s quite a bit of irony about online campaigning when 
it comes to resources. 
National’s campaign team concurred with the observation of this study that the 
party’s online voter interaction and engagement was highly limited, especially on 
social networking sites. This, according to the team, was not for a lack of genuine 
interest to interact and engage with voters but the lack of time resources. As the 
team explained, each day during the campaign period, about a thousand 
comments were received from voters directly to Key on his blog entries and 
National’s Facebook page. The team firmly believed that ‘any online 
communications must be authentic’, therefore, only Key could respond to any of 
those voter comments. However, ‘[Key’s] diary was always full during the 
campaign period. He’s so busy to the extent that [the team] even struggled at times 
to get him in front of the video camera to make campaign videos.’ To that end, Key 
‘simply didn’t have the amount of time to personally respond to each and every 
comment people made’. ‘Online interactions’, the team added, ‘are extremely 
important in web campaigning … but they’re getting more and more resource-
intensive.’ The team did not have any solution to handle that and found it greatly 
concerning. 
A notable feature of National’s e-campaigning pertained to several campaigns 
targeted at specific voter segments. However, there was a gulf between those 
campaigns and what the team desired; the cause, said the team, was resource 
availability. According to the team, both Kevin Rudd, former Australian prime 
minister, and Obama were ‘exceptionally good at data mining and targeting 
specific voter groups and marginal seats’ in their e-campaigning, which was 
‘totally fascinating and way more advanced and sophisticated’ than National’s. The 
team strongly wanted to emulate the targeted campaigning by Rudd and Obama 
in the election. That, however, remained as an intention only as ‘it’s too expensive’ 
and the team did not possess ‘large-scale resources like [Rudd and Obama]’. The 
team added, ‘There’s a great myth that National has plenty of money to play with. 
Not really, membership-based organisations, little old ladies basically. We could 
only work with the resources that we had at the end of the day.’ It can be inferred 
 99 
from this instance that the impact of subjective norm was moderated by resource 
availability. 
‘Pouring’ more resources – such as money, time, and campaign staff – would 
definitely promote extensive and innovative e-campaigning, the team 
acknowledged. That, however, ‘sounds good in theory but it’s simply not practical’. 
Two reasons were noted. 
First, the team ‘didn’t have unlimited resources for campaigning to start with and, 
more importantly, online campaign is always led by the offline, which is extremely 
unlikely to change’. Accordingly, ‘a large chunk of resources are always handed to 
offline campaigning.’ ‘In fact,’ the team continued, ‘right from the start [of the 
election] we were given a clear message to keep our resource spending – not just 
money but also other resources – at an absolute minimum.’ 
Second, the team pointed out that many inside National had not realised that e-
campaigning beyond the basic level was tremendously resource-intensive. Thus, 
‘it has not yet come across their mind to consider giving more [resources to e-
campaigning].’ ‘It’s going to take quite a while for them to see that’, the team 
continued, ‘and before that happens, the expectation of how much should be spent 
on web campaigning, which is a minimum level of resources, is going to stay.’ 
In all, resource availability encouraged and depressed National’s e-campaigning 
utilisation. In other words, the impact of the factor on National’s e-campaigning 
consisted of two facets: positive and negative. As illustrated, the impact of 
resource availability was moderated by other factors, namely result 
demonstrability and subjective norm. And resource availability moderated the 
impact of another factor, namely subjective norm. It is worth highlighting the 
reasons provided by National’s campaign team for the impracticality of increasing 
campaign resources in order to foster extensive and innovative e-campaigning. 
4.4.5 Subjective norm 
Two instances have been noted so far where subjective norm moderated or 
partially moderated the impact of another factor on National’s e-campaigning 
utilisation. In the first instance, National’s campaign team felt that in the early 
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phase of the campaign period, the EFA 2007 severely affected National’s e-
campaigning plans. However, the negative impact of the Act waned because the 
team perceived that National was ‘not alone’ in observing the impact of the Act 
and the Act did not appear to withhold National’s counterparts from ‘campaigning 
aggressively online’. In the second instance, National’s campaign team did not 
initially intend to host the party’s campaign videos on its own, due to resource 
availability; however, the team overturned its initial stance after receiving strong 
advice from both National’s senior members and the focus groups that ‘[National’s] 
online videos were excellent … They should be on [National’s] website.’ 
The first instance pertained to competitive pressure and the second related to 
opinions of people whom were highly valued by National’s campaign team. The 
team also acknowledged that parts of National’s e-campaigning were influenced 
by the e-campaigning of some overseas political candidates and parties whom the 
team perceived to be important. Notably, the decision to ‘run an aggressive web 
campaign as a challenger and not be afraid to experiment different daring and 
innovative ideas’ was largely influenced by several e-campaigns in Canada, the US, 
Australia, the UK, France, and Germany that were closely followed by National’s 
campaign team before or during the 2008 election. 
Furthermore, the team admitted that a few features of its e-campaign, ‘Send an 
Ecard’ for instance, were in fact inspired by some of its political counterparts’ e-
campaigning in the election. The underlying reason centred on the team’s concern 
that National could ‘give away the edge’ to those political rivals if it did not follow 
suit. 
In all, subjective norm encouraged National’s e-campaigning utilisation. In other 
words, the impact of the factor was positive. The subjective norms in National’s e-
campaigning were derived from competitive pressure as well as the opinions and 
behaviour of those whom the team perceived to be significant. 
4.4.6 Image 
As National’s campaign team pointed out, ‘at the heart of [election] campaigning, 
doesn’t matter if it’s online or offline, a lot of it is to do with a party’s brand.’ 
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Further, ‘It has become more and more common in recent times [that] a great deal 
of effort in party campaigns also revolves around the image and personality of 
party leaders.’ Expectedly, consideration over National’s party’s and leader’s 
images played a role in National’s e-campaigning utilisation. 
Differing from National’s e-campaigning in the previous election cycle, according 
to the team, ‘A significant amount of effort was made to ensure the content and the 
look and feel across the National Party’s and its MPs’ Internet presence were 
consistent.’ However trivial this might appear to others, the team believed that it 
directly dealt with an important asset of a political party – image; therefore, any 
efforts devoted to promoting and protecting party image were ‘rightly justified’. 
As the team explained: 
A lot of people might think the consistency of content, look and feel across 
a party and its MPs’ websites is really a cosmetic issue. It’s not. A number 
of the National Party’s supporters told us that they’re turned off by the lack 
of strong consistency in terms of content, look and feel across our Internet 
presence during and after the 2005 election. They felt it actually affected 
our party image in some ways. We agreed. Why would you vote for a party 
to become the next government if it doesn’t seem to be serious and 
professional? This applies to our Internet presence as well. So this time 
around, we spent quite some effort developing and maintaining our brand 
consistency, which involved everything from specifying the RGB values of 
colours used in any websites associated with the National Party to blogs, 
newsletters, etc., for a simple reason – we wanted to be seen as professional 
and polished. 
Despite characterising its e-campaigning utilisation as ‘adventurous’, National’s 
campaign team initially decided to confine its virtual presence to the party website 
only. Establishing a Facebook campaign page was not originally intended. This, 
according to the team, was due to a twofold concern relating to National’s image. 
First, the team considered using Facebook to be ‘hip’, which ‘isn’t the typical image 
National normally associated itself with’; second, the team believed that being 
present on interactive websites, such as Facebook, would be perceived by many 
voters as an invitation for two-way communication between voters and National 
– particularly the party leader. However, Key’s hefty schedule during the entire 
campaign period deemed it impossible for him to personally respond to each voter 
message. The team continued, if Key did not personally respond to voter messages, 
it could be perceived to be ‘a lack of genuine interest in engagement with voters’, 
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however understandable the underlying reason might be; if someone else was 
allowed to answer voter messages on Key’s behalf, it could be perceived as ‘lacking 
authenticity’, ultimately jeopardising ‘the credibility of both the party and John 
[Key]’. 
Nevertheless, Facebook was employed as part of National’s e-campaigning during 
the election. Intriguingly, according to the team, a contributing factor was also 
image. More specifically, during the course of campaigning, the team both 
discovered and was alerted to a number of Facebook pages that masqueraded as 
the party’s or Key’s. ‘Although we took a close look at the content [on those pages] 
and it didn’t show anything particularly harmful,’ said the team, ‘it, quite frankly, 
caused quite some concern about the National Party’s brand, especially when 
many voters who’ve come across or have become friends [or] fans with these 
pages most likely do not know they’re actually fake.’ In response, National decided 
to establish its Facebook presence in order to protect and defend its image. 
Negative campaigning was observed in National’s e-campaign, which was mainly 
confined to policies. This, according to National’s campaign team, was deliberate, 
out of consideration relating to National’s political image. Specifically, the team 
believed that targeting at opponents’ policies, especially in an election, ‘is 
generally accepted and expected [by voters]’ and therefore inconsequential to the 
party’s image. The team, however, held that ‘a line must be drawn between policy 
and personal attacks’. The latter was perceived to be ill-received among voters. 
The team added that employing ‘smear tactics’ against political opponents would 
directly contradict the core message, ‘a bright future’, National heavily 
campaigned on, which emphasised positivity, and would ultimately lead to a lot of 
damage to the party’s brand, which was ‘totally unworthy’. The perception that 
personal attacks were highly pernicious to National’s political image was so 
vehemently held by National’s campaign team that the team steered clear of 
personal attacks in e-campaigning throughout the election, even when several 
overseas e-campaigns that inspired National’s e-campaigning utilisation 
employed the tactic, and domestically, numerous personal attacks, particularly 
aimed at Key, were launched from National’s opponents. This instance also 
suggests that the impact of subjective norm was moderated by image. 
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In brief, concerns over both National’s and Key’s images stimulated and dissuaded 
National’s e-campaigning utilisation. Put differently, the impact of image on 
National’s e-campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. Although 
National’s e-campaigning utilisation was considerably inspired by others’ – both 
domestically and globally, personal attacks were an exception; in other words, the 
impact of subjective norm on National’s e-campaigning utilisation was 
occasionally moderated by image. 
4.4.7 Job relevance 
National’s campaign team noted that a key difference in e-campaigning between 
the 2008 election and previous elections lied in the rapid rise of social networking 
websites, which could be integrated as part of an e-campaign. National, however, 
did not embrace all social networking websites in its 2008 e-campaign. Three 
‘popular’ social networking websites at the time of the election, namely, Bebo, 
Myspace, and LinkedIn, were particularly omitted, plainly because the team did 
not consider them to be relevant. Specifically, ‘Bebo’s user base is young kids who 
represent the voters of tomorrow but not today,’ the team explained, ‘Myspace and 
LinkedIn are anything but politics so it’s a waste of time to engage on them.’ 
Based on numerous overseas e-campaigns that occurred around the 2008 election 
National’s campaign team found that ‘It’s becoming a global trend for politicians, 
such as Obama, to increase their popularity and votes by chatting and interacting 
with voters online.’ Yet, the perceived trend did not propel National to act similarly 
in its e-campaigning utilisation. As the team explained, ‘Spending a lot of time 
online chatting and interacting with voters isn’t really relevant in the New Zealand 
context when you consider the culture here; the voters here in New Zealand still 
very much prefer face-to-face interaction.’ It can be inferred from this instance 
that the impact of subjective norm was moderated by job relevance. 
From closely observing e-campaigning during the 2008 US presidential election, 
National’s campaign team noted a new feature garnering much public attention 
and commendation. It pertained to networked collaboration between voters and 
politicians to develop election policies. This feature did not appeal to the team 
however popular it appeared. This was due to the perception that it was ‘more a 
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gimmick than of any true relevance to election campaigning’. More specifically, it 
was inconceivable that, at least in New Zealand, ‘any political party would go into 
an election and say to the public, “Look, we haven’t got any policies to campaign 
on but would you like to help us to come up with some?”’ because political parties 
were expected to enter election campaigning with most of their main policies 
being almost, if not already, finalised. 
In general, job relevance discouraged National’s e-campaigning utilisation in 
several aspects. It is worth highlighting the instance where National’s campaign 
team preferred to engage and interact with voters face-to-face despite a growing 
global trend of online voter interaction and engagement, as it suggests the impact 
of subjective norm was moderated by job relevance. National’s campaign team 
added that the relevance of a particular technology, application, or approach to e-
campaigning ‘is subjective and constantly evolving’. With ‘some fresh thinking or 
tweaking’, a previously seemingly irrelevant technology, application, or approach 
could be turned into a ‘relevant, or even very successful’, one. 
4.4.8 Output quality 
Being a challenger in traditional election campaigning, National often found itself 
in an unfavourable position in that, compared to the incumbent, much less 
exposure and attention was given by traditional media in order to promote itself 
and its policies, according to National’s campaign team. 
The 2008 election was especially arduous for National as a third-time challenger 
to some extent because the party needed to solicit additional exposure to promote 
its new party leader who was largely unknown to the New Zealand public. Under 
such a ‘challenging circumstance’, National’s campaign team had decided before 
the election to extensively promote the party’s election policies and leader online, 
because the team strongly perceived that e-campaigning had presented itself as ‘a 
powerful alternative to accomplish those important tasks in a way that wasn’t 
possible before’. This perception consisted of two main facets. First, the team 
surmised that the number of New Zealand voters online was similar to, if not 
greater than, that engaging in traditional media. And second, the team believed 
that e-campaigning ‘is empowering, and, more importantly, provides any 
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challengers with more or less equal campaign opportunities’. It is worth noting 
that the perception had not been verified before being acted on; in other words, as 
the team described, it was ‘a leap of faith’. 
National’s campaign team understood that ‘the voting public is the ultimate 
audience of any election campaign,’ voters’ thoughts and feelings relating to any 
aspect of the party’s campaign were therefore ‘strategically valuable’. Yet, the 
team acknowledged that it had not been ‘particularly proactive’ when gathering 
voters’ feedback of any sort in National’s e-campaigning. This, as stressed by the 
team, was not contradictory but a plain reflection of the belief that soliciting 
feedback online would not ‘perform as well as’ its offline counterpart, such as the 
various in-person focus groups organised by the party during the election. As the 
team further explained, the Internet was an environment consisting of not only 
opportunities but also risks that could not be fully managed. Particularly, ‘If not 
careful, it’s quite easy to get out of our [the party’s] control … and there’re lots of 
trolls and people with a very vicious agenda out there [in the online environment].’ 
Since it was extremely difficult to identify trolls or people with a very vicious 
agenda, gathering feedback online inevitably ‘opens up an enormous possibility to 
invite yourself [the party itself] to nothing remotely meaningful but being abused’. 
In short, output quality propelled and dampened National’s e-campaigning 
utilisation. That is, the impact of the factor consisted of two sides: positive and 
negative. 
4.4.9 Result demonstrability 
As noted, before the election National’s campaign team decided to take an 
‘aggressive’, ‘new’ approach to promoting the party’s policies and ‘new leader’ in 
its e-campaign, guided by the untested belief that in doing so the party could 
combat the anticipated campaign challenges in those areas. Such an approach was 
primarily reflected in the depiction of Key in various roles and activities through 
images and videos, and in a series of videos where senior National MPs promoted 
the party’s main election policies for which they were responsible. National’s 
campaign team was ‘quite confident’ that the ‘new’ approach would ‘really take off’ 
when it was launched but in the meanwhile, the team was also acutely aware that 
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‘there’s still a small fraction of senior members [within National] who were quite 
sceptical [about the approach].’ 
Nevertheless, as the team indicated, the scepticism evaporated when the merits of 
the approach became ‘quickly and increasingly apparent’ after implementation, 
through both quantified and qualified results. Notably, the images and videos, 
especially the latter, that promoted National’s policies and Key constantly 
attracted increased and significant attention from both national and overseas 
voters. This was demonstrated by ‘the viewership and website traffic’. Moreover, 
before the election, Key ‘was only known as a rich capitalist to many’, according to 
the team. This narrow perception of National’s leader caused considerable 
concern to National’s campaign team, particularly when it ‘formed the basis of a 
series of Labour’s smear campaigns directly against both the National Party and 
John [Key]’. However, by the mid-phase of the campaign, both the images and 
videos in National’s e-campaign portraying Key in different roles and activities had 
diversified the public perception of Key, based on the feedback from different 
sources gathered by National. According to the team, the result demonstrability of 
the approach had affirmed its position and warranted further development in 
National’s e-campaigning. Put differently, had the approach been unable to 
indicate any observable results, its continuity in National’s campaign could have 
been in jeopardy. 
As noted, during the election, National’s campaign team shifted its stance on 
Facebook in e-campaigning – from rejecting to accepting it, primarily out of image 
considerations. However, not all of National’s senior members were entirely 
comfortable with it because, said the team, it was the first time that Facebook was 
part of National’s election campaigning, so no one knew ‘what to expect’. 
Nevertheless, within only a few weeks after National’s Facebook campaign page 
went live, the senior members’ feelings of discomfort were substantially eased 
because the aptness of utilising Facebook became ‘very apparent to everyone in 
the party’. More specifically, the number of people wanting to befriend Key on 
Facebook was volcanic, so much so that the limit of 5,000 friends on the Facebook 
profile was rapidly reached and an additional profile was set up in order to 
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accommodate a backlog of 2,000 friend requests as well as new requests. These 
clear results, said the team, had won support from every member of National, 
including the sceptics, consequently fortifying the role of Facebook in National’s 
e-campaigning. 
National’s campaign team also noted that a few e-campaigning approaches were 
restricted or halted due to a lack of observable results. For instance, at the 
beginning of the campaign, National’s campaign team published a few videos on 
the campaign website relating to post-cabinet press conferences. However, the 
team was unsure how those videos fared, consequently, the team stopped 
producing them as much as before. 
In sum, result demonstrability stimulated and discouraged National’s e-
campaigning utilisation. Put differently, the impact of the factor consisted of two 
facets: positive and negative. The team stressed that caution had to be taken when 
reacting towards the result demonstrability of any e-campaigning idea or 
approach, because it could take time for results to be generated, especially if the 
concerned approach or idea was new. The team also noted that its understanding 
of e-campaigning was not holistic, it was therefore difficult for the team to 
adequately obtain or assess results of e-campaigning. 
4.4.10 Perceived ease of use 
National’s campaign team pointed out that as ICTs advanced and the pressure to 
‘do more and break new ground’ from both within the party and the public 
increased, e-campaigning had gone beyond ‘simply moving text and a few pictures 
to a website’. Because of that, the extent of National’s e-campaigning utilisation ‘is 
increasingly driven by how much we [the campaign team] know’. This suggests 
that National’s e-campaigning utilisation was influenced by perceived ease of use. 
It was not straightforward for National’s campaign team to arrive at the decision 
to incorporate Facebook in its e-campaigning, considering the amount of thought 
and deliberation involved. Despite that, the extent of the party’s utilisation of this 
social networking website was rather limited. More precisely, National utilised 
Facebook chiefly for information dissemination. This could be explained by a lack 
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of comprehensive knowledge, according to the team. More specifically, ‘In many 
ways Facebook is a completely different breed when you compare it with 
traditional websites such as the National Party’s own website,’ said the team. ‘It 
[Facebook] can be turned into a powerful campaign machine … but we didn’t fully 
know how in this election so we could only stick to doing what we did know at that 
point in time.’ 
In National’s e-campaigning, online videos were another new element whose 
extent of utilisation was elevated by perceived ease of use. As the team explained, 
We did lots of campaign videos of all sorts in our online campaign. Because 
technically speaking, it’s simple, straightforward, and there wasn’t any 
learning curve involved. More importantly, it’s unnecessary for online 
videos to involve TV quality production, which meant we didn’t need to 
worry about any complicated and time-consuming stuff such as studio 
lighting or professional video editing. That’s why we’re very keen on doing 
more video stuff. 
From a non-technical perspective, the team believed that it was easier to promote 
Key with online videos than other available alternatives in the election. More 
specifically, before the campaign, little was known among voters about Key except 
for him being ‘a rich investment banker’. The campaign team understood that in 
order to have a National-led government after the election, the voting public 
needed to be made aware that Key was ‘more than just a successful banker in his 
past job; in fact, he’s a very charismatic, caring, approachable, and likeable guy’. 
To accomplish that, according to the team, ‘voters needed to be given a chance to 
see for themselves those qualities of John in different natural situations.’ On that 
note, online videos were considered to be ‘the easiest option’. The team also 
perceived National’s online campaign videos of Key to be the easiest mechanism 
to refute Labour’s constant negative campaigning against Key. More specifically, 
‘Every time they [Labour] attacked John Key, saying he’s this slippery, slimy 
bastard, the easiest way to counter this was to show people our videos of John Key,’ 
said the team, ‘so that they could find out themselves what the Labour Party said 
about John Key couldn’t be further from the truth. So we produced quite a lot of 
videos of John.’ 
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In short, perceived ease of use motivated and hindered National’s e-campaigning 
utilisation. That is, the impact of the factor consisted of two facets: positive and 
negative. 
4.4.11 Summary 
National’s e-campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election was shaped by 
the ten factors in Table 2.2, namely, election type, electoral regulations, voters’ 
technology access, resource availability, subjective norm, image, job relevance, 
output quality, result demonstrability, and perceived ease of use. Each factor in 
essence represents a unique perspective, therefore, National’s e-campaigning 
utilisation has been explained from ten perspectives. Various specific and 
contextual instances that occurred in National’s e-campaigning utilisation have 
been presented to illustrate the factors, lending valuable insights into this unique 
phenomenon. Table 4.2 highlights the ten factors that influenced National’s e-
campaigning utilisation. 
Table 4.2 The factors influencing National's e-campaigning utilisation 
Factor Dual impact Moderated by 
Election type  Result demonstrability 
Electoral regulations  Subjective norm 
Voters' technology access ● Resource availability 
Resource availability ● Result demonstrability, subjective norm 
Subjective norm  Resource availability, image, job relevance 
Image ●  
Job relevance   
Output quality ●  
Result demonstrability ●  
Perceived ease of use ●  
 
As noted in the table, the impacts of some factors, such as resource availability, on 
National’s e-campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. This 
means that those factors were enablers as well as inhibitors of National’s e-
campaigning utilisation. The impacts of some factors, such as election type, were 
moderated by other factors, such as result demonstrability. Taken together, it 
suggests that National’s e-campaigning utilisation was complex, contextual, and 
dynamic. 
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4.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented the key findings from the case study relating to 
National’s e-campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election. It has 
comprehensively analysed the breadth and depth of National’s e-campaigning 
utilisation. Based on that, it has identified and illustrated in depth the ten factors 
that influenced National’s e-campaigning utilisation. 
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Chapter 5 Labour’s e-campaigning utilisation 
5.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter presents the key findings from the second case study: Labour’s e-
campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election. This chapter proceeds as 
follows: section 5.2 outlines the case background; then, section 5.3 and 5.4 answer 
the first and second research questions respectively; and last, section 5.5 
summarises this chapter. 
5.2 Case background 
Founded in 1916, Labour is the political party with the longest history in New 
Zealand, representing the country’s working class. It is also one of the two major 
New Zealand political parties. The party’s political stance is generally regarded as 
centre-left and socially liberal. 
With 50 seats in Parliament, Labour was the largest party before the 2008 general 
election. Since 1999 the party, together with coalition partners, had been the New 
Zealand government for three consecutive terms. Labour was led by Clark, the first 
elected female prime minister in New Zealand. Clark first entered Parliament as 
an elected Labour MP in 1981 then rose to the Labour leadership and prime 
ministership in 1993 and 1999, respectively. In the 2008 election Clark led her 
party to seek a fourth term in government. 
In past election cycles offline campaigning had been the primary focus, as 
acknowledged by Labour’s campaign team, the notion of e-campaigning, on the 
other hand, ‘didn’t really appear on [the party’s] campaign radar until 2007’. Thus, 
e-campaigning in the 2008 election was regarded by Labour’s campaign team as 
‘an exciting experience’. 
Despite being a new comer, e-campaigning received serious attention from Labour, 
so much so that the party sent some members of its campaign team to the US in 
2007 in order to closely observe and learn from the e-campaigning conducted by 
Obama’s campaign team. In addition, Labour’s campaign team opted for a new 
 112 
website (www.labour08.co.nz), designated for the party’s e-campaign. Therefore, 
this case study is based on Labour’s campaign-specific website. Figure 5.1 and 5.2 
depict the entire home page of Labour’s campaign website. 
 
Figure 5.1 The home page of Labour's campaign website (part 1) 
 
Figure 5.2 The home page of Labour's campaign website (part 2) 
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The decision to utilise a campaign-specific website was made not long before the 
official announcement of the 2008 general election. This, compounded with a 
severe shortage of e-campaigning staff, saw Labour’s campaign website go live 
before completion. Consequently, early in the campaign, a large number of pages 
of Labour’s campaign website, including the ones relating to the party’s election 
policies, displayed ‘under construction’ only. 
Labour took a centralised approach to e-campaigning, meaning that the party’s 
entire e-campaigning was directed, implemented, and managed by Labour’s 
campaign team from the party’s head office. Despite being a large political 
organisation, Labour did not specifically have an internal IT unit providing 
oversight to any of the party’s ICT activities such as e-campaigning. Labour’s 
campaign team acknowledged that the party relied considerably on its campaign 
volunteers to assist in the operation of its e-campaigning. 
In the election, Labour’s primary campaign message, across both offline and online 
campaigns, centred on political stability and the credibility of Clark and Key, the 
party leader of National. Labour’s campaign message formed a stark contrast to 
National’s which focused on change of government and the leader of the country. 
5.3 Labour’s e-campaigning utilisation and its 
extent 
On the basis of the proposed e-campaigning framework, Labour’s e-campaigning 
encompassed all five practices, namely, information dissemination, voter 
interaction and engagement, support mobilisation, targeted campaigning, and 
resource generation. Those practices were conducted to varying degrees. The 
analysis in this section is structured according to the practices. This section is 
concluded with a summary. 
5.3.1 Information dissemination 
Labour’s e-campaign disseminated a large quantity of campaign information. The 
header of Labour’s campaign website was the party’s primary campaign message 
expressed through different quotes from Clark – for instance, ‘strong proven 
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leadership’ or ‘I believe that we have shown in government that we deliver on our 
promises and we keep our word to voters.’ Labour’s campaign message was also 
expressed through campaign videos on the website. In general, Labour’s campaign 
information was organised around different themes, such as ‘News’, ‘The 
Campaign Trail’, ‘Meet Helen Clark’, ‘Labour’s Policy’, and ‘Speeches’. 
Labour provided a large volume of campaign news under the ‘News’ page. The 
news articles were represented as hypertext links and organised in reverse 
chronological order. The articles encompassed a wide range of topics – from 
announcing the party’s latest election policies to attacking National’s policies. 
Labour’s campaign news was updated on an almost daily basis. Quite often, the 
news was updated frequently within the same day. Labour’s press releases were 
placed together with campaign news. 
Labour’s campaign website provided comprehensive election policies under the 
‘Labour’s Policy’ page. The coverage of the party’s election policies was broad, 
which was expected for a major political party. This, however, did not compromise 
the ease of navigation as the policies were thoughtfully compartmentalised. More 
specifically, the classification of Labour’s election policies involved two levels: 
macro and micro. At the macro level, policies were sectionalised into ten domains, 
such as ‘People and Communities’, ‘Education’, and ‘Sustainability’. At the micro 
level, policies under each domain were subdivided; take policies under the 
Education domain for instance, they were further divided into seven portfolios, 
such as ‘Tertiary Education’, and ‘Student Allowances’. 
Labour’s policy domains and portfolios were both presented as hypertext links. 
When navigating a particular domain or portfolio, the significance and main goals 
relating to the domain or portfolio were stated. The policy web page also featured 
a search engine, enabling a policy search with keywords. Two particular economic 
policies namely ‘Tax Cuts’ and ‘Working for Families’ were the main foci in 
Labour’s e-campaign, as they centrally featured on the home page of Labour’s 
campaign website. It is noteworthy that Labour adopted tag cloud, a web 2.0 
application, as an additional means to inform its economic policies, based on the 
emphasis that the party placed on them. Specifically, Labour’s economic policies 
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were tagged with terms encapsulating the essence of the policies, for instance, 
‘Finding Work’ and ‘Productivity’. The font size of a tag visualised the frequency of 
application. That is, the larger a tag in the tag cloud, the more frequently it had 
been applied by Labour, thereby suggesting the more emphasis that Labour placed 
on the particular area represented by the tag. Figure 5.3 illustrates the utilisation 
of tag cloud by Labour to inform the emphases of the party’s economic policies. 
The figure suggests that ‘Finding Work’ or ‘Responding to the international 
downturn’ received more focus from Labour than ‘Science and Innovation Funding’ 
or ‘International Connections’. It should be noted that Labour’s use of tag cloud to 
inform the emphases of the party’s policies was confined to the economic domain. 
Similar to the party’s campaign news, Labour’s election policies received frequent 
updates during the entire campaign period. 
 
Figure 5.3 Labour's use of tag cloud 
Labour’s campaign trail, also referred to by the party as ‘Labour’s campaign blog’, 
was a dominant feature of the party’s e-campaign. Not only was a web page 
created for Labour’s campaign trail, but links to the six most recent additions to 
Labour’s campaign trail also featured on the home page. The campaign blog, 
according to the website, was ‘a chance for us [Labour] to tell the story of what 
we’ve achieved for New Zealand in the last nine years, and … for us to shout out, 
loud and clear, what we can achieve with another term’. It was also a place where 
Labour could tell its story in entirety ‘through facts and figures and through the 
real Kiwis that we talk to on the campaign trail’, not ‘in soundbites [sic] or two-line 
billboards dreamt up in an advertising agency’s boardroom’. Moreover, the blog 
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served as a chance for Labour ‘to engage with voters in every corner of the 
country’. Despite covering various topics, Labour’s campaign trail predominantly 
centred on announcing new election policies, highlighting Labour’s offline 
campaign, promoting Labour’s main election policies, and attacking National’s 
policies and party leader. A number of the entries were penned by Clark 
personally, referred to as ‘Helen’s diary’, shown in Figure 5.4. Helen’s diary 
particularly focused on the credibility of her party, the main achievements of her 
government in the past nine years, the significance of Labour’s election policies, 
and the criticality of Labour being re-elected. The entries of Labour’s campaign 
trail were predominantly text-based and displayed as hypertext links in reverse 
chronological order. A search engine was provided on the campaign trail page, 
enabling information retrieval with keywords. Commenting on any entry of 
Labour’s campaign blog was disabled, suggesting that the nature of the blog was 
primarily to inform voters. 
 
Figure 5.4 Helen's diary 
A noticeable portion of Labour’s e-campaign was allocated for profiles of Labour’s 
2008 candidates. All profiles were contained in the ‘Candidates’ page, organised 
according to the candidates’ list ranking by default. Each profile was displayed as 
 117 
a hypertext link with the candidate’s name, the electorate, if applicable, and the 
candidate’s list ranking. Upon clicking a candidate’s name, the candidate’s full 
profile rendered in a separate web page, highlighting the candidate’s background, 
and political ambitions and achievements in the candidate’s own words. Clark’s 
profile received particular emphasis; not only was her profile included in the 
‘Candidates’ page, a separate, alternative profile of the Labour leader and prime 
minister was also provided, which featured as ‘Meet Helen Clark’ on the home page. 
The content of this alternative profile was reworded. A sizeable portion of Clark’s 
alternative profile focused on her personal life, such as her regular visits to the 
gym and conquering Africa’s highest peak. Clark’s alternative profile and its 
content, along with the campaign message emphasising Clark’s ‘proven 
leadership’, suggests that Labour’s e-campaigning leaned towards the party leader 
as opposed to the party. 
Speeches delivered by select senior Labour MPs, mostly Clark, in offline activities, 
such as conferences and award ceremonies, were available in Labour’s e-
campaign. However, only nine speeches were provided. Also, based on the time 
stamps, Labour’s speeches received updates much less frequently than did the 
party’s campaign news or campaign blog. Labour utilised three social networking 
websites, namely, Facebook, YouTube, and Flickr in its 2008 e-campaigning. 
However, only its Facebook presence was explicitly indicated on Labour’s 
campaign website; the party’s YouTube and Flickr presence was suggested only 
when clicking on video clips or pictures depicting Labour’s campaign roadshow, 
respectively. 
Labour almost solely relied on text to disseminate its campaign information. Quite 
rarely, the party utilised video clips or images to describe its major election 
policies or campaign trail. 
A few content elements associated with information dissemination were absent 
from Labour’s e-campaign, namely, party information, campaign events, and 
contact information of Labour’s 2008 candidates. 
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5.3.2 Voter interaction and engagement 
Labour’s e-campaign consisted of two elements that enabled interaction and 
engagement with voters. These elements pertained to interacting with Labour’s 
election policies and providing feedback. The former was synchronous interaction 
and the latter was asynchronous. 
Labour’s campaign website offered voters two forms of interaction with its 
election policies. First, an online calculator was provided for voters to interact 
with Labour’s policies relating to personal income tax, particularly ‘Working for 
Families’ – a flagship policy of Labour relating to paying tax credits to families with 
dependent children under 18 years old in order to assist them with raising their 
families. Figure 5.5 depicts Labour’s tax calculator. As shown in the figure, when a 
voter input personal information as a parent – both parents’ annual income, and 
the number and age of dependent children in the family – the calculator would 
then respond with the sum of personalised tax credits under Labour’s Working for 
Families from the current tax year to two subsequent years. The same calculator 
also enabled voters to interact as an individual, as opposed to a parent, with 
Labour’s intensely-campaigned policy on personal income tax by simply clicking 
on the icon in the calculator that switched to calculation of individual income tax. 
 
Figure 5.5 Labour's tax calculator 
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The second form of interaction with Labour’s election policies, manifested as 
another online calculator, related to ‘KiwiSaver’ – a major policy championed by 
Labour, fostering voluntary, work-based savings for retirement with monetary 
contributions from both the employer and the New Zealand government as the 
primary enticement. Figure 5.6 exhibits the calculator, referred to as ‘KiwiSaver 
Calculator’ on Labour’s campaign website. The calculator functioned similarly to 
the one for personal income tax. That is, the calculator was able to advise voters 
the amount of tax cut and KiwiSaver support that they would receive, based on the 
personal information, namely salary, they entered and Labour’s election policy on 
the relevant areas. Also included in the calculator was an icon, which, upon clicking, 
would render a separate page, disseminating the details of Labour’s policies on 
personal income tax. This suggests that the calculator also performed information 
dissemination. 
 
Figure 5.6 Labour's KiwiSaver calculator 
In addition to synchronous interaction, Labour’s campaign website also included 
asynchronous interaction. Specifically, an icon could be located on Labour’s 
campaign website that allowed visitors to send their feedback to the party. The 
icon was in essence a mailto link; in other words, feedback would be delivered as 
an email from the visitor’s email client with a predefined email subject (‘Labour08 
website’) to a designated email address (myideas@labour08.org.nz). 
Labour included three social networking websites as part of its e-campaigning, 
namely, Facebook, YouTube, and Flickr. Despite being intrinsically interactive, 
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those websites were found to primarily serve the purpose of disseminating 
campaign information or attacking National’s leader for Labour. More specifically, 
Facebook was used to inform new content that was added to Labour’s campaign 
website, such as news and policy releases; YouTube was employed to broadcast 
Clark’s offline speeches and particularly Labour’s televised campaign 
advertisements that chiefly focused on attacking the credibility of National’s 
leader; and Flickr was utilised to host more than 100 images taken during Labour’s 
campaign roadshow. Visitor comments were rarely spotted on any of Labour’s 
pages on the social networking websites, although commenting was permitted. 
This could be due to the potential moderation by Labour of online remarks, or a 
lack of keen interest among visitors to proactively interact with Labour online. 
Moreover, no response from Labour was provided to any comment on Labour’s 
pages. 
5.3.3 Support mobilisation 
Mobilising voter support was a significant practice in Labour’s e-campaigning. The 
home page featured a noticeable image icon. As the label of the icon suggested, 
clicking on the icon would direct the visitor to the website of the New Zealand 
Electoral Commission for checking enrolment status. If not yet enrolled as a voter, 
the visitor could complete the enrolment on the Commission’s website. The link to 
the Electoral Commission’s website was also found on Labour’s Facebook page. 
In addition to encouraging voter registration, Labour urged voters to cast their 
votes for the party on the polling day in its e-campaign. More specifically, it was 
frequently noted in Helen’s diary, speeches, and policy releases that voters must 
cast their votes for Labour in the election, in order to sustain ‘all the good work’ 
delivered to New Zealanders by Clark’s government and to reap the future benefits 
of Labour’s various election policies. For instance, in an entry of Helen’s diary, 
titled ‘Labour tackles financial crisis at launch’, Clark first stressed that under her 
government the New Zealand economy not only remained unscathed in the worst 
worldwide financial crisis since the 1930s but also saw continuous growth. Clark 
continued that there was no room for complacency and a lot of work remained to 
be carried out in order to ‘keep our [New Zealand’s] banking system sound and 
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the economy on a growth path’. Therefore, Clark affirmed, it was paramount that 
Labour was given ‘the privilege of re-election’. 
Labour’s campaign website consisted of a notable means for voters to share its 
campaign content. More specifically, each entry of Labour’s campaign blog was 
attached with four Web 2.0 services, namely ‘Scoopit’, ‘Digg’, ‘Reddit’, and 
‘Del.icio.us’, as shown in Figure 5.7. Each web service related to a particular social 
networking website – for instance, Scoopit connected to www.scoopit.co.nz, 
focusing on bookmarking, sharing, and discovering web content. Therefore, these 
four services enabled readers to effortlessly spread Labour’s election campaign on 
the associated social networking websites, accessed by a large, growing quantity 
of both domestic and international visitors. 
 
Figure 5.7 Labour's use of Web 2.0 services for sharing its campaign blog 
Subscribing to Labour’s campaign email was straightforward by simply locating 
the section on every web page of Labour’s campaign website that was labelled ‘Get 
email updates’, entering an email address, and clicking on the ‘subscribe’ button. 
Digital copies of Labour’s offline campaign billboards were also available on 
Labour’s campaign website for downloading and sharing. 
As noted, information relating to Labour’s campaign events was absent from 
Labour’s campaign website; unsurprisingly, means for voters to invite others to 
participate in Labour’s campaign events were also absent. Moreover, Labour’s 
campaign website did not provide any means for visitors to connect with other 
third-party supporter groups. 
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5.3.4 Targeted campaigning 
A prominent portion of content on Labour’s campaign website was fiercely 
targeted at Labour’s largest political rival, namely National. More precisely, 
Labour’s targeted campaigning at National could be classified into two branches 
according to the subject: National’s policies, particularly economic policies, and 
Key, National’s party leader. 
Labour accused National’s election policies of undermining the economic 
achievements that had been made by Clark’s government and enjoyed by the 
majority of New Zealanders, and, more importantly, jeopardising the future of the 
New Zealand economy and the wellbeing of most New Zealanders. This accusation 
was observable in numerous areas. For instance, in an entry of Labour’s campaign 
blog titled ‘Short-term thinking wins in National’s inner circle’, Labour attacked 
National’s tax cut plan by stating that it was going to ‘sacrifice KiwiSaver, and axe 
research and development tax credits for New Zealand businesses’. Labour 
continued that National’s tax policy had ‘a scarily familiar ring’ to the one that 
former US President George W. Bush had been promoting for eight years. Labour 
concluded that National’s tax policy was in fact a populist measure, giving a short-
term reward to the wealthy few ‘at the cost of long-term growth’. 
A direct policy comparison between Labour and National is another notable 
example of Labour’s targeted campaigning at National’s policies. Centrally 
featuring on Labour’s campaign website was a section comparing Labour’s and 
National’s policies on a given area – such as ‘KiwiSaver’ and ‘90 day worker 
probation’ – with Labour’s policy in red (the party’s colour) and National’s in blue 
(the party’s colour), as shown in Figure 5.8. When clicking on the link for a full 
comparison, a separate web page named ‘Policy Comparison’ rendered as shown 
in Figure 5.9. As the figure depicts, visitors could select from 12 predetermined 
areas, ranging from ‘KiwiSaver’ to ‘Health’, on which a full policy comparison 
between Labour and National was based. Also noticeable on the home page was a 
sizeable area with a caption ‘Labour or National?’, as illustrated in Figure 5.10. It 
was essentially an alternative form of policy comparison. Labour’s policy 
comparison with National also extended to the KiwiSaver calculator. Specifically, 
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when the salary or wage of a visitor was entered, the calculator advised the 
amount of tax cut and KiwiSaver support that the visitor would receive under a 
Labour-led and a National-led government based on both parties’ election policies 
on the related areas. Irrespective of their forms, Labour’s policy comparisons cast 
itself under a positive light and National a negative. 
 
Figure 5.8 Labour's policy comparison on the home page 
 
Figure 5.9 Labour's dedicated web page for a full policy comparison 
 
Figure 5.10 An alternative form of Labour's policy comparison 
In addition to National’s policies, Key’s credibility was frequently an object of 
Labour’s targeted campaigning at National. Notably, Labour’s campaign website 
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consisted of a web page named ‘Key Facts’, which was designated to attack Key’s 
credibility in various ways. On the web page, it was stated that the prime minister 
of New Zealand ‘has the most important job in New Zealand’. Whoever aspires to 
becoming prime minister, said Labour, ‘should be upfront about where they stand 
on issues and clear on their values’. Labour went on to note that in her political 
career Clark had proven numerously to be a credible politician and to have ‘what 
it takes to lead New Zealand’. In stark contrast, Labour argued, Key constantly 
confused the New Zealand public as to his true values and stand on different issues. 
To encourage visitors to judge for themselves if Key was credible enough to be a 
prime minister, Labour distinguished 12 areas that ranged from the war in Iraq to 
KiwiSaver and showed Key’s stances in his own words. For instance, on KiwiSaver, 
the web page quoted Key as saying: ‘KiwiSaver is a glorified Christmas club and its 
design is fundamentally flawed.’ 
Also on the web page was a series of videos named ‘John Key Double Talk’. The 
aim was to explicitly cast doubt over Key’s credibility by showing his contrasting 
and confusing stances on various issues ranging from KiwiSaver to climate change, 
hence ‘double talk’. For instance, in the video relating to Key’s double talk on 
KiwiSaver, it first showed a picture of Key with a quote in his own words made on 
4 August 2008: ‘modest changes to KiwiSaver’, in reference to Key’s position on 
this policy if he was elected prime minister of New Zealand; while still in the same 
reference, the video displayed a different picture of Key with his words said on 9 
October 2008 ‘… cut KiwiSaver in half.’, demonstrating Key’s changing stance on 
the same policy. All videos of Key’s double talk ended with Clark’s campaign 
picture and a tag line that read ‘This one’s about trust’, unambiguously showing 
that credibility was the main aim of Labour’s targeted campaigning at Key. 
Furthermore, a link was provided for viewers to forward the videos to others. 
Labour’s campaign website featured another video attacking Key’s credibility. The 
video was one of Labour’s televised campaign advertisements, which portrayed a 
young mother who appeared immensely concerned about the prospect of a Key-
led government by saying: ‘You might know a few things about money trading [in 
reference to Key’s previous occupation], Mr Key, but when it comes to my family’s 
future, I just can’t trust you.’ 
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Labour’s targeted campaigning at Key could also be found in the party’s campaign 
blog. For instance, in a blog post titled ‘It’s the economy, stupid’, a phrase that 
gained prominence from former US President Clinton’s attack on his presidential 
rival George H. W. Bush, Labour asserted that Key’s economic thinking behind his 
tax cut plan was severely flawed and bore dangerous consequences. To illustrate 
that, Labour used an online video, and words of Key’s and an economics 
columnist’s. The blog concluded by stating that Key’s response to a global financial 
crisis was ‘as dumb as it sounds’ and he therefore should not be trusted to become 
prime minster of New Zealand and lead the country through the financial crisis. 
5.3.5 Resource generation 
Labour sought both financial and human resources from visitors in its e-
campaigning. A button and a hypertext link for financial donation were present on 
the home page. Upon clicking, the visitor would be taken to a secure web page 
hosted under the domain of Labour’s party website (www.labourparty.org.nz). 
The web page was essentially an online form. To make a financial donation, the 
donor needed to complete the form by selecting or specifying an amount to donate, 
choosing the recurrence of donation, and providing both personal and credit card 
details. A text link was also included on the page for those who preferred to donate 
by phone, postal mail, or online banking. 
Labour’s campaign website provided contact information, such as phone number, 
and email and offline addresses, for those who wished to become volunteers to 
assist Labour in various campaign activities such as pamphlet dropping, data entry, 
and hosting a meeting for a Labour candidate. 
Labour’s campaign website excluded a means to become a party member, a 
common form to generate both financial and human resources. In order to become 
a party member online, visitors needed to go to Labour’s party website. 
5.3.6 Summary 
Table 5.1 summarises Labour’s e-campaigning utilisation and its extent with the 
proposed e-campaigning framework. It suggests that Labour’s e-campaigning 
 126 
focused most on information dissemination and least on voter interaction and 
engagement. 
Table 5.1 Labour's e-campaigning utilisation and its extent 
Campaign practice Content elements Present 
Information 
dissemination 
Political party's information  
Candidate biography ● 
Press releases ● 
Policy statements ● 
Campaign news ● 
Campaign events  
Speeches ● 
Contact information ● 
Information relating to the political party's other online 
presence 
● 
Campaign blog without visitor comments allowed ● 
Voter interaction 
and engagement 
Instant chat or messaging  
Instant opinion polls  
Instant surveys  
Applications for interacting with the political party's policies ● 
Interactive calendar of campaign events  
Means to contact the political party  
Discussion forums  
Campaign blog with visitor comments allowed  
Means to provide feedback  ● 
Support 
mobilisation 
Means for voters to invite their peers to participate in 
campaign events 
 
Means to inform voters of electoral information ● 
Means for voters to receive campaign information and 
updates 
● 
Means for voters to connect with supporter groups  
Means for voters to download campaign material ● 
Means for voters to forward campaign material to others ● 
Means to encourage votes* ● 
Targeted 
campaigning 
Content targeted at political opponents ● 
Content targeted at political opponents' policies ● 
Content targeted at specific voter segments  
Resource generation 
Means to make donations ● 
Online merchandise shop  
Means to become a party member  
Means to become a volunteer ● 
Note: * Not present in the proposed e-campaigning framework 
 
Six areas of Labour’s e-campaigning utilisation are worth highlighting. First, a 
significant proportion of Labour’s e-campaign focused on the party leader, 
especially her political experience and credibility. Second, online voter interaction 
and engagement was highly limited and confined to key election policies. Third, 
although three social networking sites, namely, Facebook, Flickr, and YouTube, 
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featured in Labour’s e-campaigning, they were primarily intended for information 
dissemination; that is, the interactive nature of those social networking sites were 
hardly exploited. Fourth, Web 2.0 applications or services were employed in 
Labour’s e-campaigning for information dissemination and support mobilisation. 
Fifth, Labour’s targeted campaigning was fierce and sophisticated; it was confined 
to National, National’s leader and key election policies. Last, online videos were 
prominent in Labour’s e-campaign; however, they were confined to Labour’s 
targeted campaigning. Also note that a content element in Labour’s e-campaign 
was not captured by the proposed e-campaigning framework, namely means to 
encourage votes. 
5.4 The factors influencing Labour’s e-
campaigning utilisation 
Labour’s e-campaigning utilisation was attributable to all factors in Table 2.2, 
namely, election type, electoral regulations, voters’ technology access, resource 
availability, subjective norm, image, job relevance, output quality, result 
demonstrability, and perceived ease of use. The remainder of this section is 
structured according to those factors. This section is concluded with a summary. 
5.4.1 Election type 
Election campaigning under a party-led election meant that it was necessary to 
work with a political party, a form of organisation, said Labour’s campaign team. 
However, ‘Unlike working with a typical organisation such as 3M, working with a 
political organisation can be very “interesting” in that the decision-making 
structure isn’t always straightforward, the [decision-making] pace isn’t always 
ideal, and the task allocation isn’t always clear.’ Consequently, campaigning under 
a party-led election could often involve ‘delay, chaos, and confusion’, all of which 
were undesirable and encountered by Labour’s campaign team ‘at some point 
during the campaign period’. The team added that delay, chaos, and confusion 
could also be present when campaigning under a candidate-led election, but ‘to a 
much lesser degree’. 
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A significant advantage of e-campaigning over its offline counterpart lied within 
the ability to be ‘nimble’, said the team. Yet, such an advantage was not always 
apparent under a party-led election because of ‘the number of hoops [a campaign 
team needs] to jump through inside the party in order to perform the [campaign] 
tasks’. The team indicated that the negative impact of party-led elections on e-
campaigning utilisation was applicable to most, if not all, political parties. In other 
words, the impact was not unique to Labour. 
Nevertheless, the team found that in some aspects, party-led elections were 
beneficial to Labour’s e-campaigning utilisation. As the team explained, 
campaigning under a party-led election meant that the campaign team could 
‘capitalise on’ the party’s networks, members, supporters, and volunteers for 
valuable suggestions and assistance in different aspects of campaigning, which 
was ‘certainly the case for Labour’ in the election. The team acknowledged that 
Labour’s e-campaign ‘wasn’t perfect. There’re a number of areas that the Labour 
Party could definitely improve on’. However, it’s difficult to imagine what Labour’s 
e-campaign would have been but for the suggestions and assistance from the 
party’s ‘committed and passionate’ members, supporters, and volunteers. The 
team added that campaigning in party-led elections was often highly centralised. 
Although at times it could increase complexity and curb some individuals’ 
spontaneous ideas, which could be perceived as negative, it could often protect 
scarce campaign resources against wastage, which was ‘crucial and beneficial’ to 
e-campaigning utilisation. 
In brief, party-led elections supported as well as hindered Labour’s e-campaigning 
utilisation. Put differently, the impact of election type on Labour’s e-campaigning 
consisted of two facets: positive and negative. 
5.4.2 Electoral regulations 
Labour’s use of a separate, fully party-funded website for its e-campaigning was 
in part due to electoral regulations. More specifically, prior to the election, Labour 
had a website that was ‘fully geared and pretty much ready to hit the ground 
running, if it was used as the campaign website’. In other words, the website was 
fully developed and functional and would consume a minimum level of campaign 
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resources, had it been chosen as the party’s campaign website. However, the 
website was in part funded by the New Zealand Parliamentary Service. ‘Before the 
Electoral Finance Act [2007], it wouldn’t be too much of an issue if it’s used for 
election campaigning,’ said the team. However, under the new Act, if the website 
served as the primary platform for Labour’s e-campaigning, the party had to 
confine the campaign functions to only providing contacts of existing MPs and 
publishing press releases. Labour’s campaign team felt that the party’s e-
campaigning would be ‘heavily impaired and meaningless’ if the Parliament-
funded website was used. Because of that, Labour’s campaign team decided to opt 
for an independent and completely party-funded website for full e-campaigning 
utilisation, even if it meant ‘having to start all the bits and pieces from scratch’, 
committing more scarce resources, and a risk of being unable to launch a fully 
functional website on schedule. 
The team indicated that a notable aspect of the Act pertained to a clear distinction 
between parliamentary and party business. In the election, Labour had ‘some 
talented people with great ideas and skillsets’ that were immensely beneficial to 
its e-campaigning utilisation. However, they were working on the parliamentary 
side of Labour; in other words, they were paid by the New Zealand Parliamentary 
Service. The distinction between parliamentary and party business set by the EFA 
2007 meant that those people were unable to ‘work around the clock’ with 
Labour’s campaign team for the party’s e-campaigning. Labour’s e-campaigning 
could have been different had those people been able to be fully involved in the 
party’s e-campaigning, said the team. 
Another important aspect of the EFA 2007 was the strict spending limits 
encompassing all areas of election campaigning that were subject to close scrutiny 
by the Electoral Commission, said the team. Because of that as well as Labour’s 
stronger emphasis on offline campaign activities that were ‘increasingly costly’, 
the team was enjoined by the party’s senior staff before the election that it should 
keep the monetary expenditure on most of its e-campaigning ‘free’, or ‘very cheap’, 
so that the money spending allocation for Labour’s offline campaign activities 
remained uncontested and the party stayed on ‘the right side of the law’. 
Consequently, several ‘brilliant’ e-campaigning ideas ‘couldn’t be made reality’, 
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according to the team. For instance, before the election, the team noticed various 
tactics of interaction and engagement with voters in overseas e-campaigns. And 
the team ‘intended to do something very similar’ in Labour’s e-campaign. While ‘It 
wouldn’t cost much technologically to implement because of the free and open tool 
sets available, it would definitely require at least a full-time employee to run and 
manage on an ongoing basis throughout the entire campaign period.’ And this 
would attract a considerable amount of cost that would be counted towards the 
total election spending. For that reason, the campaign team halted the intention of 
interacting and engaging with voters in Labour’s e-campaign. This instance 
suggests that the impact of subjective norm was moderated by electoral 
regulations. 
In brief, electoral regulations stimulated and dissuaded Labour’s e-campaigning 
utilisation. That is, the impact of the factor on Labour’s e-campaigning consisted 
of two facets: positive and negative. It is worth noting the instance where the 
campaign team halted the intention to interact and engage with voters online as 
its overseas counterparts, as it suggests that the impact of subjective norm was 
moderated by another factor – electoral regulations. Further, with the 
proliferation of e-campaigning in New Zealand, the campaign team strongly 
believed that the existing electoral regulations would soon closely reflect the 
phenomenon. And by then, most, if not all, campaign teams in New Zealand could 
be further subject to the associated impact on their e-campaigning utilisation. 
5.4.3 Voters’ technology access 
Before the election, Labour’s campaign team contemplated ‘different ways of 
leveraging text messaging’ for informing and, more importantly, mobilising voter 
support. The underlying reason was ‘simple and compelling’, said the team: ‘cell 
phones stand out hands down as the communication technology most used by 
people in this country. And the most popular cell phone service in this country – 
regardless of age, background and the type of phone – is SMS.’ ‘At the end of the 
day, voters are a central part of any election campaign’, the team continued, ‘and 
because of that, what sort of media or technology they use the most becomes very 
critical when developing a modern election campaign.’ Despite that, the strong 
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intention of SMS campaigning did not materialise for a two-fold reason, according 
to the team. First, SMS campaigning was considered expensive and, more 
importantly, had to be fully party-funded in order to comply with the EFA 2007; 
second, in light of the previous reason, the party side of Labour was unable to 
solely and fully fund SMS campaigning. In other words, electoral regulations and 
resource availability jointly moderated the impact of voters’ technology access in 
this particular instance. 
From observing various overseas e-campaigns, the campaign team was 
particularly ‘wowed by the digital campaigns especially designed for smartphone 
users’. More specifically, some overseas campaign teams targeted part of their e-
campaigns at smartphone users by utilising features exclusive to smartphones – 
such as digital mapping, GPS, email, calendar, and smartphone applications – in 
order to inform, interact, and mobilise voters. This new variant of e-campaigning 
could have potentially been a strategic differentiator for Labour, said the team, 
because putting the wow factor aside and judging by overseas experience, it could 
have offered ‘a more interactive, personalised, and seamless campaign’ to voters, 
thereby reviving their interest and experience of Labour’s election campaign. 
Keen as it was, the campaign team did not pursue the smartphone election 
campaign. This, according to the team, was for the sheer reason that unlike its 
overseas counterparts, the number of voters with capable smartphones in New 
Zealand during the election was ‘still far from critical mass’, rendering the 
inclusion of this particular form of e-campaign unfeasible. Put simply, the 
perceived low level of smartphone access in New Zealand during the election 
dissuaded Labour’s campaign team from employing a new form of e-campaigning. 
It can be inferred from this instance that the impact of result demonstrability was 
moderated by voters’ technology access. That is, despite its demonstrated results 
from overseas examples, an e-campaign tailored for smartphones was only 
considered, but not embraced, by Labour’s campaign team owing to its concern 
over voters’ access to smartphones. 
One of the main features in Labour’s e-campaign was the use of multimedia, 
according to the team, as it provided ‘more avenues’ for the party’s campaign 
content to appeal to the voters. However, it was ‘partly the fact there’re lots of 
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people in the country having access to home broadband’ that secured the presence 
of this feature in Labour’s e-campaign. The team continued that it was unthinkable 
to deploy bandwidth-intensive features, particularly online videos, in previous e-
campaigns because ‘it’s only recently that the number of home broadband has 
seriously picked up.’ 
Nonetheless, Labour’s campaign team acknowledged that the use of bandwidth-
intensive features in the party’s e-campaign was moderate, especially when 
compared to Labour’s major adversary National. Two reasons were given. First, 
despite the growing number of home broadband, the team recognised that there 
were still a number of voters throughout the country with dial-up Internet access. 
The campaign team was mindful of those voters’ potential feelings of exclusion if 
Labour’s e-campaign primarily revolved around bandwidth-consuming features. 
Second, the team recognised that, contrasting with some overseas countries, home 
broadband in New Zealand came with ‘a high price tag and monthly [data] usage 
cap’. As the team perspicaciously put, ‘Voters, particularly undecided voters, 
simply wouldn’t go so far as to use up their costly, limited [broadband] data on an 
election campaign.’ 
In short, voters’ technology access inspired and discouraged Labour’s e-
campaigning utilisation. That is, the impact of the factor on Labour’s e-
campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. It is worth noting two 
instances: first, the team abandoned the idea of conducting a text campaign and 
second, the team decided not to pursue a smartphone campaign. The first instance 
illustrates that the impact of voters’ technology access was moderated by other 
factors – electoral regulations and resource availability; the second suggests that 
the impact of result demonstrability was moderated by another factor – voters’ 
technology access. 
5.4.4 Resource availability 
As noted, Labour’s e-campaigning utilisation reflected the campaign team’s 
resource considerations. Indeed, resource availability was frequently emphasised 
by the team as a pivotal factor shaping its e-campaigning; as the team incisively 
put, 
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Throughout the campaign, we had quite a few people asking why we didn’t 
do certain things in our digital campaign like Kevin Rudd or Obama had 
done in theirs. Well, the answer has always been the same: ‘It’s not we 
haven’t thought about it or didn’t want to. We simply didn’t have the same 
scale of resources those guys had, or anything close to that.’ 
A noticeable trend within Labour in this election could be observed, according to 
the team, which saw the party’s senior members increasingly champion further e-
campaigning utilisation primarily because of Labour’s limited campaign resources. 
More specifically, contrary to popular belief, Labour had ‘very slim resources for 
campaigning in general’, said the team. As the cost of offline campaign activities 
continuously soared, it had become increasingly challenging for Labour to 
perform its offline campaign to the same extent as in previous elections. This 
‘could be incredibly frustrating at times’, the team noted. In stark contrast, e-
campaigning was perceived by many senior members to be not ‘just as capable as 
traditional campaigning’ but, more importantly, ‘much more resource-friendly’. 
The perceived resource-friendliness of e-campaigning was so compelling for those 
members that ‘there’s a strong push within the party’ to pursue e-campaigning 
beyond ‘just a few simple lines along with the party logo on a website’, in order to 
avoid suffering from any potential setbacks owing to the party’s limited resources. 
This could be observed in several areas of Labour’s e-campaign, according to the 
team. 
Notably, it was mentioned that under the ‘newly’ introduced EFA 2007, if Labour 
wanted to perform more campaign activities online than merely listing the contact 
details of its current MPs, it had to finance the website for its e-campaigning 
entirely with its already limited campaign resources. Undeterred, the campaign 
team decided to launch a new, campaign-specific website, instead of temporarily 
turning its party website to campaign only as suggested by some senior members. 
This was partly due to Labour’s limited campaign resources. More specifically, the 
team believed that ‘with the large number and variety of free toolsets around’, it 
would consume much fewer campaign resources to build an entirely campaign-
focused website ‘from scratch’ than transforming its existing ‘complex and very 
user-unfriendly’ party website to the website that the team needed. 
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Another instance that saw the campaign team embrace e-campaigning because of 
its campaign resources pertained to the party’s online campaign photos and 
videos. More specifically, the team understood that in election campaigning, 
images and videos generally produced a stronger impact on voters than text. 
Despite that, Labour’s use of images and videos in traditional campaigning had 
always been insufficient, as the team acknowledged, due to the increasing cost of 
producing or presenting them. However, ‘It’s a totally different story when it 
comes to online campaigning.’ The resources required for producing, editing, and 
presenting online images and videos were ‘minuscule’, the team explained. 
Typically, for instance, it required only ‘a basic video camera and one person’ to 
produce an online video; ‘if really necessary, there’s plenty of free or low-cost 
software around that’s sufficient for editing online videos’; ‘then there’re websites 
like YouTube to take care of … hosting and broadcasting online videos for free’, 
according to the team. Consequently, the level of using images and videos was 
greater in Labour’s e-campaign than in its offline counterpart. 
Nonetheless, as Labour’s campaign team further utilised e-campaigning, it became 
increasingly evident that the resource advantage of e-campaigning, which 
immensely elevated the positive perception of e-campaigning among many 
Labour members, was not always true. On many occasions, the amount of 
resources required for e-campaigning was even comparable to its offline 
counterpart. 
For instance, the team agreed with the observation of this study that ‘interactive 
wasn’t exactly the word’ to describe Labour’s campaigning on Facebook. In fact, 
the team acknowledged that ‘there wasn’t much going on there.’ However, ‘it 
wasn’t a question of whether or not [Labour] wanted to interact with supporters 
or voters at all;’ rather, ‘it really came down to the amount of resources available 
for us to commit [to interacting and engaging with voters online],’ said the team. 
More specifically, the team firmly believed that, like its offline counterpart, any 
online interaction and engagement should be ‘authentic and consistent’. In that 
light, any responses to visitors’ remarks would need to be made by ‘no one else 
but Helen’ since the party’s Facebook campaign page was under Clark’s name, as 
noted; also, if any responses were made, every remark or visitor, instead of only a 
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selected few, would need to be attended to for consistency. Consequently, this was 
‘mission impossible’ given the ‘fully-loaded schedule of Helen Clark’. The team 
further indicated that Helen’s diary, Clark’s campaign blog, had already been a 
‘huge commitment’ of Clark’s time resources, given she was also the prime 
minister at the time. Moreover, if Labour wanted to have a ‘truly interactive 
Facebook site, [the team] had to find someone to build and run it. So that’s at least 
$100K a year and [the team] couldn’t ask volunteers to do it for free because that 
raised questions about trust and permission’, the team added. ‘Again, $100K to run 
a Facebook site was a cost that the party would struggle to find the money [for].’ 
Put briefly, the lack of resources resulted in Labour’s largely non-interactive e-
campaign. 
The team revealed that it was ‘extremely keen to put forward a sophisticated 
digital campaign targeted at specific groups of voters, based on their 
characteristics and the issues they most care about’. This form of targeted 
campaign ‘seems very useful in terms of allowing parties or candidates to remain 
in touch with different voters across the spectrum, if overseas experiences – such 
as Obama’s or Kevin Rudd’s campaigns – are anything to go by’. Running a 
sophisticated targeted e-campaign at voters in the end remained as ‘an item on a 
wish list’ as opposed to a reality for Labour, however, because of resource 
constraints. More specifically, large data sets and detailed voter analysis were the 
central elements of the targeted campaign that the campaign team desired. Yet, 
those elements were resource-intensive and therefore unaffordable for Labour. As 
the team elaborated, to set up reliable data sets, ‘you need to send armies of people 
to different parts of the country to politically engage with people in order to collect 
voter data; then, you need to put the offline data into a database; and then you 
need to connect the database to another.’ This process would not be a ‘one-off’; it 
would have to be repeated regularly to ensure data accuracy and currency, which 
‘is essential to a precise and meaningful targeted campaign [at voters]’. Moreover, 
the team would have to purchase voters’ data in different contexts from other 
sources to enrich its own data. To perform detailed voter analysis, the team would 
have to assign dedicated personnel to ‘closely monitor web traffic, clicks, and 
statistics literally on a daily basis and say, “these are the patterns of the site visitor 
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we’ve discovered”, or “[web] traffic was up or down today”, and take a stab at why’. 
While those financial, time, and labour resources ‘didn’t seem to be an issue’ for 
Obama or Rudd, they posed as ‘a luxury [the team] simply couldn’t afford’. With 
the scale of Labour’s campaign resources, the team could still have ‘pulled off a 
much more watered-down version of the kind of [targeted] campaign [at voters] 
carried out by Obama or Kevin Rudd’, but ‘then that would’ve been so meaningless 
that it would’ve simply been a waste of resources in the end’. That being so, the 
intention of conducting a sophisticated e-campaign targeted at specific voter 
segments had to be withdrawn. It can be inferred from this instance that the 
impact of result demonstrability was moderated by resource availability. 
Another instance illuminating the negative impact of resource availability on 
Labour’s e-campaigning pertained to support mobilisation. Although Labour’s e-
campaign exhibited a certain extent of support mobilisation, it ‘came nowhere 
near’ what the team initially intended. More precisely, an aspect of Obama’s e-
campaign aiming at support mobilisation particularly captured Labour’s 
campaign team’s attention: Obama’s campaign team built a ‘state-of-the-art’ 
application that leveraged the key features of the Internet and smartphones to 
organise offline door knocking performed by the presidential candidate’s 
supporters and volunteers in different parts of the country. Before knocking on 
any voter’s door, those supporters and volunteers received digital maps on their 
smartphones. The maps showed all houses within the areas where door knocking 
was performed. The houses had been colour-coded, with sophisticated and 
expensive data sets and data mining technology, which exhibited the doors of 
Democrats, Republicans, and swing voters, so that door knockers would avoid 
approaching any Republican supporters, thereby increasing their efficiency. 
Moreover, the same application enabled door knockers to update their progress 
in real time and provide additional notes on any canvassed voters for subsequent 
follow-ups, which further enhanced the outcome of support mobilisation by 
Obama’s campaign team. Labour’s campaign team admitted that it was hugely 
inclined to replicate the utilisation of ICTs to seamlessly orchestrate the party’s 
offline support mobilisation as observed in Obama’s e-campaigning, but stopped 
short of acting on that because of ‘the vast amount of resources needed’. Still, with 
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its available resources, Labour’s campaign team delivered ‘a fair bit of’ support 
mobilisation in its e-campaign, which bore little resemblance to the team’s initial 
intention, however. This instance also illustrates that the impact of subjective 
norm was moderated by resource availability. 
It was further suggested that the understanding of the resource-intensive nature 
of e-campaigning was confined to Labour’s campaign team; in other words, 
‘external people had little idea how expensive and resource-demanding online 
campaigning could be’. This largely contributed to the instruction from the senior 
hierarchy of confining the resource spending for e-campaigning to ‘free’ or ‘very 
cheap’. It rendered the team ‘severely under-resourced’ in the election and its e-
campaigning utilisation ‘extra challenging in a lot of respects’. 
In all, resource availability not only stimulated but also depressed Labour’s e-
campaigning utilisation. In other words, the impact of this factor on Labour’s e-
campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. It is worth highlighting 
two instances pertaining to the team’s decision not to embrace targeted 
campaigning at specific voter segments and Labour’s online support mobilisation; 
the former illustrates that the impact of result demonstrability was moderated by 
another factor – resource availability and the latter suggests that the impact of 
subjective norm was moderated by another factor – resource availability. Labour’s 
campaign team noted that the party’s e-campaigning utilisation would be plagued 
by its limited resource availability beyond this election. The team added that it 
was ‘highly unlikely’ that Labour would be able to inject an enormous amount of 
resources into building a ‘sophisticated, cutting-edge’ e-campaign in the near 
future in order to unleash the full potential of e-campaigning, mainly because of 
the continual dominance of offline campaigning, which had become increasingly 
costly, and the strict campaign spending limits imposed by electoral law. The team 
further noted that a sophisticated, ‘game-changing’ e-campaign needed 
continuous investment in ICT infrastructure and resources, which required a shift 
in perception among Labour members that election campaigning ‘doesn’t 
necessarily have to be a temporary, short-term event’. In other words, a shift from 
the traditional perception of election campaigning to the notion of permanent 
campaigning formed the foundation for continuous investment in e-campaigning. 
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5.4.5 Subjective norm 
Using online photos and videos was considered to be one of the highlights in 
Labour’s e-campaign by the campaign team. This, as noted, was partly motivated 
by voters’ technology access as well as resource availability. Another factor that 
gave rise to such e-campaigning utilisation was subjective norm. 
More specifically, before the election, the team had already decided to incorporate 
online photos and videos in Labour’s e-campaign, but to a lesser extent than ‘what 
[the team] actually put out in the end’. While increasing online photos and videos 
in Labour’s e-campaign was ‘without a doubt a good thing to do’, to a certain 
degree it stemmed from competitive pressure from National. As the team 
explained, throughout the campaign, it ‘kept a good eye on’ both overseas and 
domestic e-campaigns, which was believed to be ‘a common practice shared by 
other campaign teams across the spectrum’. An aspect of National’s e-campaign 
that particularly gathered the attention of Labour’s campaign team was the 
extensive use of online images and videos to deliver and reinforce its campaign 
content. In response, Labour’s team strategically decided to scale up its e-
campaigning utilisation in the same area; as the team put it, ‘[in Labour’s increased 
use of images and videos in its e-campaign] there’s an element of trying to … stay 
on top of the game.’ Despite being somehow propelled by National’s e-
campaigning utilisation, Labour’s online campaign photos and videos exhibited a 
marked difference in both style and content. 
Another aspect of Labour’s e-campaigning that commanded attention was the 
extent and diversity of the targeted campaigning at National and, particularly, Key. 
One of the underlying motivations pertained to subjective norm. As the team 
elaborated, from extensively observing overseas e-campaigns of the political 
parties and candidates whom Labour’s campaign team considered influential, the 
team identified an emergent, increasingly prevalent feature: a campaign attacking 
political adversaries. ‘And lots of [overseas] voters actually seemed to quite enjoy 
them,’ said the team. This consequently prompted a perception of the team that a 
global norm had already emerged where negative campaigns were increasingly 
practised with new ICTs by campaign teams, and widely accepted and demanded 
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by many voters. This perception then underpinned Labour’s extensive e-campaign 
attacking National and Key. 
Labour’s lack of extensive interaction and engagement with voters in its e-
campaign was also related to subjective norm. More specifically, Labour’s 
campaign team was acutely aware that overseas political parties and candidates 
were increasingly embarking on interacting and engaging with voters with the 
advent of new ICTs and related applications, particularly social networking 
websites. This compelled Labour’s campaign team to consider a similar 
manoeuvre in its own e-campaign. In other words, a subjective norm held by the 
team inspired its e-campaigning intention relating to voter interaction and 
engagement. Nevertheless, it was another subjective norm whose impact 
superseded the previous one. As the team elucidated, it gained a clear impression 
from the offline feedback specifically on Labour’s e-campaign, from both Labour’s 
supporters and voters in general, that ‘online interaction, or the lack of it, wasn’t 
particularly an issue’. Put differently, Labour’s campaign team did not sense a 
reverberating demand that it expand its existing online interaction and 
engagement with voters from those whose opinions were valued considerably by 
the team. The perception that there was little need to expand Labour’s existing 
online interaction and engagement with voters was reinforced by a subjective 
norm where other political parties in the election ‘were doing pretty much the 
same’ in the respective area, the team added. Consequently, voter interaction and 
engagement was highly limited in Labour’s e-campaigning. 
In general, subjective norm propelled as well as undermined Labour’s e-
campaigning utilisation. Put differently, the impact of the factor on Labour’s e-
campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. The norms perceived 
by Labour’s campaign team stemmed from competitive pressure as well as the 
opinions and behaviour of those whom Labour’s campaign team valued. It bears 
reiterating that the lack of interest of Labour’s campaign team to increase the 
party’s online interaction and engagement with voters was in part due to a 
subjective norm held by the team that Labour’s counterparts were performing to 
a similar extent in the same area, as it can be inferred that subjective norm could 
induce inertia in e-campaigning utilisation. 
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5.4.6 Image 
Image was one of the reasons instigating Labour’s opting for a new, campaign-
specific website. As the team explained, despite many other political parties 
claiming to be serious about their e-campaigning, scarcely could any marked 
difference in content or presentation be discerned when their party websites 
during the campaign period were compared to the previous ones. This, said the 
team, could be perceived as only ‘business as usual’. ‘If you say you’re serious 
about online campaigning, you need to be seen that way by the public, by that I 
mean all content and material on your website needs to focus on nothing else but 
campaigning.’ This, consequently, contributed to the team’s deployment of a new 
website specifically for Labour’s e-campaigning. 
Unsurprisingly, the team revealed that image was a significant driver of Labour’s 
constant and fierce targeted campaigning that cast both Helen and Labour in a 
favourable light and both Key and National to the contrary. More specifically, in 
this election, the team sensed that traditional media somehow uniformly 
portrayed National and, in particular, Key as being ‘energetic, friendly, and 
connected’ and Labour and Clark, by stark contrast, ‘jaded, stroppy, and out of 
touch with mainstream New Zealand’. More importantly, the team continued, 
‘John Key’s credibility, or lack of it, combined with his political inexperience’ – 
which Labour’s campaign team considered to be the Achilles’ heel of Key as a 
potential prime minister – barely received any mention in the media; neither did 
‘Helen’s proven track record, strong leadership, and vast political experience’. 
Labour’s campaign team believed that such portrayals by the media were 
‘extremely biased’ and ‘would definitely upset the chance of [Labour] getting re-
elected’. Under such circumstances, a significant proportion of Labour’s e-
campaigning was targeted at both National and Key as the team perceived that it 
would be able to ‘present Helen in as favourable a light as possible, to show she’s 
still in touch and is speaking [about] what people need, and to show the major 
weaknesses of the National Party’s policies and particularly John Key’. Despite 
conceding its targeted campaigning at the images of Labour, Clark, National, and 
Key had backfired in the end, Labour’s campaign team remained adamant that the 
targeted campaigning was necessary because it was paramount to seize every 
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opportunity to promote, maintain, and defend Labour’s image in an election, 
especially the 2008 election. 
Labour’s campaign team acknowledged that Facebook ‘wasn’t part of the original 
[e-campaigning] plan in the election’. More precisely, the team initially opposed 
using the popular social networking website during the entire campaign period, 
which also applied to all Labour candidates. That was partly related to concerns 
over the party’s image. As the team explained, the general idea of Facebook was 
‘to friend people’. In a social context, ‘you would normally have some kind of idea 
about the people you friend on Facebook’. But that ‘isn’t usually the case’ in a 
political context; that is, people who friend political parties or politicians on 
Facebook are usually strangers to the parties or politicians. This was perceived to 
be ‘a great risk’ to Labour’s public image during the election because the party 
‘could end up unknowingly friending someone who’s an axe murderer or 
something that rings alarm bells’. Put concisely, Labour’s campaign team initially 
intended to steer clear of Facebook in the election for fear that the party could be 
unknowingly and publicly associated with people with a negative image or 
personality, thereby tarnishing the party’s image. The team’s early opposition to 
Facebook failed to endure, however. As noted, the party was observed to campaign 
on Facebook under Clark’s name, albeit highly restrictedly. As the team elaborated, 
‘Facebook had become such a big phenomenon around the time our campaign 
began to kick off that almost everyone we know … reckoned we just had to be in 
that space, regardless. So it’s basically inevitable [to use Facebook as part of 
Labour’s e-campaign].’ This suggests that the negative impact of image was 
moderated by subjective norm. 
As noted, National’s e-campaign targeted at overseas voters, Internats, 
incorporated a blog by an ardent National supporter and active political blogger, 
which chiefly aimed at information dissemination and support mobilisation. This 
also garnered the attention of Labour’s campaign team. The team did not intend 
to emulate that particular e-campaigning tactic of National, despite praising it as 
‘a smart move’ and Labour itself having plenty of ardent supporters in the New 
Zealand political blogosphere. The underlying reason, according to the team, was 
connected to Labour’s public image. As the team explained, the author of the blog 
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included in National’s e-campaign targeted at Internats had well established ‘a 
facade of balance’ in that the author not only enthusiastically promoted but also 
constructively criticised National. Because of that, National had ‘nothing to lose 
but everything to gain’ relating to its image by publicly associating itself with the 
author. Labour, on the other hand, ‘had no such luck’, as left wing political bloggers 
in New Zealand ‘unfortunately shared a bunker mentality when it comes to 
critiquing political parties, including Labour’. That, according to the team, was 
‘really unfortunate’ as Labour consequently had to distance itself from those 
bloggers in the election in order to protect its image. 
In short, image motivated and dissuaded Labour’s e-campaigning utilisation. Put 
differently, the impact of the factor on Labour’s e-campaigning consisted of two 
sides: positive and negative. It is worth highlighting the instance where the team 
changed its initial rejection of Facebook as part of Labour’s e-campaigning as it 
suggests that the negative impact of image was moderated by another factor – 
subjective norm. 
5.4.7 Job relevance 
In addition to electoral regulations, resource availability, and image, job relevance 
was an important factor driving Labour’s utilisation of a new, independent 
website, instead of its existing party website, for e-campaigning. More specifically, 
Labour’s campaign team strongly perceived that a party’s election policies and 
leader were the two primary and most important areas of focus to visitors of a 
political party’s campaign website during an election. For that reason, the content 
and material of Labour’s campaign website should concentrate on the party’s wide 
range of election policies and Clark. This, however, would not have been possible 
with Labour’s party website, because ‘a fair amount of content on the website 
wasn't really relevant to the campaign purpose but very important for a party 
website.’ For this reason, the team opted for a campaign-focused website. Also for 
the same reason, the team limited the number of media and news releases and 
deliberately omitted Labour’s background, Labour candidates’ contact 
information, and offline campaign events on Labour’s campaign website. The 
omission of offline campaign events was particularly noteworthy. Despite 
 143 
acknowledging that the particular element was relevant to campaigning, the team 
added that it was ‘not something people would normally look for’ on a campaign 
website; ‘voters would normally contact Labour’s local party office in their own 
region if they want to be part of any Labour’s campaign events’. Consequently, the 
team did not perceive offline campaign events to be a highly relevant element in 
Labour’s e-campaign. 
As noted, the campaign team initially strongly rejected Facebook as part of 
Labour’s or any Labour candidate’s e-campaign. In addition to image, this was 
prompted by job relevance. As the team elucidated, ‘Most people sign in to 
Facebook to socialise and catch up with their family members, friends, and 
acquaintances. And the last thing on their mind is to follow some parties’ or 
candidates’ campaigns.’ Moreover, ‘during an election period, campaigning on 
policies and getting support are the things parties and candidates mainly, if not 
only, care about. Chit-chatting about random things, as you do on Facebook, is 
simply unrelated to campaigning.’ Consequently, the team considered Facebook to 
be inappropriate for election campaigning. This, compounded with the team’s 
concern over the potentially detrimental effect of using the social networking 
website on Labour’s public image, fortified the opposition to incorporating 
Facebook in Labour’s e-campaigning. As noted, this opposition faded as a result of 
subjective norm. Put differently, this instance suggests that the negative impact of 
job relevance was moderated by subjective norm. 
An aspect of contemporary e-campaigning, particularly in the US, that Labour’s 
campaign team found ‘especially eye-opening’ pertained to an unprecedentedly 
high extent of innovative, and sometimes risk-taking, e-campaigning utilisation. 
Intrigued as it was, the team acknowledged that it had little intention to steer 
Labour’s e-campaigning utilisation towards the same direction in the election. 
Consequently, the team described its own e-campaigning utilisation as ‘pretty 
standard and, by and large, risk adverse’. The main reason for that centred on the 
team’s perception of relevance. More specifically, in their election campaigning, 
overseas parties and candidates constantly faced a challenge of ‘campaigning to 
an extremely large scale of voters spreading across vast electorates with limited 
resources’. Accordingly, those parties and candidates had to ‘aggressively use 
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technology, especially the latest, to broadcast, communicate, connect, rally 
support, and raise money’. That in turn led to innovative and risk-taking e-
campaigning utilisation as witnessed in many overseas e-campaigns. The pressing 
campaign challenge confronted by the overseas parties and candidates ‘is not 
particularly the case for us’, however, said the team, ‘because we’ve got the luxury 
of living in a small country with a much smaller scale of voters’. To that end, the 
team had little intention of conducting innovative, risk-taking e-campaigning. Put 
succinctly, the perception of Labour’s campaign team that the main driver of 
innovative and risk-taking e-campaigning utilisation was irrelevant to the party’s 
own context resulted in Labour’s conventional, safe e-campaigning utilisation. 
In all, job relevance incentivised as well as dampened Labour’s e-campaigning 
utilisation. Put differently, the impact of the factor on Labour’s e-campaigning 
consisted of two facets: positive and negative. It is worth highlighting the instance 
where the team’s initial rejection of Facebook as part of Labour’s e-campaigning 
was reversed for it suggests that the negative impact of job relevance was 
moderated by another factor – subjective norm. The team further noted that the 
perception of job relevance did not remain static; rather, it was relative to the 
context and understanding of e-campaigning ‘at a particular point in time’. 
5.4.8 Output quality 
As reported, a notable aspect of Labour’s e-campaigning pertained to the party’s 
new approach to support mobilisation. More specifically, visitors to Labour’s 
campaign website were encouraged to spread the party’s campaign blog with four 
social networking services, such as Scoopit, instead of the conventional email 
approach. This was not inspired by the novelty of the social networking services, 
but by the perceivably better outcome of the new approach. According to the team, 
encouraging voters to spread campaign content to others with email often 
produced a ‘very limited’ impact, because ‘People nowadays have become more 
and more careful about what they send to their family, friends, or colleagues, 
simply for the fact that they don’t want to be seen as a spammer.’ Although some 
voters were still willing to share campaign content with this conventional 
technology, the team continued, the number of recipients was generally limited. 
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By comparison, the four emerging social networking services were perceived by 
the team to ‘deliver a greater result’. As the team explained, each of the social 
networking services had already been connected with a substantial user base. 
More importantly, those services essentially functioned as intermediaries 
between those on the sharing end and the receiving end, effectively tackling the 
concern over being seen as a spammer. Consequently, the four social networking 
services were employed in Labour’s e-campaigning. 
As mentioned, Labour’s campaign team had decided before the election to 
embrace e-campaigning ‘with open arms’. This was evident, for instance, in 
sending campaign staff overseas to observe and learn e-campaigning, opting for a 
campaign-specific website, and increasing the scope and extent of the party’s e-
campaigning utilisation. And output quality was a motivating factor. As the team 
noted, ‘the media is a central element in election campaigning, as is the ability to 
have a firm grip on the campaign agenda’. Yet, those elements ‘often don’t go hand 
in hand’ for the team in traditional campaigning ‘simply because traditional media 
always has its own agenda, they don’t always tell the campaign stories we want or 
in the way we want’. Put differently, Labour’s campaign team often felt that it had 
lost control, to a varying degree, of its campaign agenda to the media in traditional 
campaigning, which the team considered ‘very frustrating’. That eventuated in the 
team’s exceptional commitment to e-campaigning in the election. As the team 
explained, the Internet had already become as versatile and powerful as, if not 
more than, traditional media and, more importantly, the Internet empowered the 
team to fully control Labour’s campaign agenda, messages, narratives, and style. 
Thus, ‘it’s a no-brainer we wanted to do more of it [e-campaigning] and take it to 
a whole other level,’ the team pointed out. 
Labour’s campaign team indicated that among the various approaches to 
disseminating information and targeted campaigning in Labour’s e-campaigning, 
online videos were most preferred because of the perceived quality. As the team 
explained, online videos enabled voters to vividly experience ‘Labour’s passion 
and enthusiasm’, which was difficult or impossible to achieve through other 
alternatives, for instance, text or images. 
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Despite being considered by Labour’s campaign team to be the most preferred 
approach in the central parts of Labour’s e-campaigning and ‘a key attraction’ of 
Labour’s e-campaign, Labour’s online campaign videos were observably shorter 
than National’s. This, according to Labour’s campaign team, was deliberate, due in 
large part to the output quality as perceived by the team. More specifically, the 
team believed that voters in general ‘have a very short attention span when it 
comes to anything campaign-related, including online videos’. Moreover, voters 
‘simply wouldn’t spend more than 3 minutes of their time watching videos of 
politicians talking online’ however fun the videos might appear. ‘We watched quite 
a few of National’s online videos of John Key talking about various things. Most of 
them were more than 3 minutes long and, in our opinion, they literally achieved 
nothing but making John Key a talking head,’ the team further commented. 
Consequently, the team established a rule of keeping each Labour’s online 
campaign video ‘well under 3 minutes’. Put concisely, Labour’s campaign team 
decidedly kept the party’s online campaign videos short because of the perception 
that it would perform better. 
In brief, output quality stimulated as well as dissuaded Labour’s e-campaigning 
utilisation. Put differently, the impact of the factor on Labour’s e-campaigning 
consisted of two facets: positive and negative. 
5.4.9 Result demonstrability 
An instance that saw the impact of result demonstrability on Labour’s e-
campaigning utilisation pertained to resource generation. As noted, Labour’s 
online fundraising was limited and conventional, especially when compared to the 
party’s e-campaigning in areas such as information dissemination and targeted 
campaigning. More precisely, only a web form was provided for voters to make 
online donations with credit cards. This observation was shared by Labour’s 
campaign team, who described the party’s approach to online fundraising to be 
‘small scale, pretty average, and not interesting by any measure’. This was not due 
to neglect – in fact, the team claimed that it was immensely interested in further 
exploring online fundraising before the election; rather, it was the result 
demonstrability of Labour’s existing online fundraising that dampened the team’s 
 147 
intention to further explore that area. As the team explained, ‘many New 
Zealanders enjoy making donations to support different causes and transacting 
online with credit cards,’ therefore, the team assumed that online fundraising 
would ‘take off’. That said, the team decided to first take ‘the basic approach’, the 
online donation form, before committing further resources to other ‘more 
advanced’ approaches. By the middle of the campaign period, it had yet become 
‘crystal clear’ to the team if online fundraising ‘would really take off’. Consequently, 
the team stopped short of exploring online fundraising any further. 
Nevertheless, result demonstrability did not present itself as merely an inhibitor 
of Labour’s e-campaigning utilisation. For instance, among the various elements 
in Labour’s e-campaign, Labour’s campaign team acknowledged that it was 
especially enthusiastic about the party’s online campaign videos and the campaign 
blog penned by Clark, as they epitomised the modernity of Labour’s e-campaign. 
Furthermore, their continuity and expansion were largely reliant on the tangible 
results that they exhibited. As the team elaborated, both online videos and Helen’s 
diary were ‘relatively new’ and, more importantly, required ongoing input of 
resources and energy; it therefore prompted questions as to whether the two 
elements would enable Labour to gain traction in the election, and whether it was 
justified to continue or expand the utilisation of both elements. Not long after 
implementation, both elements presented abundant tangible results. Notably, a 
number of stories in Labour’s online campaign videos and Helen’s diary were 
mentioned by the mainstream media, and ‘a significant surge’ in web traffic or 
viewership was witnessed whenever a new campaign video or Clark’s blog post 
was added to Labour’s campaign website. Such tangible results were perceived as 
‘crucial’ by Labour’s campaign team; they not only adequately answered the 
earlier questions but also secured the continuity and expansion of Labour’s online 
videos and Helen’s diary. 
In short, result demonstrability supported and dampened Labour’s e-campaigning 
utilisation. Put differently, the impact of the factor on Labour’s e-campaigning 
consisted of two facets: positive and negative. Labour’s campaign team indicated 
that it obtained tangible results of the party’s e-campaigning utilisation primarily 
from ‘web analytics, such as the number of hits, page views, visits, and unique 
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visitors’. The team added that those results ‘don’t always show a full picture of 
how Internet campaigning is working’. Yet, it was immensely challenging for the 
team to obtain the full results of a given e-campaigning approach, as the team 
admitted that it lacked a comprehensive view of e-campaigning. To that end, the 
team emphasised that ‘it’s a slippery slope’ to steer e-campaigning utilisation on 
the basis of result demonstrability alone. 
5.4.10 Perceived ease of use 
‘At the end of the day, the Internet, Facebook, YouTube, and such others are just 
tools or machines. To make the best of them for election campaigning, the key is 
know-how,’ said Labour’s campaign team. ‘It’s fair to say [that] in our Internet 
campaigning, we stuck to the tools and tactics that we had quite a bit of insight 
into or didn’t take a mountain of effort to grasp,’ the team continued, ‘on the other 
hand, we did very little or nothing at all with the ones that were either uncharted 
territory to us or too hard to get our heads around.’ Those words of Labour’s 
campaign team suggest perceived ease of use as a factor influencing its e-
campaigning. 
A notable instance demonstrating the impact of perceived ease of use pertained to 
the varying extent of utilising three social networking websites – Facebook, 
YouTube, and Flickr – by the team in the election. 
More specifically, Labour’s campaign team acknowledged that although Facebook, 
YouTube, and Flickr debuted around a similar time and were all part of the party’s 
e-campaigning, YouTube and Flickr were more frequently utilised than Facebook. 
As the team explained, ‘it’s very straightforward to understand the purpose of 
YouTube and Flickr, and how to use them for our campaigning: YouTube is for 
distributing videos and Flickr for photos.’ 
Facebook, by comparison, ‘was quite tricky’. ‘It’s not that we didn’t understand its 
general purpose, which, in a nutshell, is for socialising,’ said the team. ‘The 
challenging part was knowing how to shift the interest and focus of “Facebookers” 
from socialising with their family, friends, and acquaintances to engaging with 
something completely different like election campaigns.’ The team indicated that 
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it received a large volume of friend requests in the election after Labour’s 
Facebook campaign profile went live. It, however, merely reflected ‘the fact that 
many people think it cool to have the prime minister on their friend list’. In other 
words, the team still lacked ‘substantial knowledge and expertise’ in election 
campaigning with the growingly prominent social networking website. And the 
team did not believe that it could easily acquire such knowledge and expertise in 
the election. This was accordingly reflected in Labour’s ‘extremely limited 
Facebook activities in the election’. 
Overall, perceived ease of use encouraged as well as depressed Labour’s e-
campaigning utilisation. In other words, the impact of the factor on Labour’s e-
campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. 
5.4.11 Summary 
Labour’s e-campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election was shaped by the 
ten factors in Table 2.2, namely, election type, electoral regulations, voters’ 
technology access, resource availability, subjective norm, image, job relevance, 
output quality, result demonstrability, and perceived ease of use. Each factor in 
essence represents a unique perspective, therefore, Labour’s e-campaigning 
utilisation has been explained from ten perspectives. Various specific and 
contextual instances that occurred in Labour’s e-campaigning utilisation have 
been presented to illustrate the factors, lending valuable insights into this unique 
phenomenon. Table 5.2 highlights the ten factors that influenced Labour’s e-
campaigning utilisation. 
Table 5.2 The factors influencing Labour's e-campaigning utilisation 
Factor Dual impact Moderated by 
Election type ●  
Electoral regulations ●  
Voters' technology access ● Electoral regulations, resource availability 
Resource availability ●  
Subjective norm ● Electoral regulations, resource availability 
Image ● Subjective norm 
Job relevance ● Subjective norm 
Output quality ●  
Result demonstrability ● Voters’ technology access, resource availability 
Perceived ease of use ●  
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As noted in the table, the impact of any given factor on Labour’s e-campaigning 
utilisation consisted of two facets: positive and negative. This means that each 
factor was an enabler as well as an inhibitor of Labour’s e-campaigning utilisation. 
The impacts of some factors, such as image, were moderated by other factors, such 
as subjective norm. Taken together, it suggests that Labour’s e-campaigning 
utilisation was complex, contextual, and dynamic. 
5.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented the key findings from the case study relating to 
Labour’s e-campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election. It has 
comprehensively analysed the breadth and depth of Labour’s e-campaigning 
utilisation. Based on that, it has identified and illustrated in depth the ten factors 
that influenced Labour’s e-campaigning utilisation. 
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Chapter 6 The Greens’ e-campaigning 
utilisation 
6.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter presents the key findings from the third case study: the Greens’ e-
campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election. This chapter proceeds as 
follows: section 6.2 outlines the case background; then, section 6.3 and 6.4 answer 
the first and second research questions respectively; and last, section 6.5 
summarises this chapter. 
6.2 Case background 
The Greens’ origin can be traced back to the Values Party, which stemmed from a 
meeting held at Victoria University of Wellington in 1972. It was the world’s first 
environmentalist political party at the national level. Besides, the Values Party was 
known for its ‘radical’ policies, such as zero economic and population growth, and 
law reforms ranging from abortion to drugs. 
When the Values Party combined with the new Green groups in 1990, it defined 
the Greens in its present form. The Greens’ political stance is generally regarded 
to be left-wing, with a particular focus on environmental issues. The Greens 
became a founding member of the Alliance, a left-wing political party, in 1992 but 
left the party five years later. Since 1999, the Greens has become an independent 
contestant in New Zealand general elections. With six list MPs in Parliament before 
the 2008 general election, the Greens was the second largest minor party. The 
Greens was jointly led by Jeanette Fitzsimons and Russel Norman, who first 
entered Parliament as an MP in 1996 and 2008 respectively. 
Unlike other parties in general elections, the Greens has chiefly focused on the 
party vote since the introduction of MMP. This formed the overarching goal of the 
Greens’ election campaign in the election. Also, unlike many other parties, the 
Greens considered e-campaigning and offline campaigning to be equally 
important. In fact, the Greens perceived itself to be at the forefront of e-
campaigning in New Zealand. Two priorities were set by the Greens’ campaign 
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team specifically for the party’s e-campaigning in this election: the first focused on 
‘providing comprehensive, accessible campaign information’, and the other on 
‘interacting and engaging with the voter’. Simply put, the two priorities pertained 
to information dissemination, and voter interaction and engagement. 
Similar to other parties, a campaign team was set up by the Greens prior to the 
election. The team was responsible for steering all aspects of the Greens’ election 
campaigning; however, it was small, comprising only a few full-time members. 
And the operation of the Greens’ e-campaigning was almost entirely ‘picked up’ by 
volunteers from different parts of the country and abroad. For that reason, the 
Greens’ campaign team described the approach to managing the party’s e-
campaigning as ‘networked or distributed’. 
The Greens’ party website (www.greens.org.nz) was utilised as the primary 
platform for e-campaigning. Figure 6.1 depicts the home page of the Greens’ 
campaign website. The home page also featured the Greens’ simple and direct 
campaign message: ‘Vote for me’. 
 
Figure 6.1 The home page of the Greens' campaign website 
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6.3 The Greens’ e-campaigning utilisation and its 
extent 
On the basis of the proposed e-campaigning framework, the Greens’ e-
campaigning encompassed all five practices, namely, information dissemination, 
voter interaction and engagement, support mobilisation, targeted campaigning, 
and resource generation. Those practices were conducted to varying degrees. The 
analysis in this section is structured according to the practices. This section is 
conclude with a summary. 
6.3.1 Information dissemination 
‘Minimalist’ was the word to describe the home page of the Greens’ campaign 
website. It, however, did not reflect the campaign information disseminated on the 
website. Overall, the Greens’ campaign information was comprehensive and well-
structured. The main page of the Greens’ website was dominated by recent entries 
of campaign news, organised in reverse chronological order. Each entry was 
clickable and displayed with a heading, image, and synopsis. Clicking on an entry 
exhibited the corresponding news article in full. The organisation and 
presentation of the Greens’ campaign news also applied to the party’s press 
releases. A large volume of speeches were listed on a dedicated page. They were, 
by default, sorted by date, with the latest entry at the top of the list. Each speech 
on the list was displayed with its title and speaker. Clicking on a speech title 
rendered the entire speech where the image of the speaker and the venue of the 
speech were also included. Two aspects of the Greens’ speeches were notable: first, 
visitors could interact with the Greens’ speeches, which is elaborated in section 
6.3.2; second, visitors could find speeches delivered prior to the election, as far 
back as 1996, when the Greens was still part of the Alliance. 
Despite being a minor party with a primary focus on the environment, the Greens 
exhibited wide policy coverage on its campaign website. More specifically, on the 
‘Policies’ page, visitors could browse the party’s election policies on various 
subjects such as ‘Economics’. Each election policy was presented in a hypertext 
link and populated alphabetically. Clicking on a policy rendered a new page that 
not only detailed the policy but also enabled the policy to be downloaded for 
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offline viewing. The Greens’ website included a webpage called ‘Campaigns’ in 
order to emphasise the party’s five key election policies, namely, ‘Climate Change’, 
‘Peak Oil’, ‘Food’, ‘Water’, and ‘Transport’. 
All offline campaign events of the Greens were listed on the ‘Events’ page. Those 
events were organised on specific issues by different branches affiliated to the 
Greens across the country and the world. Each campaign event was displayed 
along with its organiser, topic, and date as a hypertext link. Clicking on an event 
rendered its full details, including the background and significance of the 
particular issue associated with the event. The Greens also offered visitors means 
to interact with its campaign events, which is elaborated in section 6.3.2. 
The Greens’ campaign website provided comprehensive information about the 
party, Green MPs, and Green Candidates. On the ‘About Us’ page, visitors were 
informed of the party’s principles, vision, values, mission, organisational structure, 
history, and political achievements in Parliament. The six Green MPs were listed 
on the ‘Our MPs’ page. Clicking on an MP’s photo or name displayed the MP’s 
background, contact information, and the issues for which the MP was a 
spokesperson. All Green candidates could be found on the ‘Our Candidates’ page. 
Clicking on a candidate’s name rendered details of the candidate, such as list 
position; electorate, if applicable; background; qualifications and training; and 
community and other involvement. Contact information relating to the Greens’ 
staff, and national and parliamentary offices was also available. 
Although the Greens’ campaign information was predominantly disseminated in 
text format, online videos were utilised for the party’s election policies, especially 
the key ones. The home page of the Greens’ campaign website indicated the party’s 
presence on three social networking websites, namely, YouTube, Facebook, and 
Bebo. Given the large volume of campaign information disseminated, a search 
engine was provided on the website, enabling swift information retrieval. 
6.3.2 Voter interaction and engagement 
The Greens’ campaign website exhibited a few elements for interacting and 
engaging with voters. Most notably, the website consisted of two blogs, namely 
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‘frogblog’ and ‘g.blog’. The former was a party blog and the latter was a partisan 
blog that claimed to be ‘a community of green voices’. The key themes of those 
blogs differed markedly: the frogblog primarily focused on issues in New Zealand 
and the Greens’ 2008 election campaign while the g.blog touched on both New 
Zealand and global ‘green issues’. Despite that, both blogs were interactive. 
Specifically, they allowed registered visitors to freely post and edit comments, 
subject to relevant policies – for instance, spamming, defamatory, offensive, or 
vulgar comments would be moderated or removed. Both blogs often attracted 
reader comments. Responses from blog authors were frequently observed. Put 
differently, a three-way communication – author-to-reader, reader-to-author, and 
reader-to-reader – was evident in the blogs featured on the Greens’ campaign 
website. In addition, entries on both blogs were tagged with keywords – such as 
‘Economy’ and ‘Work & Welfare’, enabling readers to interact and engage with 
blog content according to topics. The entries on frogblog that related to the Greens’ 
election campaign were tagged ‘Campaign’. Figure 6.2 exhibits a blog entry on 
frogblog. 
A few interactive features were found on the page relating to the Greens’ campaign 
events. Specifically, an interactive calendar was utilised to present the Greens’ 
campaign events. In addition, visitors were able to filter campaign events based 
on location by clicking on hypertext links, such as ‘Auckland’ and ‘Overseas’. 
Similarly, visitors were able to filter the Greens’ speeches with relevant drop-
down boxes and hypertext links. Another interactive feature on the Greens’ 
campaign website pertained to web forms allowing visitors to report a technical 
problem, comment on the Greens’ campaign, and provide general feedback. 
The Greens also established its presence on a few social networking websites 
fostering interaction and engagement, namely, YouTube, Facebook, and Bebo; 
however, hardly any interaction and engagement was observed, which formed a 
stark contrast to the blogs that featured on the Greens’ website. Specifically, 
YouTube was utilised for broadcasting campaign videos that primarily focused on 
promoting the Greens’ key election policies; both Facebook and Bebo were chiefly 
for announcing content updates on the Greens’ campaign website. Although 
visitors were able to comment on those social networking websites, rarely was a 
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comment found. And the Greens did not appear to respond to visitor comments on 
those websites. 
 
Figure 6.2 An entry on frogblog 
6.3.3 Support mobilisation 
Diverse efforts to garner and mobilise voter support were observed on the Greens’ 
campaign website. Specifically, on the ‘Support Us’ page, the Greens urged visitors 
to keep up to date with the party’s campaign by signing up to receive the latest 
press releases and speeches via email on specific issues such as ‘Buy Local’. 
Alternatively, visitors could choose to receive press releases and speeches based 
on general topics such as ‘Community Development’. The Greens also encouraged 
visitors to subscribe to a series of newsletters that it published, namely, 
‘GreenWeek e-bulletin’ – weekly news relating to the Green MPs’ activities, 
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‘Campaign News’ – weekly news on the Greens’ election campaign, and ‘Climate 
Snippets’ – an occasional e-bulletin on domestic and international news and 
activities associated with climate change. In order to sign up for the Greens’ press 
releases, speeches, or newsletters, relevant web forms needed to be completed 
and a user account on the campaign website was required. 
Also on the ‘Support Us’ page, a link labelled ‘Get Active’ was noteworthy. Clicking 
on the link rendered a new page that began with a personal message from 
Fitzsimons. The message first highlighted the increasing environmental 
challenges facing the planet and the Greens’ political achievements in tackling 
some of those challenges. It then asserted that the current number of Green MPs 
was largely insufficient to deliver further achievements and changes, and 
therefore urged visitors to support the party in the election. 
Fitzsimons’ message was followed by several hypertext links, namely, ‘Cyber-
volunteering’, ‘Display a web advert’, and ‘Go to an event’; clicking on a link 
rendered a new page specifying how visitors could support the Greens in the 
election. On the ‘Cyber-volunteering’ page, the Greens suggested two main ways 
that visitors could lend their support to the party in virtual space. The first was 
‘spread the word’. Specifically, visitors were encouraged to ‘Tell [their] friends, 
workmates and online contacts about the Green Party website, not just once, but 
whenever something new and interesting is added.’ Visitors were also asked to 
‘Post messages on blogs, forums, mailing lists, newsgroups and anywhere else 
where people gather online.’ The other was ‘Help with the Green Party website’. 
Specifically, visitors were asked to test the Greens’ campaign website and report 
any issues – either technical or cosmetic – to the party with the email address 
provided. On the ‘Display a web advert’ page, visitors were encouraged to 
download a series of electioneering web banners and endorse them on personal 
websites or blogs. Those banners included the Greens’ party logo and campaign 
billboards. Visitors were also invited to create their own web banners supporting 
the Greens and email the banners to the party so that the banners could be shared 
with other supporters. The “Go to an event’ link directed visitors to the ‘Events’ 
page, where visitors were urged to participate in the Greens’ offline campaign 
events. 
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Another web page called ‘Why vote Green?’ also exhibited the Greens’ effort to 
mobilise support. On this page the party explained the significance of receiving 
party votes on election day by stating that voting for the party was akin to 
supporting free annual health check, free education, the Treaty of Waitangi, 
pollution taxes, efficient and affordable public transport, healthy safe food, clean 
energy, and a treasured environment. This was followed by personal messages for 
support from the Greens’ co-leaders. 
The Greens’ campaign website provided a link to the Electoral Commission’s 
website, so that visitors could enrol as voters and cast their party votes for the 
Greens on election day. The Greens also included a list of links to both national and 
international supporter groups. 
The Greens’ support mobilisation in virtual space was not confined to its campaign 
website. On Facebook, the Greens reminded visitors to enrol as voters and vote for 
the party. On YouTube, the Greens presented videos of the Greens’ co-leaders 
explaining the importance of receiving party votes on election day. On the two 
blogs included in the Greens’ campaign website, readers were frequently urged to 
support the Greens in the election in order to expand the Greens’ political 
influence. Figure 6.3 exhibits an entry on g.blog urging readers to support the 
Greens. Also, frogblog utilised Web 2.0 services for readers to bookmark and share 
its entries. 
 
Figure 6.3 An entry on g.blog mobilising voter support 
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6.3.4 Targeted campaigning 
On various occasions, the Greens targeted other political parties, namely Labour 
and National, as part of its e-campaign. 
The Greens targeted the two major parties, Labour and National, as a means to 
champion its key election policies. For instance, in promoting the Greens’ water 
policy, Norman attacked the Labour-led government’s treatment of the country’s 
fresh water. More specifically, Norman suggested that Labour ‘should be ashamed 
for allowing the country’s waterways to become more polluted under its watch, 
despite Labour promising at the last election to make rivers safe’. Norman then 
specifically targeted the then Environment Minister Trevor Mallard, indicating 
that Mallard ‘did little’ about the pressing water pollution problem. Following that, 
Norman began to promote the Greens’ water policy, particularly focusing on how 
the policy would be able to resolve Labour’s ‘legacy of pollution’. Similarly, when 
promoting the Greens’ transport policy, Fitzsimons attacked National’s policy on 
the same subject, arguing that ‘John Key seems to think all the world’s problems 
can be solved by fast-tracking the building of a multi-lane road.’ 
The Greens’ press releases were another area where Labour and National were 
targeted. For instance, in an article titled ‘Labour heats up the left overs and 
promises hot air’ the Greens’ co-leaders referred to Labour’s election policies on 
climate change, employment, environment, housing, and water as ‘a disappointing 
mixture of already-announced initiatives and promises so vague they have no real 
meaning’. In another article titled ‘Nat’s cut will increase debt, poverty’ the Greens’ 
co-leaders aimed at National’s tax cut policy. The co-leaders labelled National’s 
proposed tax cut ‘a fake free lunch’ and ‘back-to-the-‘90s’. They then targeted 
National’s leader, saying that ‘Key pretends he has found a free lunch and will not 
increase borrowing, but this is a sham.’ The article concluded by promoting the 
Greens’ key election policies on economics, science and research, transport, and 
housing. 
The last area of the Greens’ e-campaign where Labour and National were targeted 
pertained to the two blogs that featured on the website, namely frogblog and 
g.blog. For instance, in an article on frogblog titled ‘Campaigning on waste’ Labour 
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was accused of claiming political credit for the Greens’ environmental policy on 
waste. An article on g.blog titled ‘John “Palin” Key?’ was another example of the 
Greens’ targeted campaigning in the blogosphere. The article was in response to 
the National leader likening himself to Obama in the election. It argued that rather 
than Obama, Key was in fact similar to a US Republican politician Sarah Palin 
(hence the article title), in that they both made numerous ‘gaffes’ in public and 
their only qualifications for office were ‘looking good’, appealing to the middle 
class, and ‘being very good at avoiding making any answer to important questions 
that might make them look bad’. 
Despite targeting other political parties rather regularly, the Greens did not 
appear to target its e-campaign at any particular voter segment. In other words, 
the Greens exhibited only one form of targeted campaigning in the virtual space. 
6.3.5 Resource generation 
The Greens’ campaign website presented a number of elements of resource 
generation. As noted, the Greens invited visitors to become cyber volunteers by 
giving their time in testing or fixing technical or non-technical issues of the party’s 
campaign website. This can be considered as a form of generating both time and 
human resources. Furthermore, different web forms could be found that enabled 
visitors to join the party, become party volunteers, or make financial donations – 
either one-off or regular – with credit cards or other alternatives, namely, online 
banking, sending a cheque, and phoning the party. 
The ‘Green Shop’ was particularly noteworthy among the elements of resource 
generation on the Greens’ website. As its name suggested, the Green Shop was an 
online store featuring six types of Green Party merchandise, namely, t-shirts, 
badges, bags, bike gear, stickers, and books. Figure 6.4 exhibits the Green Shop. 
All items featuring in the Green Shop strongly reflected the Greens’ political 
messages. For instance, the Greens’ party logo was embedded in almost all items. 
Also, it was stated that all t-shirts and badges were ‘Kiwi-made’, and bags were 
made of fair trade cotton, which reflected the Greens’ trade policy. Moreover, some 
badges and stickers went so far as to say: ‘I only date boys who vote Green’ or ‘I 
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only date girls who vote Green’. Figure 6.5 exhibits one such sticker. It is worth 
noting that the Green Shop was fully functional. Put differently, visitors were able 
to purchase items directly from the Green Shop with credit cards or bank transfer. 
 
Figure 6.4 The Green Shop 
 
Figure 6.5 A sticker sold in the Green Shop 
6.3.6 Summary 
Table 6.1 summarises the Greens’ e-campaigning utilisation and its extent with the 
proposed e-campaigning framework. It suggests that the Greens’ e-campaigning 
focused most on information dissemination, support mobilisation, and resource 
generation. By comparison, voter interaction and engagement appeared to be 
least focused on. 
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Table 6.1 The Greens' e-campaigning utilisation and its extent 
Campaign practice Content elements Present 
Information 
dissemination 
Political party's information ● 
Candidate biography ● 
Press releases ● 
Policy statements ● 
Campaign news ● 
Campaign events ● 
Speeches ● 
Contact information ● 
Information relating to the political party's other online 
presence 
● 
Campaign blog without visitor comments allowed  
Voter interaction 
and engagement 
Instant chat or messaging  
Instant opinion polls  
Instant surveys  
Applications for interacting with the political party's policies  
Interactive calendar of campaign events ● 
Means to contact the political party ● 
Discussion forums  
Campaign blog with visitor comments allowed ● 
Means to provide feedback  ● 
Support 
mobilisation 
Means for voters to invite their peers to participate in 
campaign events 
 
Means to inform voters of electoral information ● 
Means for voters to receive campaign information and 
updates 
● 
Means for voters to connect with supporter groups ● 
Means for voters to download campaign material ● 
Means for voters to forward campaign material to others ● 
Means for voters to endorse the political party* ● 
Means to encourage votes* ● 
Targeted 
campaigning 
Content targeted at political opponents ● 
Content targeted at political opponents' policies ● 
Content targeted at specific voter segments  
Resource generation 
Means to make donations ● 
Online merchandise shop ● 
Means to become a party member ● 
Means to become a volunteer ● 
Note: * Not present in the proposed e-campaigning framework 
 
Five areas of the Greens’ e-campaigning utilisation deserve highlighting. First, 
despite the Greens being a minor party, its effort in each e-campaigning practice 
was comparable to its major counterparts’. Second, although the Greens did not 
appear to utilise ICTs for voter interaction and engagement as much as the other 
practices, it is thus far the first party under study that exhibited voter interaction 
and engagement in the blogosphere. Third, the Greens’ support mobilisation was 
diverse and innovative, in particular, the party encouraged voters to publicly 
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endorse its campaign banners and invited visitors to create and share their own 
campaign banners for the party. Fourth, while it was unsurprising that National 
was targeted in the Greens’ negative campaigning because of political ideology, it 
was unexpected that Labour too was targeted as both Labour and the Greens were 
on the left of the political spectrum. In fact, Labour was targeted almost as 
frequently as National. Last, the Greens moved beyond conventional means to 
generate campaign resources by establishing a fully functional online 
merchandise store. Also note that two content elements in the Greens’ e-campaign 
are not captured by the proposed e-campaigning framework, namely, means for 
voters to endorse the political party and means to encourage votes. 
6.4 The factors influencing the Greens’ e-
campaigning utilisation 
The Greens’ e-campaigning utilisation was attributable to all factors in Table 2.2, 
namely, election type, electoral regulations, voters’ technology access, resource 
availability, subjective norm, image, job relevance, output quality, result 
demonstrability, and perceived ease of use. The remainder of this section is 
structured according to those factors. This section is concluded with a summary. 
6.4.1 Election type 
As noted, the Greens’ election campaign almost entirely centred on the party vote; 
thus, the election ‘couldn’t get more party-driven’ to the party. This, according to 
the Greens’ campaign team, was ‘totally a good thing’ for the party’s e-campaigning. 
More specifically, in contrast to candidate-led elections, New Zealand campaign 
teams in party-led elections could have a wider reach of resources, a crucial 
ingredient in expansive, extensive, and innovative e-campaigning, the team 
claimed. For instance, the Greens’ campaign team was small, with extremely 
limited full-time staff for e-campaigning. The party’s e-campaigning, however, was 
not compromised. The party capitalised on its growing party membership and 
both domestic and international volunteers to realise the vision of taking its e-
campaigning ‘to a whole new level’. Most, if not all, of those members and 
volunteers were affiliated with the party rather than any particular candidate. The 
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team therefore indicated that it would not have had the same scale of resources to 
leverage, had it been a candidate-led election. It was also those party members and 
volunteers whose creative thinking and ideas – such as the Green Shop and 
‘encouraging voters to create and share their own Green campaigns’ – that partly 
enabled the Greens’ e-campaign to ‘really stand out in the crowd’, said the team. 
Simply put, party-led elections were considered to be beneficial to the Greens’ e-
campaigning utilisation for the team gained greater access to resources and 
diverse, innovative ideas. 
6.4.2 Electoral regulations 
Although the Greens was a strong proponent of the EFA 2007, its campaign team 
‘didn’t get away from quite a bit of confusion and anxiety’. As a result, the team 
‘had to hold back’ some e-campaigning activities. In other words, the Greens’ e-
campaigning utilisation was influenced by electoral regulations. 
For instance, it is noted that the Greens’ utilisation of Facebook for election 
campaigning was mainly confined to announcing content updates on the party’s 
campaign website; the party exhibited hardly any voter interaction and 
engagement on the social networking website. That, according to the Greens’ 
campaign team, was largely due to the EFA 2007. More specifically, under the Act, 
the party secretary’s authorisation was required for messages that persuaded 
voters to vote or not to vote for a political party or candidate. However, it was 
ambiguous to the team if that rule also applied to messages posted on the Greens’ 
Facebook campaign page. Such ambiguity caused the team ‘a great deal of concern 
over the legal implications of the EFA if [the team] intended to go all the way on 
Facebook [for election campaigning]’. After careful consideration, the team had 
decided to ‘put the brakes on’ campaigning on Facebook to avoid the risk of 
breaching the Act. 
Nevertheless, the team stressed that although the EFA 2007 had caused 
‘considerable concern and anxiety’, instances where the Act affected the team’s e-
campaigning were ‘only occasional’. The team further noted that the ‘unfavourable’ 
impact of the EFA 2007 on its e-campaigning ‘should be put into context’. As the 
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team explained, the Act was so overwhelming in the election only because of its 
novelty; the team therefore doubted if the Act would affect the Greens’ e-
campaigning with the same intensity in the next election. However, the team noted 
that electoral regulations would not cease to affect a party’s or candidate’s e-
campaigning because as e-campaigning evolved, ‘there’re always new rules and 
regulations that come along’. 
6.4.3 Voters’ technology access 
To the Greens’ campaign team, the 2008 election bore significance; it symbolised 
‘a brand new chapter of [the Greens’] online campaigning’. The team further noted 
that ‘the increasing access to broadband Internet in the country’ was ‘a defining 
factor’. In other words, voters’ technology access served a role in the Greens’ e-
campaigning utilisation. 
As noted by the team, the party’s e-campaigns in previous elections were ‘quite 
amateur’ and ‘no more than brochureware’. In comparison, the party’s e-campaign 
in the 2008 election was ‘much more polished, professional, and way more than 
just brochureware’. This, according to the team, ‘had a lot to do with the significant 
uptake of Internet and broadband that occurred only recently’. 
As the team explained, in previous elections ‘we didn’t have many New Zealanders 
online;’ consequently, ‘we had to ask, “Why bother doing something that many 
people had limited access to?”’ Also, ‘with the slow Internet connection in past 
elections we couldn’t really do anything more with our online campaigning other 
than treating it like brochureware,’ said the team. In the 2008 election, however, 
‘there’re many New Zealanders online doing all sorts of things and, more 
importantly, there’re a growing number of New Zealanders with broadband 
Internet,’ which collectively incentivised the team to ‘up [its] game’ by 
professionalising and expanding its e-campaigning utilisation. For instance, the 
team devoted considerable effort and resources to polishing the appearance and 
user experience of the Greens’ campaign website in response to voters’ increasing 
Internet access. Furthermore, the steady penetration of broadband enabled the 
campaign team to embrace multimedia campaign content, particularly online 
videos, and a few bandwidth-intensive e-campaigning activities, such as 
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downloading and displaying the Greens’ web banners, and creating and sharing 
voters’ own Green web banners. 
Despite turning a new chapter of its e-campaigning, the team indicated that the 
party’s e-campaigning in this election ‘didn’t go as far as it could have or many 
supporters had hoped’, especially considering a growing, large party support base 
that comprised young voters, most of whom were best described as ‘tech-savvy’ 
with ‘exceptionally high access to different technologies and gadgets’. That was 
largely due to technology access among another large support base of the Greens. 
As the team explained, a sizable portion of the Greens’ core supporters was made 
up of ‘grey hairs’; most of them ‘are not technologically savvy and are still using 
basic computers and dial-up at home’. In other words, those supporters were 
opposite to the Greens’ young supporters in technology access. Consequently, 
those ‘grey hairs would’ve been overwhelmed and singled out, had [the Greens’] 
online campaign gone too far and been too fancy’. As the team perspicaciously 
pointed out, when a political party embodied different supporter groups with 
varying technology access, it was crucial that no group should be excluded from 
the party’s e-campaign because of technological skills and access. For that reason, 
the team indicated that ‘compromises are inevitable and necessary [in the party’s 
e-campaigning utilisation]’. 
In brief, voters’ technology access stimulated as well as withheld the Greens’ e-
campaigning utilisation. In other words, the impact of this factor on the Greens’ e-
campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. 
6.4.4 Resource availability 
‘It’s fair to say that what we did and didn’t do online, and how we went about it 
was mostly driven by the amount of resources we already had and what we could 
get.’ These words of the Greens’ campaign team suggests the role of campaign 
resources in its e-campaigning. In other words, the team’s resource availability 
influenced its e-campaigning utilisation. 
As noted, the Greens’ e-campaigning was largely operated by party members and 
volunteers. This, according to the team, reflected the amount of resources 
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available. As the team explained, with the broad penetration of the Internet and 
the increasing uptake of broadband in New Zealand around the election, ‘it’s time 
to expand the scope of [the Greens’] online campaigning and be more professional.’ 
However, the party’s limited campaign budget and staff immediately became a 
major hindrance to achieving that overarching goal. The team did not give up; 
rather, the party’s limited resource availability prompted the campaign team to 
‘get really creative’ about its e-campaigning. 
More specifically, the team understood that many members and volunteers of the 
Greens possessed high computer literacy. ‘They’re highly capable of taking up the 
operational side of the Green Party’s online campaigning, provided there’s some 
clear direction in place,’ said the team. For that reason, the team decided to 
primarily focus on the managerial and strategic side of the Greens’ e-campaigning 
while inviting party members and volunteers to take charge of the operational side. 
Such a decision might have appeared unorthodox to other campaign teams in the 
election, said the team, but it creatively enabled the team to achieve the e-
campaigning goal. The team added that it encouraged those involved in the Greens’ 
e-campaigning operation to utilise open-source software and applications that 
they were familiar with, as the team could not afford commercial software and 
training respectively. 
The Greens’ campaign team believed that traditional means still performed better 
in some areas of election campaigning; however, the team admitted that it mostly 
utilised the Internet in those areas in actuality. Such a contradiction, according to 
the team, was ascribed to the availability of the Greens’ campaign resources. This 
also suggests that the impact of output quality was moderated by resource 
availability. ‘The newspaper’, for instance, ‘is still the most effective and powerful 
way of campaign advertising,’ said the team. However, ‘It’s also very expensive and, 
more importantly, the impact is ephemeral in the sense that if you place an ad in 
the paper it’s gone tomorrow.’ ‘If you want to maintain the impact,’ the team 
continued, ‘you have to keep on paying, which wasn’t feasible to us as we didn’t 
have a big budget at our disposal.’ Campaign advertising online, by comparison, ‘is 
exceptionally cheaper and produces a way more persistent impact’; it 
consequently became the team’s preferred means. 
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Nevertheless, there were a few occasions that saw the Greens’ e-campaigning 
utilisation be obstructed by resource availability. For instance, the team believed 
that voter interaction and engagement on the Greens’ Facebook page constantly 
required ‘a significant amount of time’ and, more importantly, should be carried 
out by the Greens’ MPs because of authenticity. However, it was impractical for 
the MPs to ‘spend a huge chunk of their limited time on only one of many aspects 
of election campaigning’. Furthermore, the team believed that it had to recruit at 
least one full-time campaign staff in order to ‘fully run [the Greens’] Facebook 
page’, which the Greens could not afford. Consequently, there was limited voter 
interaction and engagement on the party’s Facebook campaign page. Put 
succinctly, the level of voter interaction and engagement on the Greens’ Facebook 
page was in part compromised by the party’s limited financial and time resources. 
In short, resource availability propelled as well hindered the Greens’ e-
campaigning utilisation. Put differently, the impact of the factor on the Greens’ e-
campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. It is worth highlighting 
the instance where the Greens preferred campaign advertising online for it 
suggests the impact of output quality was moderated by another factor – resource 
availability. 
6.4.5 Subjective norm 
‘In the past, political parties could get away with not doing anything online for 
their election campaigning’, said the Greens’ campaign team, ‘but that’s no longer 
the case this time around.’ ‘There’s this wide expectation that not only should 
political parties have their own online presence,’ the team continued, ‘but more 
importantly, they should be seen actively doing all sorts of things for campaigning 
in a sophisticated way.’ As the team indicated, such an expectation inspired the 
Greens’ expansive and polished e-campaigning. 
As noted, some policies received particular emphasis in the Green’s e-campaigning, 
so much so that the party provided a separate web page for further promoting 
them in addition to the ‘Policies’ page, where those policies and other Green 
policies were particularised. This, according to the team, was another instance 
where external expectations inspired the Greens’ e-campaigning. As the team 
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explained, ‘When voters visit a political party’s website, there’re always certain 
things they expect to see or see more of.’ The team perceived that the Greens was 
expected to especially focus on issues and, more importantly, the Greens’ solutions 
relating to the environment, climate change, public transport, food, and water. If 
voters failed to see that, ‘it’s not the Green Party’s campaign to them.’ For that 
reason, the Greens’ policies on climate change, peak oil, food, water, and transport 
were especially focused on in the party’s e-campaigning. 
‘What others were doing, and how, in the same or a similar context’, or simply 
referred to as ‘the industry trend’, formed another source of inspiration in the 
Greens’ e-campaigning utilisation. The team perceptively indicated that the 
utilisation of ICTs in a commercial context was primarily driven by industry. Put 
differently, ‘When the industry promoted certain IT trends – such as using IT to do 
certain things or in certain ways, most firms tended to follow.’ Political parties’ e-
campaigning, said the team, followed a similar trajectory. In other words, political 
parties’ e-campaigning was ‘largely driven by what others were doing, and how, 
in the same or a similar context’. A specific instance was provided to further 
illustrate that. According to the team, a blog debuted chiefly as an interconnected 
platform for an individual to publish thoughts and exchange opinions. It was then 
widely promoted in the political context as a modern campaign vehicle for parties 
and politicians to advocate their ideologies and policies, and seek feedback from 
the general public. Such a trend was accordingly followed by parties and 
politicians in many parts of the world, hence the Greens’ frogblog. ‘Of course 
there’re many different means to promote policies and gather feedback in the 
election,’ said the team. And Frogblog was the predominant means ‘simply 
because it reflected the current trend in the campaign landscape’. Put succinctly, 
the team favoured a blog over other alternatives as its primary means to publicly 
promote the party’s policies and values and solicit feedback because the team 
perceived that to be the current trend. 
There were also other instances, albeit seldom, where the norm perceived by the 
team curbed the Greens’ e-campaigning utilisation. Most notably, a few social 
networking platforms were utilised in the Greens’ e-campaigning, Twitter, 
however, was excluded. That was due to subjective norm. The team acknowledged 
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that it had pondered incorporating Twitter as part of its e-campaign in the election, 
especially considering the increasing popularity of this social networking platform 
among many New Zealanders. Nonetheless, the team did not perceive 
campaigning on such an emerging social networking platform to be a significant 
trend in the 2008 election. In fact, the team believed that most of its counterparts 
held a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude towards Twitter in the election. In addition, the team 
did not feel, from interacting with the Greens’ supporters, that it was expected to 
utilise Twitter in the election. Consequently, Twitter was omitted from the Greens’ 
e-campaigning. Put differently, the Greens’ campaign team excluded Twitter from 
the party’s e-campaigning as it did not sense a trend nor an external expectation 
to act otherwise. 
In all, subjective norm encouraged and dissuaded the Greens’ e-campaigning 
utilisation. In other words, the impact of the factor on the Greens’ e-campaigning 
consisted of two facets: positive and negative. The norms perceived by the Greens’ 
campaign team were derived from voters’ expectations and e-campaigning trends. 
The team further pointed out that hardly any trend remained static by nature. That 
is, ‘what political parties did [for their e-campaigning], and how, in this election 
wouldn’t be the same in future elections.’ For instance, at the end of the 2008 
election the team sensed an emerging trend where Twitter would replace blogs as 
an important campaign vehicle for parties to interact with voters; this trend, 
according to the team, would be accordingly reflected in many parties’ future e-
campaigning. This also suggests that subjective norm plays an ongoing role in e-
campaigning utilisation. 
6.4.6 Image 
As noted, Labour was one of the main objects of the Greens’ targeted campaigning. 
This was rather unexpected as both parties were situated at the same end of the 
political spectrum and were widely considered as natural political allies. 
According to the campaign team, the inclusion of Labour in the Greens’ targeted 
campaigning was essential as it publicly demonstrated the party’s impartiality and 
determination to adhere to its own belief and values irrespectively, thereby 
strengthening its political credibility. Put differently, Labour was attacked in the 
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Greens’ e-campaign because the team perceived such a move to be beneficial to 
the Greens’ political image. 
Thus far, the Greens is the first political party under study that enabled the 
audience of its blogs to post and edit comments. This was largely due to image 
considerations. More specifically, the team understood that enabling reader 
comments on a party’s campaign blog could be ‘risky’, especially during an election, 
as it could attract malicious attacks, tarnishing the party’s political image. For that 
reason, the team believed, some political parties were reluctant to invite 
comments on their blogs. Despite that, the Greens welcomed ‘all sorts of 
comments from [its] blog visitors’. As the team explained, 
Online campaigning has to be authentic and genuine, first and foremost. … 
When you endorse a blog or any social media, you are signalling [that] you 
want to interact and have a two-way conversation with people. People are 
going to make great comments and bad comments; they are going to throw 
stones at you and abuse you. So what? It’s just part of the normal ebb and 
flow of human interaction; it’s no different from what you get from talking 
about politics with people at the pub. … Taking away others’ opportunities 
to talk back online is no different from standing on the street corner with a 
megaphone, yelling at people about your ideas but expecting everyone else 
to just shut up and listen. That’s not an authentic or genuine interaction or 
conversation and would end up looking seriously bad, in fact, far worse 
than people making a few bad comments towards you. 
Put succinctly, the Greens’ campaign team perceived that’ taking away’ visitors’ 
ability to comment on the party’s campaign blog would appear unauthentic and 
disingenuous, resulting in greater damage to the party’s political image than 
enabling visitors to post comments that could be perceived as negative. 
There were other situations where the team had to moderate some aspects of its 
e-campaigning because of the Greens’ image. Notably, the team acknowledged that 
although it was able to ‘see the large potential of online campaign videos, [it] had 
not done much’. As the team explained, it was salient for the Greens and its MPs to 
‘look their best’ in the party’s campaign videos. To achieve that, ‘certain 
professional standards, such as lighting, recording, and editing, had to be met’. 
However, the campaign videos that the team could afford to produce ‘fell short of 
those standards by any measure’. Consequently, the team presented limited 
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campaign videos in the Greens’ e-campaign. This instance also suggests the impact 
of resource availability. 
In sum, image propelled as well as discouraged the Greens’ e-campaigning 
utilisation. Put differently, the impact of the factor consisted of two facets: positive 
and negative. 
6.4.7 Job relevance 
As noted, the Greens promoted its key election policies partly through a noticeable 
portion of its e-campaign targeted at its major counterparts, namely Labour and 
National. While that might be considered negative by some, thereby potentially 
affecting the Greens’ image, the Greens’ campaign team was adamant that such a 
tactic was integral to election campaigning. As the team explained, ‘It’s part of the 
job description for any political party to advocate its own policies, and challenge 
and debate other parties’ policies, especially during an election.’ The team further 
noted that it would not fully be an election campaign if political parties refrained 
from ‘taking a swipe at’ each other’s stance and policies. In other words, the 
campaign team targeted the Greens’ major counterparts in its e-campaigning as it 
perceived the tactic to be relevant to election campaigning. 
The team noted that the choice of the social networks to endorse in the election 
chiefly ‘came down to their relevance to [the party’s] election campaigning’. The 
team indicated that it ‘knew of quite a few [social networks] before the election’. 
Most of them, however, had been excluded from the Greens’ e-campaigning 
because they were perceived ‘irrelevant’ by the team. For instance, the team was 
acutely aware that Myspace and Bebo were ‘also very popular’ around the election. 
However, the team perceived that the former was ‘all about music’ and the latter 
was occupied primarily by ‘the demographic that’s simply not old enough to vote’. 
The team subsequently decided to ‘rule out’ those social networks because they 
were deemed ‘irrelevant’ in that they could neither serve as an additional 
campaign platform nor increase the Greens’ votes in the election. 
It bears noting that Bebo was actually included in the Greens’ e-campaigning. This 
apparent contradiction, the team believed, could be that some of the Greens’ 
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members or volunteers ‘might think it’s a nice idea to have Bebo for whatever 
reason and subsequently acted on that’. 
In general, job relevance motivated as well as dissuaded the Greens’ e-
campaigning utilisation. In other words, the impact of the factor on the Greens’ e-
campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. 
6.4.8 Output quality 
As mentioned, the Greens’ campaign team perceived that campaign advertising in 
the newspaper produced the strongest impact; however, the Internet was the 
preferred means partly because it left a more enduring impact. This suggests the 
role of output quality in the Greens’ e-campaigning. The team noted other 
instances where the Greens’ e-campaigning utilisation was shaped by output 
quality. 
Notably, the team claimed that the Greens’ fundamental approach to election 
campaigning had always been policy-driven. For that reason, the largest 
proportion of the Greens’ election campaign had long been devoted to 
championing the party’s election policies. This had been almost entirely handled 
by traditional means, particularly door knocking, television, radio, and the 
newspaper, until the 2008 election, when the Internet served as the primary and 
‘preferred’ means. Such a switch was based on the team’s perception that e-
campaigning could outperform its traditional counterpart in the most significant 
part of the Greens’ election campaign. This perception, according to the team, 
could be understood from two angles. 
First, unlike its traditional counterpart, ‘the Internet is the least polluted and 
restrictive medium for communicating outwards.’ More specifically, the team felt 
that traditional media was laden with filters and biases. Consequently, the team 
found it immensely challenging, if not impossible, to promote election policies 
with integrity intact through that media. ‘Offline campaign billboards allow you to 
say what you want so they are unpolluted; however, they are highly restrictive, 
you can’t just stick them up when and where you want,’ said the team. The Internet, 
in stark contrast, was considered by the team to be ‘largely free of “noise” and 
 174 
restraints’, which resulted in a facet of the team’s perception that e-campaigning 
outperformed its traditional counterpart in policy promotion. 
Second, the team indicated that door knocking was a major means for the Greens 
to promote policies in prior elections. Despite offering face-to-face communication 
between the party and voters, which was important, door knocking consisted of ‘a 
couple of critical limitations potentially hampering the outcome’. ‘To begin with,’ 
the team explained, ‘door knocking, especially on a regular basis, is very hard to 
organise because it requires a group of random people to all be available at a 
particular time and location.’ Moreover, ‘the best you can do with door knocking 
is hand over a flyer or leaflet with your key policies on it.’ Consequently, the team 
continued, ‘all your key policies have to be reduced to a few sound bites. That’s 
just superficial and nowhere close to what’s considered policy-driven.’ The team 
perceived that with e-campaigning, it was able to promote the Greens’ policies in 
their entirety, as opposed to sound bites, anytime and anywhere; that is, 
overcoming the limitations of door knocking. This accordingly formed the second 
facet of the team’s perception that e-campaigning outperformed its traditional 
counterpart in policy promotion. 
There were, however, situations where the team primarily employed traditional 
means for election campaigning because of output quality. For instance, the team 
acknowledged that in the election it was given more means of fund raising with e-
campaigning, most notably, the Green Shop. Despite that, the team ‘mainly stuck 
to’ traditional means as they were considered ‘to still do a better job’ than e-
campaigning in that they enabled the team to ‘raise larger funds within a shorter 
time’, which was immensely critical during elections. 
Overall, output quality encouraged as well as dampened the Greens’ e-
campaigning utilisation. In other words, the impact of this factor on the Greens’ e-
campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. The team perceived 
that e-campaigning generally performed as well as, if not better than, its 
traditional counterpart. It therefore held an ‘optimistic’ attitude towards e-
campaigning and treated both forms of election campaigning equally in general. 
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6.4.9 Result demonstrability 
The Greens’ campaign team indicated that when it was proposed a new approach 
to raise funds and for voters to show party support by including the Green Shop in 
the Greens’ e-campaign, it ‘didn’t take long to get [the team’s] full support’. The 
primary reason was that the team was able to ‘get a clear, concrete idea about how 
it [the approach] went by just looking at the level of sales, very direct, no guessing’. 
It bears noting that the online store ‘didn’t sell just anything; it sold products 
branded with the Green Party logo and, in some cases, the party’s campaign 
message’. ‘So,’ the team continued, ‘buying something from the Green Shop wasn’t 
the same as buying from any other shop; it actually meant endorsement of the 
party.’ Because of that, the level of sales served as a tangible indication of both the 
campaign funds and the level of voter support generated by the approach. 
Encouraging voters to create and share their own Green digital campaign banners 
was another new e-campaigning approach that was employed because of result 
demonstrability. According to the team, the purpose of the approach was to garner 
and mobilise voter support. As the team put it, the level of voter support was an 
element that most, if not all, political parties were eager to ‘get a clear view on’ yet 
often remained intangible. The approach, however, enabled this important and 
often intangible element to be apparent to the team. More specifically, the level of 
voter support garnered and mobilised by the approach was demonstrable through 
the number of participants and the extent of participation. To that end, the team 
‘had no hesitation to embrace [the new approach] with open arms’. 
Although result demonstrability appeared to produce a positive impact on the 
Greens’ e-campaigning – that is, the factor motivated the Greens’ e-campaigning 
utilisation, the team was wary of acting on the implication of the factor alone. This, 
according to the team, was due to two main problems. First, some e-campaigning 
activities were unlikely to deliver tangible results but were essential. For instance, 
the team indicated that it was difficult to discern the impact of promoting election 
policies online; this, however, would not limit or prevent the team’s engagement 
in the activity for it was the core of the Greens’ e-campaign. Second, to be able to 
discern the results or impact of e-campaigning, said the team, it was crucial to 
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know ‘what to look for’, as well as ‘when, where, and how to look for it’. Since the 
team sometimes found itself struggling with that in the election, it treated the 
implication of result demonstrability cautiously. The team further suggested that 
the second problem would be ‘half solved’ when ‘someone comes up with a clear, 
holistic view of e-campaigning’. 
6.4.10 Perceived ease of use 
The Greens’ campaign team pointed out that ‘Today, it’s too simplistic to see e-
campaigning as just another channel for election campaigning.’ As the team put it, 
‘E-campaigning requires its own sets of knowledge, skills, and insights, so it’s fair 
to say e-campaigning, in many ways, is a speciality in its own right.’ To that end, 
the team found that ‘you would only do it [e-campaigning] or do more of it when 
you find it easy to get your head around or it doesn’t take a lot to get your head 
around’. Those words suggest the impact of perceived ease of use on e-
campaigning utilisation, evident in some parts of the Greens’ e-campaigning. 
As noted, in order to deal with its limited campaign resources, the Greens’ 
campaign team invited the party’s members and volunteers to participate in the 
party’s e-campaigning operation. In particular, the team encouraged the 
participants to use applications that they were familiar with. This led to ‘a few 
compatibility glitches further down the track’, requiring the team’s scarce 
campaign resources to rectify them. The team acknowledged that had it specified 
the applications for the Greens’ e-campaigning operation, instead of allowing the 
participants to choose their own, those compatibility issues would not have 
existed. Nevertheless, the team maintained that ‘it’s a good decision to let [the 
participants] use applications of their own choice,’ and the team ‘wouldn’t have it 
any other way’. As the team explained, when people were encouraged to perform 
tasks with the tools that they felt most comfortable and familiar with, they often 
found the tasks ‘more straightforward’ and consequently, would be more 
motivated to perform and contribute. This, according to the team, was ‘exactly 
what happened’ to the participants of the Greens’ e-campaigning operation. Put 
differently, the team encouraged the participants to operate the Greens’ e-
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campaign with applications that they felt most comfortable and familiar with, 
based on perceived ease of use. 
The team further indicated that most who were involved in the Greens’ e-
campaigning, from the strategic to the operational level, possessed extensive 
knowledge and skills that could be applied to e-campaigning, such as e-commerce, 
online marketing, and database administration. Also, a number of them had been 
previously exposed to e-campaigning. They accordingly found many aspects of e-
campaigning ‘quite straightforward and relatively easy to get your head around’. 
Consequently, the Greens experienced expansive e-campaigning in the election. 
In brief, perceived ease of use contributed to the Greens’ expansive and extensive 
e-campaigning utilisation. In other words, the impact of the factor on the Greens’ 
e-campaigning was positive. It is worth noting that perceived ease of use in e-
campaigning ‘is an evolving subject in some respects’, according to the Greens’ 
campaign team. More specifically, political parties perceived e-campaigning to be 
more straightforward and easier to navigate as they acquired and accumulated 
knowledge, insights, and experiences pertaining to e-campaigning. The campaign 
team further noted that ‘it’s almost definite that there will be new technologies, 
applications, and tactics coming into the mix [for e-campaigning] in future 
elections,’ resetting perceptions about the ease of use relating to e-campaigning. 
These indications suggest that the role of perceived ease of use in e-campaigning 
utilisation would be ongoing. 
6.4.11 Summary 
The Greens’ e-campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election was shaped by 
the ten factors in Table 2.2, namely, election type, electoral regulations, voters’ 
technology access, resource availability, subjective norm, image, job relevance, 
output quality, result demonstrability, and perceived ease of use. Each factor in 
essence represents a unique perspective, therefore, the Greens’ e-campaigning 
utilisation has been explained from ten perspectives. Various specific and 
contextual instances that occurred in the Greens’ e-campaigning utilisation have 
been presented to illustrate the factors, lending valuable insights into this unique 
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phenomenon. Table 6.2 highlights the ten factors that influenced the Greens’ e-
campaigning utilisation. 
Table 6.2 The factors influencing the Greens' e-campaigning utilisation 
Factor Dual impact Moderated by 
Election type   
Electoral regulations   
Voters' technology access ●  
Resource availability ●  
Subjective norm ●  
Image ●  
Job relevance ●  
Output quality ● Resource availability 
Result demonstrability   
Perceived ease of use   
 
As noted in the table, the impacts of several factors, such as voters’ technology 
access, consisted of two facets: positive and negative. This means that those 
factors were enablers as well as inhibitors of the Greens’ e-campaigning utilisation. 
On one occasion, the impact of output quality was moderated by resource 
availability. Taken together, it suggests that the Greens’ e-campaigning utilisation 
was complex, contextual, and dynamic. 
6.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented the key findings from the case study relating to the 
Greens’ e-campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election. It has 
comprehensively analysed the breadth and depth of the Greens’ e-campaigning 
utilisation. Based on that, it has identified and illustrated in depth the ten factors 
influencing the Greens’ e-campaigning utilisation. 
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Chapter 7 ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation 
7.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter presents the key findings from the fourth case study: ACT’s e-
campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election. This chapter proceeds as 
follows: section 7.2 outlines the case background; then, section 7.3 and 7.4 answer 
the first and second research questions respectively; and last, section 7.5 
summarises this chapter. 
7.2 Case background 
Established in 1994 jointly by Roger Douglas and Derek Quigley, ACT is a relatively 
young, minor political party in New Zealand. ACT is an acronym for the Association 
of Consumers and Taxpayers. Both founders had been cabinet ministers prior to 
the establishment of the party. Richard Prebble, a former Labour cabinet minister, 
was the first party leader. ACT was founded on two principles: first, ‘individuals 
are the rightful owners of their own lives and therefore have inherent rights and 
responsibilities’; and second, ‘the proper purpose of government is to protect such 
rights and not to assume such responsibilities’. On that note, the chief objective of 
the party ‘is to promote an open, progressive and benevolent society in which 
individual New Zealanders are free to achieve their full potential’. ACT is situated 
towards the right of the political spectrum and is widely considered as a close 
political ally of National. 
ACT was led by Rodney Hide in the 2008 general election. Hide first entered 
Parliament as a list MP of ACT in 1996. He then succeeded Prebble as ACT’s leader 
in 2004. Having won the Epsom electorate in the 2005 general election, Hide 
became an electorate MP. Before the 2008 election, ACT held two seats in 
Parliament. Under MMP, a political party must win at least one electorate seat or 
5 per cent of the party vote in order to be in Parliament. Since ACT came 
considerably under the party vote threshold in the previous election, securing 
Hide’s hold of the Epsom electorate formed the principal aim of ACT’s election 
campaigning. ACT had ‘an extremely small campaign team’ in the election. ACT’s 
campaign team claimed that the party ‘is definitely no stranger to’ e-campaigning. 
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The team further noted that in the previous election, ACT had already employed 
blogging as a main campaign instrument while many other parties were merely 
‘covering the basic stuff online’. According to the team, blogging continued to be 
the main feature of ACT’s e-campaign in the 2008 election. The team also pointed 
out that instead of any particular vision or strategy, only a few objectives were 
present for the party’s e-campaigning in this election; most notably, ‘putting 
everything that’s campaign-related into one place [ACT’s campaign website]’ and 
ensuring prompt, up-to-date, and accurate information on ACT’s campaign 
website. ACT utilised its party website (www.act.org.nz) as the primary platform 
for e-campaigning. The campaign message was: ‘Be the Difference – ACT Now’. 
Figure 7.1 exhibits the home page of ACT’s campaign website. 
 
Figure 7.1 The home page of ACT's campaign website 
7.3 ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation and its extent 
On the basis of the proposed e-campaigning framework, ACT’s e-campaigning 
utilisation encompassed all five practices, namely, information dissemination, 
voter interaction and engagement, support mobilisation, targeted campaigning, 
and resource generation. Those practices were conducted to varying degrees. The 
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analysis in this section is structured according to the practices. This section is 
concluded with a summary. 
7.3.1 Information dissemination 
The campaign information disseminated on ACT’s campaign website was diverse 
and well-structured. Images of ACT’s party leader and deputy leader, Hide and 
Heather Roy, along with ACT’s campaign message consistently featured on the top 
of all web pages. All election policies of ACT were alphabetically filed on the 
‘Policies’ page. Despite being a minor party, ACT exhibited broad policy coverage. 
More specifically, the party’s election policies encompassed 20 areas, such as local 
government, and privatisation. Each policy was presented as a hypertext link, 
along with brief statements of the key actions and benefits associated with the 
policy. Clicking on a policy rendered a policy document that fully described the 
goal, background, principles, and details of the policy. The policy document could 
also be downloaded for offline viewing. 
ACT’s campaign news, speeches, and press releases were put together in reverse 
chronological order under the ‘News’ page. The page comprised two main sections, 
one listing clickable entries and the other displaying the selected entry in full. 
There were a large number of entries on the page, many of them predated the 
election. Each entry was attached with a time stamp. It can be inferred from the 
time stamps that the ‘News’ page was frequently updated, especially during the 
weeks leading up to election day. Furthermore, on the ‘Media’ page ACT provided 
external links to select items featuring ACT in the New Zealand news media, such 
as news articles and poll results. 
All ACT candidates were listed under the ‘Candidates’ page. Each candidate was 
displayed with the candidate’s name, photo, rank on the party list, and electorate. 
Clicking on a candidate’s name or photo rendered further details of the candidate: 
the candidate’s contact information, background, and key responsibilities. 
Offline campaign events could be found on the ‘Events’ page. Each event was 
attached with its date, time, location, and key theme. The contact information 
relating to the party’s candidates, parliamentary office, head office, and board was 
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listed under the ‘Contact’ page. Also included on the page was Hide’s electorate 
office. Information relating to ACT’s background and principles was absent from 
the party’s campaign website. 
Occasionally, ACT’s campaign information was disseminated in other formats 
besides text, namely, image, audio, and online video. It is worth mentioning that 
all ACT’s online campaign videos were centralised on the ‘Media’ page, as depicted 
in Figure 7.2. Most videos on that page pertained to ACT candidates promoting 
some of ACT’s key election policies relating to the New Zealand Emissions Trading 
Scheme, law and order, and early childhood education. The remaining videos were 
used to depict some of ACT’s campaign trail. The page also provided a link to ACT’s 
YouTube page, an alternative location for the party’s online campaign videos. 
 
Figure 7.2 ACT's ‘Media’ page 
7.3.2 Voter interaction and engagement 
The elements on ACT’s campaign website relating to voter interaction and 
engagement merely centred on links that enabled visitors to directly email ACT’s 
candidates, staff, and board members, and the ability to filter content and post 
comments in some parts of ACT’s e-campaign. It could be said that ACT’s online 
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voter interaction and engagement was rather limited; however, there were some 
notable areas. 
More specifically, the ‘Blog’ page of ACT’s campaign website, exhibited in Figure 
7.3, centralised campaign blogs penned by four ACT candidates, including ACT’s 
leader and deputy leader. The ‘Blog’ page provided two forms of interaction with 
its content for readers. First, blog entries could be filtered according to author by 
simply clicking on a name. Second, readers were able to post comments on any 
blog entry, provided that they had been registered and logged in. In general, 
comments on ACT’s blog entries were limited, so was the number of readers 
posting comments. However, none of the blog authors appeared to respond to 
reader comments. It was unnecessary to be registered or logged in, in order to 
read others’ comments. 
 
Figure 7.3 ACT's 'Blog' page 
The ‘News’ page was another area offering voter interaction and engagement. 
Similar to the ‘Blog’ page, visitors were able to interact with content on the ‘News’ 
page based on keywords, the associated policy domain; entry format, namely, 
audio, video, and text; entry type, namely press releases, speeches, and Hansard; 
and time range. Registered and logged-in visitors were allowed to post comments 
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on any entry. Rarely was a reader comment posted, however. ACT’s YouTube page 
also enabled viewers to comment or rate its entries. Again, both comments and 
viewers posting comments were limited. Moreover, the party did not seem to 
respond to any viewer comment. 
7.3.3 Support mobilisation 
ACT’s efforts to generate and mobilise voter support were observable in the 
party’s e-campaign, albeit restricted. Typically, on the ‘Media’ page ACT provided 
an external link to the Electoral Commission’s website for voter enrolment. In 
addition, three instances relating to support mobilisation in ACT’s e-campaign 
were noteworthy, namely an open letter, an invitation, and online videos. 
Centrally featuring on the home page of ACT’s campaign website was a clickable 
image that read ‘An open letter to all New Zealanders’. The letter was written by 
Hide and titled ‘OK, We Know We’re In a Hole – Now It’s Time to Stop Digging’. 
Hide began the letter by boldly stating that ‘New Zealand is facing an 
extraordinary situation in its history.’ He then described the ‘mire the current 
Labour government has placed us in and that National refuses to acknowledge’. 
Following that, Hide claimed that ACT had devised a plan ‘to get New Zealand out 
of the mire’. In order to realise the plan, it was essential for ACT to become part of 
the upcoming government – led by National – by obtaining the party vote, 
according to the party leader. Hide concluded the letter by saying ‘If … you’re 
concerned as to where our country is heading, and want to see ACT stand by the 
new National Government and help it stay on track, then please give your party 
vote to ACT on November 8 [the election day].’ 
Occasionally, visitors were greeted by an invitation also penned by Hide on the 
home page of the ACT’s campaign website. Depicted in Figure 7.4, the invitation 
was orientated towards capturing the party vote, which was similar to, but shorter 
than, the open letter. The message stressed the significance of every party vote for 
ACT under MMP. To further illustrate this, Hide provided some specific examples. 
For instance, securing an electorate and 3 per cent of the party vote would 
translate into four ACT MPs in Parliament, despite not reaching the 5 per cent 
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party vote threshold. It is worth noting that the invitation disappeared from the 
website in the weeks leading up to the election. 
 
Figure 7.4 An invitation from Hide 
The majority of ACT’s online campaign videos concentrated on disseminating the 
party’s campaign information, as noted; the remainder pertained to garnering 
voter support, conducted by several high-ranking ACT candidates in addition to 
the party leader. For instance, in a video John Boscawen, the fourth candidate on 
ACT’s list, reinforced the significance of each party vote for ACT, similar to the 
primary message in Hide’s invitation; in another video Douglas, one of the co-
founders of ACT and the third candidate on the party list, explained the influence 
of voting ACT in the election on both the overthrow of the Labour-led government 
and the formation of a National-led government. ACT’s televised campaign 
advertisement soliciting the party vote also featured on the party’s campaign 
website. 
As depicted, ACT’s efforts to mobilise voter support in its e-campaign almost 
entirely concentrated on the party vote. Although the party indicated that 
ensuring Hide’s hold of his constituency formed the central theme of ACT’s 
election campaign, support mobilisation concerning that particular aspect was not 
observed in ACT’s e-campaign. 
7.3.4 Targeted campaigning 
Labour, ACT’s political adversary, and some of its ministers were targeted in ACT’s 
e-campaign. For instance, in his open letter Hide attacked the Labour-led 
government by labelling it ‘cynical’, ‘blind’, ‘deceit’, and ‘faint-hearted’. Hide 
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further criticised Labour for focusing on proffering election bribes paid for with 
taxpayers’ money rather than extricating New Zealand from the financial 
misfortune that ACT held Labour accountable for. Also, in his blog post titled 
‘Cullen Has Lost the Plot’, Hide argued that Cullen, the then finance minister, 
lacked sound economic management. Hide further asserted that ‘Cullen’s 
response to the global financial crisis has been woeful’ because the mere economic 
solution Cullen was capable of propounding was increasing the expenditure of 
taxpayers’ money in good or bad times. The ACT’s leader concluded that Cullen 
and Labour could only worsen the financial crisis confronting New Zealand. 
ACT always explicitly positioned itself as a close, if not the closest, political ally of 
National, so much so that ACT constantly expressed that it wanted the upcoming 
government to be led by National and supported by ACT. That, however, did not 
exempt National from being another target of ACT’s negative campaigning. For 
instance, in the open letter where Labour was heavily attacked, Hide also criticised 
National for refusing to acknowledge the financial mire that the Labour-led 
government was responsible for. ACT’s targeted campaigning at National’s 
policies could be noted in some blog entries on ACT’s campaign website. For 
instance, in his blog post titled ‘John Key’s Economic Plan’, Hide described 
National’s fiscal plan as disappointing. He further suggested that National’s 
economic policy was indistinguishable from Labour’s in that both parties 
considered increasing expenditure of taxpayers’ money to be the chief solution to 
the financial crisis facing New Zealand, which could not alleviate the financial 
burden on New Zealanders. To that end, Hide argued that ‘a party vote for the 
National Party will dump Helen Clark but keep Michael Cullen’s economic policy.’ 
The ACT leader went on to claim that ‘A party vote for ACT will dump Helen Clark 
and Cullen’s economic policy.’ Put differently, Hide attempted to mobilise support 
for ACT through attacking National’s policy. 
A discernible portion of ACT’s e-campaign was targeted at a particular voter 
segment. More specifically, ACT’s election policies were bilingually presented. As 
illustrated in Figure 7.5, the summary of ACT’s 20 main election policies could be 
rendered in English or Chinese by simply clicking on a link in the corresponding 
language. This suggests that Chinese-speaking voters were particularly targeted 
 187 
in ACT’s e-campaign. It also suggests that ACT segmented voters partly based on 
language or ethnicity. 
 
Figure 7.5 ACT's e-campaign targeted at Chinese-speaking voters 
ACT’s campaign advertisement on Facebook was another instance of the party’s 
targeted campaigning at a particular voter segment. More specifically, during the 
election period, Facebook featured an election advertisement of ACT with a title 
and a subtitle that respectively read ‘Why Nats Should Vote ACT’ and ‘The Guts to 
Do What’s Right’. As depicted in Figure 7.6, the advertisement encouraged 
National’s supporters to click and find out ‘the reasons … that National party 
supporters are better off voting ACT with their party vote’. Upon clicking, the 
visitor was redirected to ACT’s campaign website. This instance suggests that 
another approach of ACT to voter segmentation was based on political leaning. 
 
Figure 7.6 ACT's election advertisement on Facebook 
7.3.5 Resource generation 
ACT’s e-campaign exhibited several ways to generate campaign resources. More 
specifically, on the ‘Media’ page, ACT provided options to join, donate, or volunteer 
by clicking on the corresponding button. 
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It cost $20 to join. To do so online, visitors needed to complete a web form 
soliciting a few personal details, namely email address and first and last names. 
Alternatively, visitors could click on a button called ‘Join Offline’ to download, 
print, and complete ACT’s membership form and then return the form to the postal 
address provided. 
Visitors were able to make financial contributions to ACT’s election campaign 
online by filling in a secure web form. The form solicited the donor’s personal 
information and credit card details, if the donor elected credit card as the payment 
method. Two areas relating to ACT’s online fundraising were noteworthy. First, 
the party allowed the donor, in principle, to freely nominate the amount of 
donation instead of choosing a predetermined figure. In practice, however, there 
were limitations on the amount that a donor was allowed to contribute. More 
specifically, ACT indicated that under the EFA 2007, a donor’s identity must be 
disclosed if the donor contributed over $10,000 during an election year, spanning 
from 1 January to 31 December. The party further stated that it could not accept 
more than $1,000 from any overseas donor under the Act. Second, ACT offered 
PayPal as a payment method, in addition to credit card. 
Similar to joining or donating to ACT, becoming an ACT campaign volunteer online 
was straightforward by completing a web form. It is worth noting that despite 
exhibiting several means to generate different campaign resources, ACT did not 
appear as proactive in this practice as in others, such as targeted campaigning or 
support mobilisation. 
7.3.6 Summary 
Table 7.1 summarises ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation and its extent with the 
proposed e-campaigning framework. It suggests that ACT’s e-campaigning 
focused most on information dissemination and targeted campaigning. By 
comparison, voter interaction and engagement as well as support mobilisation 
were least focused on. 
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Table 7.1 ACT's e-campaigning utilisation and its extent 
Campaign practice Content elements Present 
Information 
dissemination 
Political party's information  
Candidate biography ● 
Press releases ● 
Policy statements ● 
Campaign news ● 
Campaign events ● 
Speeches ● 
Contact information ● 
Information relating to the political party's other online 
presence 
● 
Campaign blog without visitor comments allowed  
Voter interaction 
and engagement 
Instant chat or messaging  
Instant opinion polls  
Instant surveys  
Applications for interacting with the political party's policies  
Interactive calendar of campaign events  
Means to contact the political party ● 
Discussion forums  
Campaign blog with visitor comments allowed ● 
Means to provide feedback   
Support 
mobilisation 
Means for voters to invite their peers to participate in 
campaign events 
 
Means to inform voters of electoral information ● 
Means for voters to receive campaign information and 
updates 
 
Means for voters to connect with supporter groups  
Means for voters to download campaign material ● 
Means for voters to forward campaign material to others  
Means to encourage votes* ● 
Targeted 
campaigning 
Content targeted at political opponents ● 
Content targeted at political opponents' policies ● 
Content targeted at specific voter segments ● 
Resource generation 
Means to make donations ● 
Online merchandise shop  
Means to become a party member ● 
Means to become a volunteer ● 
Note: * Not present in the proposed e-campaigning framework 
 
Five areas of ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation deserve highlighting. First, ACT is 
thus far the first party that opened multiple avenues, such as campaign blogs, news, 
and speeches, for visitors to post comments. Second, ACT employed diverse means 
to encourage votes, such as an open letter and online videos; this, however, is not 
captured by the proposed framework. Third, ACT is the second party in this study 
that also attacked its political ally, namely National. Fourth, ACT is the second 
party in this study that enabled some of its campaign content to be rendered in a 
foreign language. Last, although ACT indicated that securing the electorate vote 
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for Hide was the primary focus of the party’s election campaigning, it was not 
reflected in ACT’s e-campaigning. Rather, ACT’s e-campaign appeared to be 
orientated towards the party vote. 
7.4 The factors influencing ACT’s e-campaigning 
utilisation 
ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation was attributable to five factors in Table 2.2, 
namely, voters’ technology access, resource availability, subjective norm, image, 
and output quality. The remainder of this section is structured according to those 
factors. This section is concluded with a summary. 
7.4.1 Voters’ technology access 
ACT’s campaign team indicated that ‘in many ways’ the party’s 2008 e-campaign 
was highly similar to that in the previous election cycle. The primary feature that 
differentiated the two e-campaigns pertained to online campaign videos. Further, 
the team considered online campaign videos to be crucial, in that they added a 
personal dimension to ACT’s e-campaign, making the e-campaign ‘come across as 
being more real and more convincing’. 
Despite their significance to ACT’s e-campaigning, ACT’s online videos ‘wouldn’t 
have been possible’ had the Internet access in this election remained the same as 
that in the previous cycle. More specifically, ACT’s campaign team indicated that 
‘to run online videos effectively requires broadband Internet’. In the 2005 general 
election, ‘the majority of New Zealanders were still dial-up users’, rendering the 
inclusion of online videos in e-campaigning completely infeasible. It was ‘the sharp 
uptake of broadband Internet [in New Zealand] just before the kick-off of this 
election’ that convinced the team to employ online videos as a significant part of 
its e-campaigning. 
Nevertheless, ACT’s campaign team further indicated that it had ‘held back’ the 
quantity of online campaign videos and the existing videos ‘could’ve been of much 
better picture quality’. The main contributing factor pertained to New Zealand 
voters’ broadband access. As the team explained, most broadband subscribers in 
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New Zealand were given a comparatively low allowance of broadband data. Once 
that allowance was reached, those subscribers’ Internet access would be 
downgraded to dial-up speed, unless they were willing to spend quite 
considerably on an additional allowance, which ‘wouldn’t be the case for many 
people’. And the team ‘just didn’t see it happening’ that most New Zealand 
broadband subscribers would ‘go overboard with’ a political party’s campaign 
material that was bandwidth-intensive. Consequently, ACT’s campaign team had 
to limit the offering of online campaign videos and accept the picture quality of its 
videos might not always be ideal. Put differently, despite the sharp uptake of 
broadband Internet in New Zealand in this election, the tight, expensive allowance 
of broadband data essentially limited voters’ access to broadband content, such as 
online videos. This accordingly constrained ACT’s e-campaigning. 
In short, New Zealand voters’ broadband access encouraged as well as withheld 
ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation. In other words, the impact of this factor on ACT’s 
e-campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. 
7.4.2 Resource availability 
ACT’s campaign team admitted that ‘in a sense’, it favoured e-campaigning over 
traditional campaigning because of the campaign resources available at its 
disposal. As the team explained, although the candidate vote for Hide in Epsom 
was extremely critical for ACT’s survival after the election, the party had never lost 
sight of the party vote for it affected not only ACT’s survival but also ACT’s political 
influence in the new parliament if the party survived the election. 
For ACT to court party votes in traditional campaigning, according to the team, it 
typically involved erecting campaign hoardings, dropping pamphlets, and 
knocking on doors. Those campaign activities became increasingly resource-
intensive; worse yet, they had to be repeated ‘many times in many parts of the 
country’ in order to maximise their impact, and yet they represented only a few 
fragments of election campaigning. That constantly posed an ‘extraordinary’ 
challenge to the team as it operated with ‘an unbelievably small scale of resources’, 
especially when compared to some of its counterparts. In stark contrast, said 
ACT’s campaign team, e-campaigning consumed far fewer resources and, more 
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importantly, did not require repetition, fitting well the reality where the team was 
‘persistently under-resourced’. To that end, the campaign team intended to 
expand its e-campaigning utilisation in the election by including most, if not all, 
ACT’s offline campaign practices. 
As ACT’s campaign team further moved into the campaign period, it was revealed 
on a few occasions that the team’s resource availability obstructed ACT’s e-
campaigning utilisation to a varying extent. Most notably, during the campaign 
period, ACT’s e-campaign had undergone several ‘very noticeable’ changes, 
reflected in redesigning the appearance of ACT’s campaign website, adding new 
campaign practices and content elements, and completing the campaign content 
that went live albeit unfinished. The team acknowledged that those changes 
should have been avoided, particularly the one relating to incomplete campaign 
content going live. However, the team indicated that it could not have prevented 
those changes because they directly represented the campaign resources available 
to the team. More specifically, the team pointed out that it did not receive all the 
financial and human resources required for fully implementing ACT’s e-
campaigning before the election. Rather, it had extremely limited funding and 
campaign personnel at the beginning of the campaign period and ‘gradually got 
more [resources] as [the team] went’. For that reason, the team could not operate 
beyond its means and had to accept a few ‘setbacks and compromises’. 
Resource availability not only influenced ACT’s e-campaigning but also moderated 
the impact of another factor. For instance, considering the high mobile phone 
access in New Zealand, ACT’s campaign team was ‘seriously keen on carrying out 
a mobile messaging campaign to voters’ as part of its e-campaigning. The team, 
however, ‘had to accept [that] the idea couldn’t go ahead in the end’ due to the lack 
of financial resources. Put succinctly, resource availability moderated the positive 
impact of voters’ technology access on ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation. 
In general, resource availability motivated as well as hindered ACT’s e-
campaigning utilisation. In other words, the impact of the factor on ACT’s e-
campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. It is worth highlighting 
the instance where the team had to give up the intention of carrying out a mobile 
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messaging campaign, as it suggests that the impact of voters’ technology access 
was moderated by another factor – resource availability. 
7.4.3 Subjective norm 
As illustrated, the team’s intention of embracing online videos in its e-campaigning 
was mainly motivated by voters’ technology access. This intention was solidified 
by subjective norm. More specifically, the team noted a widespread trend in this 
election cycle that its counterparts, be they national or international, employed 
online videos, either on their websites or YouTube, as a campaign tool to inform, 
engage, mobilise, or raise funds. Consequently, the team felt that it ‘just had to have 
some videos on [ACT’s] website in this election, no matter what’, so that ACT 
‘wouldn’t end up being on the wrong side of the trend’. Put differently, ACT’s 
campaign team was compelled by perceived competitive pressure as well as an 
overseas trend to embrace online videos in e-campaigning. 
Another instance demonstrating the impact of subjective norm on ACT’s e-
campaigning utilisation pertained to the party’s campaign blogs. As ACT’s 
campaign team explained, in the previous election, the party’s campaign blogs 
penned by Hide and Roy had drawn considerable public attention and recognition. 
The team felt a significant expectation from voters that blogging would remain a 
key activity of ACT’s e-campaigning and more ACT candidates would participate. 
In response, a page on ACT’s campaign website was dedicated to campaign blogs, 
contributed by various ACT candidates. The subjective norm in this instance 
stemmed from a perceived expectation. 
Occasionally, the impact of subjective norm on ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation 
was moderated by another factor. More specifically, ACT’s campaign team sensed 
a strong expectation from its supporters that the party would deliver more and 
continue to be innovative in its e-campaigning in this election. The team was 
unable to fully conform to that expectation because of resource poverty. In other 
words, the impact of subjective norm was moderated by resource availability in 
this instance. 
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In all, subjective norm propelled ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation. The norms 
perceived by the campaign team were derived from voters’ expectations, 
competitive pressure, and overseas trends. It is worth noting the instance where 
ACT’s campaign team was unable to fully conform to a strong expectation sensed 
by the team that the party would deliver an expansive, extensive, and innovative 
e-campaign. The instance suggests that the impact of subjective norm was 
moderated by another factor – resource availability. 
7.4.4 Image 
ACT’s campaign team noted that many of its counterparts considered that 
allowing visitors to post comments on campaign content could tarnish their 
political branding. The team, however, held a different perception; that is, 
disabling visitor comments would damage ACT’s political image. As the team 
explained, the freedom and rights of individuals had always been championed by 
ACT; so much so that it was a founding principle of the party. In that light, the team 
perceived that it would severely blemish ACT’s image to deny a visitor’s ability to 
express opinions on the party’s campaign website, as ACT would appear 
hypocritical. To that end, ACT’s campaign team embraced visitor comments 
‘wherever possible’ in its e-campaigning, resulting in ACT being the first party thus 
far that opened various avenues in its e-campaign for voters to voice thoughts and 
opinions. 
As highlighted, National and some of its policies were attacked in ACT’s e-
campaigning. This seemingly contradicted ACT’s constant claim that it was a 
staunch political ally of National and always supported a National-led government. 
ACT’s campaign team refuted that the party’s e-campaigning targeted at National 
and its policies was inconsistent with its political positioning. It was suggested 
that the targeted campaigning reflected ACT’s consideration over its political 
image. More specifically, being a minor party and a close ally of a major party often 
cast an assumption among voters that the minor party was obsequious, said ACT’s 
campaign team. Because of that, the targeted campaigning at National and some 
of its policies perceivably enabled ACT to establish and reinforce the image that 
despite being small and a staunch supporter of National, ACT was able to form its 
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views independently and was not hesitant to ‘take a stand’. Simply put, ACT took 
aim at National in its e-campaigning because it perceived that it could establish 
and reinforce a positive political image as a result. 
In sum, image motivated ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation. In other words, the 
impact of the factor on ACT’s e-campaigning was positive. 
7.4.5 Output quality 
As noted, part of ACT’s e-campaign, the summary of ACT’s 20 election policies, 
could be rendered in Chinese. This approach was motivated by output quality. 
More specifically, ACT’s campaign team noted a substantial number of Chinese-
speaking voters in this election. Gaining votes from even a fraction of them would 
have already resulted in a significant difference for ACT, said the team. To win 
support from voters, the team believed, ‘it’s critical to develop a bond and trust 
with them. And there’s no better way to do that than communicating the most 
important component of an election campaign – election policies – in their native 
language.’ 
Although ACT’s campaign team claimed that the key focus of the party’s election 
campaigning was on the candidate vote for Hide, ACT’s e-campaigning appeared 
to solely focus on the party vote. This, according to the team, was based on the 
perceived outcome. As the team explained, it was a safe assumption that most 
visitors to ACT’s campaign website were from outside Hide’s constituency. Had 
ACT’s e-campaigning primarily concentrated on the candidate vote for Hide, they 
would have found it largely irrelevant and therefore been driven away. And that 
would have been an ‘absolutely disastrous’ outcome for the team as ‘election 
campaigning in any way, shape, or form is about drawing people in instead of 
sending them away.’ To that end, the team decisively focused ACT’s e-campaigning 
on the party vote, especially given the two-fold significance of the party vote to 
ACT as noted. 
Although campaign blogging had been introduced in ACT’s e-campaigning since 
the previous election and considered to be ‘quite successful’, the team took a 
different approach in this election, driven by the perceived outcome. As the team 
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elaborated, in the last election the campaign blog penned by Hide was published 
under his own website as opposed to the party’s campaign site. That, however, had 
unintendedly resulted in a noticeable number of visitors who were chiefly 
interested in Hide’s campaign blog not visiting the party’s campaign website. Put 
differently, visible web traffic to ACT’s campaign website had been lost from 
keeping Hide’s campaign blog separate. The loss of web traffic also meant a loss of 
exposure relating to other important parts of ACT’s campaign, defeating the 
purpose of e-campaigning, said the team. In this election the team decided to 
employ a different approach to campaign blogging by centralising all ACT’s 
campaign blogs under the party’s campaign website because the team perceived 
that in doing so, it could increase web traffic and exposure of various aspects of 
ACT’s campaign, thereby enhancing the outcome of ACT’s e-campaigning. 
In all, output quality encouraged as well as dissuaded ACT’s e-campaigning 
utilisation. In other words, the impact of the factor on ACT’s e-campaigning 
consisted of two facets: positive and negative. 
7.4.6 Summary 
ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election was shaped by five 
factors in Table 2.2, namely, voters’ technology access, resource availability, 
subjective norm, image, and output quality. Each factor in essence represents a 
unique perspective, therefore, ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation has been explained 
from five perspectives. Various specific and contextual instances that occurred in 
ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation have been presented to illustrate the factors, 
lending valuable insights into this unique phenomenon. Table 7.2 highlights the 
five factors that influenced ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation. 
Table 7.2 The factors influencing ACT's e-campaigning utilisation 
Factor Dual impact Moderated by 
Voters' technology access ● Resource availability 
Resource availability ●  
Subjective norm  Resource availability 
Image   
Output quality ●  
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As noted in the table, the impacts of some factors, such as voters’ technology 
access, consisted of two facets: positive and negative. This means that those 
factors were enablers as well as inhibitors of ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation. 
Occasionally, the impacts of voters’ technology access and subjective norm were 
moderated by another factor – resource availability. Taken together, it suggests 
that ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation was complex, contextual, and dynamic. 
7.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented the key findings from the case study relating to ACT’s 
e-campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election. It has comprehensively 
analysed the breadth and depth of ACT’s e-campaigning utilisation. Based on that, 
it has identified and illustrated in depth the five factors that influenced ACT’s e-
campaigning utilisation. 
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Chapter 8 The Progressives’ e-campaigning 
utilisation 
8.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter presents the key findings from the fifth case study: the Progressives’ 
e-campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election. This chapter proceeds as 
follows: section 8.2 outlines the case background; then, section 8.3 and 8.4 answer 
the first and second research questions respectively; and last, section 8.5 
summarises this chapter. 
8.2 Case background 
The Progressives was launched in 2002 with a particular emphasis on full 
employment, high incomes, skills, and innovation. The party was established just 
before the 2002 general election as a result of Jim Anderton, the party’s founder 
and leader, departing from the Alliance, a left-wing political party no longer 
represented in Parliament. The Progressives positioned itself as a close political 
ally of Labour, supporting only a Labour-led government. Since its formation, the 
Progressives had twice been in coalition with Labour. The party held one seat in 
Parliament before the 2008 general election, making it the smallest party in 
Parliament. 
Anderton first entered Parliament as a Labour electorate MP in 1984. In less than 
two years, however, he became an independent MP. He was then involved in two 
other political parties before the Progressives. In his political career thus far 
Anderton had held various ministerial portfolios, such as agriculture, health, and 
tertiary education. In this election Anderton contested the Wigram electorate, 
which he had held since 1996. 
A ‘micro’, central campaign team was set up to take charge of all aspects of the 
Progressives’ election campaign. Because of the inability to reach, or even come 
close to, the 5 per cent party vote threshold in any past general election, the party’s 
campaign team indicated that the electorate vote for Anderton formed the core of 
the Progressives’ election campaigning in this election. The party also attempted 
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to return at least its deputy leader to the next parliament chiefly with party votes. 
Put differently, the Progressives’ election campaigning embraced both the party 
and electorate votes with the latter being the core focus. 
The Progressives’ website (www.progressive.org.nz) was employed as the only 
platform for the party’s e-campaigning. It is worth noting that the party’s website 
was completely revamped solely for the purpose of election campaigning. Figure 
8.1 depicts the home page of the campaign website. The Progressives’ campaign 
team indicated that it did not intend to run an ‘aggressive’ e-campaign and the 
primary focus of the party’s e-campaign was on increasing the awareness and 
exposure of the party and its key election policies – in other words, disseminating 
campaign information. That, said the team, was prompted by several surveys 
conducted by the party, indicating that only 18 per cent of voters ‘had ever heard 
of the Progressives’ and the party leader was better known than the party. 
 
Figure 8.1 The home page of the Progressives' campaign website 
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8.3 The Progressives’ e-campaigning utilisation 
and its extent 
On the basis of the proposed e-campaigning framework, the Progressives’ e-
campaigning encompassed four campaign practices, namely, information 
dissemination, voter interaction and engagement, support mobilisation, and 
targeted campaigning. Those practices were conducted to varying degrees. The 
analysis in this section is structured according to the practices. This section is 
concluded with a summary. 
8.3.1 Information dissemination 
Disseminating campaign information was prominent on the Progressives’ 
campaign website, in line with the primary focus of the party’s e-campaigning as 
indicated by the campaign team. More specifically, the home page was dominated 
by a slideshow of several images with the campaign slogan, ‘The strength to care’, 
and specific campaign messages. Each of those images, also displayed in a smaller 
size beneath the slideshow, represented an election policy. Based on this, the 
Progressives’ key election policies pertained to dental care, power costs, 
vulnerable teenagers, and Kiwibank. Clicking on a smaller image representing a 
particular policy rendered the ‘Policy’ page, which could also be accessed by 
clicking on a text button with the same name on the top of all web pages. Despite 
being a minor party, the Progressives exhibited broad policy coverage on the 
policy page, touching on diverse subjects, such as broadband Internet, health, and 
immigration. The key election policies were situated above other policies that 
were in alphabetical order. Each key policy was accompanied by a professionally-
produced online video that featured the party leader succinctly explaining the 
rationale and significance of the particular policy. All online videos were provided 
in two file formats. Clicking on any policy rendered its full details. 
The Progressives’ news, speeches, and press releases were deposited under the 
‘Latest’ page, collectively forming another main segment of the party’s campaign 
information. Each item on that page was listed as a clickable headline with its 
release date. Clicking on an item rendered its full content. Further, based on the 
time stamps, the content on the ‘Latest’ page was frequently refreshed, especially 
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in the lead-up to polling day. It is worth noting that each news article, speech, or 
press release was attached with a disclaimer. It first indicated that the article, 
speech, or press release was issued by Anderton. It then suggested that ‘MPs’ press 
releases and speeches are part of the normal course of business of elected 
representatives. We do not believe they are election advertisements within the 
Electoral Finance Act, and nor was the Act intended to apply to them.’ ‘However,’ 
it continued, ‘because some people are confused about the Act, and because the 
Progressive Party is proud to confirm our responsibility for what we say.’ The 
disclaimer was concluded with the party’s authorising statement. 
Other campaign information on the website included contact details and party 
information. The former were located under ‘Contact Us’ and the latter was 
disseminated in an online video, under the policy page, in which Anderton 
highlighted the values and principles of the party. A search engine was provided 
on the website, enabling information retrieval with keywords. It is however worth 
noting that information relating to the party’s candidates and campaign events 
was absent. 
8.3.2 Voter interaction and engagement 
The Progressives’ e-campaign consisted of two features of voter interaction and 
engagement. The first pertained to three email links for directly interacting with 
the party’s head office, Anderton, and his electorate office. 
The second feature was especially noteworthy. More specifically, on the ‘Dialogue’ 
page, voters were encouraged to initiate discussions or post comments. Each 
discussion or comment was displayed as a short phrase with a time stamp. 
Clicking on it rendered its full content. The subjects involved were diverse, ranging 
from the Progressives’ performance on a televised election debate to the 
Progressives’ key election policies. Also, some discussions and comments 
consisted of multimedia content, namely, image, audio, and video. The number of 
discussions and comments suggests a noticeable level of voter participation. It was 
somewhat unorthodox to participate, however. More specifically, instead of 
directly initiating a discussion or posting a comment, voters first needed to click 
on a link and submit any discussion or comment for review. The discussion or 
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comment would then be published on the ‘Dialogue’ page if it was deemed both 
inoffensive and constructive. It is worth noting that the party leader’s 
participation was often observed. Figure 8.2 depicts the ‘Dialogue’ page. 
 
Figure 8.2 The 'Dialogue' page on the Progressives' campaign website 
8.3.3 Support mobilisation 
The Progressives’ e-campaign consisted of a link to an external website named 
‘Support Progressive’. As its name clearly suggested, that website was intended 
for mobilising voter support for the party. Its appearance was almost identical to 
the Progressives’ campaign website, as depicted in Figure 8.3. Three unique 
features on the external website were worth noting. 
First, the website included a party list of 27 candidates in the election. An image 
and a brief profile was provided for each candidate. As noted, the list and 
candidate information was absent from the Progressives’ campaign website. 
Second, the external website consisted of another professionally-produced video 
that featured Anderton highlighting the significance of casting votes for his party. 
In other words, the online video was aimed at encouraging votes for the 
Progressives. Last, the website for supporting the Progressives enabled online 
donations directly to the party. This involved a credit card and completing a secure 
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web form. An online video was also provided in which Anderton explained the 
difference each donation made in empowering his party to fight for and achieve 
its political causes. 
 
Figure 8.3 The website for supporting the Progressives 
The last speech by Anderton before the election also exhibited strong vote 
encouragement. More specifically, in his speech titled ‘A Final Word from Jim’, 
Anderton suggested that the election was essentially a choice between ‘a 
government that has the strength to care for its people’ and ‘[a] return to the failed 
policies in the past’. The party leader then asserted that his party belonged to the 
former and urged voters to give the Progressives their party votes in order to 
‘achieve even more progress’. 
8.3.4 Targeted campaigning 
National and some of its policies were repeatedly targeted in the Progressives’ e-
campaigning. For instance, in promoting its policies on Kiwibank and paid annual 
leave, the Progressives respectively criticised National, if in government, for 
planning to sell Kiwibank, the only bank owned by New Zealanders, and trade the 
worker’s work-life balance for the employer’s additional financial gain. 
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Another instance could be located in the Progressives’ news, speeches, or press 
releases. More specifically, in a news article, Anderton attacked National’s tax 
policy by describing it as ‘destructive’, ‘anti-business’, and ‘anti-family’. 
A particular voter group also formed an object of the Progressives’ targeted 
campaigning. More specifically, in a press release Anderton indicated that the 
demise of New Zealand First, a political party that also provided the Labour-led 
government with confidence and supply, was imminent after the election. 
Therefore, a vote for New Zealand First in the upcoming election, said Anderton, 
was almost certainly a ‘wasted’ vote. To that end, Anderton suggested that 
supporters of New Zealand First should instead cast their votes for the 
Progressives. Simply put, part of the Progressives’ e-campaign was specifically 
targeted at New Zealand First supporters. 
8.3.5 Summary 
Table 8.1 summarises the Progressives’ e-campaigning utilisation and its extent 
with the proposed e-campaigning framework. It suggests that the Progressives’ e-
campaigning focused most on targeted campaigning, closely followed by 
information dissemination. By comparison, support mobilisation was least 
focused on. 
Four areas of the Progressives’ e-campaigning utilisation deserve highlighting. 
First, although the Progressives’ campaign team indicated that the electorate vote 
for Anderton formed the core focus of the party’s election campaigning in general, 
it was not reflected in the party’s e-campaigning. Rather, the Progressives’ e-
campaigning appeared to embrace only the party vote. Second, the Progressives’ 
campaign videos appeared to be professionally produced and highly polished. 
Third, the Progressives is thus far the first party in this study that provided a 
facility akin to a discussion forum. Last, the party leader also participated in 
discussions and commenting, which appeared to stimulate and maintain voter 
participation. It is also worth noting that the Progressives’ e-campaign exhibited 
various means to encourage votes; this, however, is not captured by the 
framework. 
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Table 8.1 The Progressives' e-campaigning utilisation and its extent 
Campaign practice Content elements Present 
Information 
dissemination 
Political party's information ● 
Candidate biography  
Press releases ● 
Policy statements ● 
Campaign news ● 
Campaign events  
Speeches ● 
Contact information ● 
Information relating to the political party's other online 
presence 
 
Campaign blog without visitor comments allowed  
Voter interaction 
and engagement 
Instant chat or messaging  
Instant opinion polls  
Instant surveys  
Applications for interacting with the political party's policies  
Interactive calendar of campaign events  
Means to contact the political party ● 
Discussion forums ● 
Campaign blog with visitor comments allowed  
Means to provide feedback  ● 
Support 
mobilisation 
Means for voters to invite their peers to participate in 
campaign events 
 
Means to inform voters of electoral information  
Means for voters to receive campaign information and 
updates 
 
Means for voters to connect with supporter groups  
Means for voters to download campaign material  
Means for voters to forward campaign material to others  
Means to encourage votes* ● 
Targeted 
campaigning 
Content targeted at political opponents ● 
Content targeted at political opponents' policies ● 
Content targeted at specific voter segments ● 
Note: * Not present in the proposed e-campaigning framework 
 
8.4 The factors influencing the Progressives’ e-
campaigning utilisation 
The Progressives’ e-campaigning utilisation was attributable to five factors in 
Table 2.2, namely, electoral regulations, resource availability, image, job relevance, 
and output quality. The remainder of this section is organised according to those 
factors. This section is concluded with a summary. 
8.4.1 Electoral regulations 
The Progressives’ campaign team indicated that early in the campaign period the 
party was reported to the police by the Electoral Commission for breaching the 
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EFA 2007. More specifically, the Progressives was alleged to have campaigned on 
different occasions without a promoter statement or an accurate one. Because of 
that, said the team, every news article, speech, and press release on the 
Progressives’ campaign website carried a promoter statement. This illustrated the 
impact of electoral regulations on the Progressives’ e-campaigning. The team 
further described other notable instances related to this factor. 
As mentioned, the Progressives’ party website was completely revamped solely 
for the purpose of election campaigning. This was partly prompted by the EFA 
2007. As the team explained, the Act specifically recognised the distinction 
between parliamentary and party resources; election campaigning in any form 
with parliamentary resources was strictly prohibited. Accordingly, the team ‘had 
no choice but to rebuild [the Progressives’] party website from the ground up’ for 
election campaigning because the original website was considerably supported by 
parliamentary resources. The team further indicated that the absence of 
fundraising on the Progressives’ campaign website was, in part, for the same 
reason. 
The team pointed out that the Progressives’ post-election survival was exclusively 
contingent on the re-election of Anderton because various pre-election opinion 
polls constantly had the party at below 1 per cent of the party vote, ‘well short of 
the 5 per cent threshold needed to return to Parliament’. The candidate vote for 
Anderton therefore formed the core focus of the Progressives’ election 
campaigning in general. However, as highlighted, the focus was not at all observed 
in the party’s e-campaigning. Rather, the Progressives’ e-campaigning appeared to 
concentrate on the party vote. This seeming inconsistency was ascribed to 
electoral regulations. As the team explained, there were strict spending caps on 
both party and candidate campaigning. Had the Progressives’ e-campaigning 
chiefly focused on the candidate vote for Anderton, it could have been perceived 
by the public, particularly the Electoral Commission, as a candidate campaign 
rather than a tactic of party campaigning. Accordingly, most, if not all, costs of the 
Progressives’ e-campaigning would have been counted towards the spending limit 
of Anderton’s candidate campaigning as opposed to party campaigning. That, said 
the team, would have substantially compromised other crucial campaign activities 
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designated for Anderton’s candidacy in order to ‘stay within the law’. 
Consequently, the team ‘made damn sure that [the Progressives’] web campaign 
didn’t come across as electorate-centric’. 
In general, electoral regulations both propelled and restrained the Progressives’ 
e-campaigning. The EFA 2007 was the primary regulation influencing the 
Progressives’ e-campaigning. Although the Act propelled the party to completely 
revamp its website for election campaigning, which ‘was a good thing in some 
ways’, its impact on the Progressives’ e-campaigning was mainly ‘unfavourable’, 
said the team. The team further stressed that it was the poor clarity and 
‘incompetent’ administration of the Act, rather than the spirit of it, that ‘caused 
headaches and frustration’ in the Progressives’ e-campaigning. 
8.4.2 Resource availability 
According to the campaign team, the Progressives’ campaign budget was 
‘extraordinarily tiny’. More than half of the budget came from funds allocated by 
the Electoral Commission for producing and broadcasting the party’s election 
programmes on designated national television and radio. Then, a considerable 
amount had to be spent on legal costs because the party was reported to the police 
on different occasions for allegedly contravening the EFA 2007, of which the party 
was a vocal proponent. Subsequently, barely any financial resources remained for 
campaigning. In addition, the human resources available for the party’s election 
campaigning were ‘remarkably small’. Consequently, the team decided to chiefly 
engage in e-campaigning and lessen or forgo some prominent traditional 
campaign activities. 
As the team explained, for a long time, the Progressives’ party campaigning had 
strongly featured ‘putting up election billboards, dropping campaign leaflets, 
writing letters, and door-to-door canvassing’. All those activities were ‘heavy’ on 
campaign resources, namely, money, time, and campaign personnel. Moreover, for 
those activities to be ‘meaningful’, they had to be ‘carried out on a national scale’; 
in other words, they had to be duplicated in various regions across the country. 
Needless to say, the Progressives’ traditional election campaigning required 
‘tremendous’ campaign resources. For that reason, resource availability had 
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always been a ‘compelling’ obstacle in the Progressives’ campaigning. And it was 
more so in this election because of the unexpected expenditure on legal costs. The 
team found that in stark contrast, it consumed far fewer resources to post the 
content on the campaign website that normally featured in the party’s election 
billboards, campaign leaflets, letters to voters, and door-to-door canvassing. And, 
more importantly, the reach of the website was beyond regional and even national; 
‘it’s international.’ This meant that duplicating campaign activities as commonly 
found in the Progressives’ traditional campaigning was unnecessary. Given the 
especially limited campaign resources available to the Progressives’ campaign 
team, the team decided to chiefly engage in e-campaigning and reduce or ‘drop’ 
some of the party’s long-established campaign activities, such as leaflet dropping 
and door-to-door canvassing. 
Still, there were occasions where resource availability restricted the Progressives’ 
e-campaigning utilisation. For instance, the team indicated that the fundraising 
element on the Progressives’ previous party website could not be migrated to the 
party’s campaign website as the element was ‘paid for by the taxpayer earlier’. 
However, the team did not intend to develop a new fundraising element partly due 
to limited resource availability. 
In stark contrast to many of its counterparts, the Progressives did not include any 
social media, such as Facebook or YouTube, in e-campaigning. That was partly 
ascribable to resource availability. As the team explained, ‘doing anything beyond 
a simple, static website is enormously expensive – we’re talking about at least 
hundreds of thousands of dollars – and it takes a good chunk of time to plan, build, 
implement, and manage’. It was therefore ‘pointless to even think about having an 
interactive website, such as Facebook’, based on the limited campaign resources 
available to the team. 
In short, resource availability encouraged as well as constrained the Progressives’ 
e-campaigning utilisation. In other words, the impact of the factor on the 
Progressives’ e-campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. 
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8.4.3 Image 
As noted, the EFA 2007 left the Progressives’ campaign team with no choice but to 
revamp the party’s website for election campaigning. According to the team, even 
without the Act, the website would have been rebuilt for campaigning, due to the 
team’s consideration of the Progressives’ ‘branding’. In other words, image was 
another factor prompting the rebuild of the Progressives’ website for election 
campaigning. More specifically, the team noted that the previous party website 
was ‘dull’, ‘very average’, and ‘quite unmemorable’. And these were not the 
characteristics with which the team wanted the party to be associated, especially 
in an election. As the team pointed out, ‘People simply wouldn’t think much of a 
party if its presence is boring and forgettable.’ Accordingly, the team decided to 
present a unique, striking, and appealing website that ‘would stand out in the 
crowd’. As the team put it, ‘When people visited the [revamped] website, they 
would go, “This is a very different sort of political party; it is bold, sharp, and 
refreshing.”’ 
As highlighted, the Progressives’ e-campaign featured a series of campaign videos 
that appeared to be professionally produced and highly polished. This, according 
to the team, was inspired by the consideration of the party’s image. More 
specifically, the team indicated that all the party’s online campaign videos were 
indeed ‘very professionally written, shot, produced, and edited’, so that the party 
would appear conscientious, sharp, and polished in the election. The team added, 
‘It’s extremely critical to spend a decent amount of time and effort on presentation 
because … no one wants themselves or anything they’re promoting to look shoddy.’ 
Although the Progressives’ e-campaign strongly encouraged visitors to post 
comments or initiate discussions on any subject, restrictions were imposed. As 
noted, no comments or discussions by visitors would become public without first 
being reviewed by the campaign team and subsequently being considered to be 
inoffensive and constructive. This was solely driven by the team’s concern over 
the Progressives’ image. As the team pointed out, without any restrictions, the 
party’s campaign website would have attracted ‘highly motivated people who 
would say all sorts of untruthful, cynical, and abusive stuff – for example, “Oh you 
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dirty socialist!” – just to wreck the party’s image and reputation’. In addition, the 
team admitted that criticism of the party or the party’s election policies was not 
published. As the team put it, ‘no shops would ever publish their customer 
complaints at the front door, saying “Hey, come and read them”. It’s all about 
image.’ Simply put, the team perceived that imposing restrictions on comments 
and discussions by visitors would protect the Progressives’ political image. The 
team added that moderating every comment and discussion was time-consuming, 
which went against any implication purely based on resource availability. 
However, the team continued, the party’s image took precedence over any other 
consideration. This suggests that the impact of resource availability was 
moderated by image. 
The campaign team claimed that the Progressives’ e-campaigning chiefly focused 
on promoting the party’s election policies, which were wide-ranging. However, 
policy promotion in the Progressives’ e-campaigning was confined to the policies 
pertaining to dental care, power costs, vulnerable teenagers, Kiwibank, and paid 
annual leave; other policies received no attention from the team. This, said the 
team, was shaped by image considerations. As the team explained, had the 
Progressives campaigned on ‘too many’ policies that it wanted to pursue if in 
government, it would have ‘instantly looked like a political party with very little 
credibility because people would go, “You’re such a small party; you just can’t do 
it”’. In order to appear credible in the election, the Progressives’ policy promotion 
was confined to ‘a very small fraction’ of its wide-ranging election policies. 
In general, the team’s consideration of the Progressives’ political image inspired 
as well as restricted the party’s e-campaigning utilisation. In other words, the 
impact of the factor on the Progressives’ e-campaigning consisted of two facets: 
positive and negative. It is worth highlighting the instance relating to restrictions 
being imposed on comments and discussions by visitors, as it suggests that the 
impact of resource availability was moderated by another factor – image. 
8.4.4 Job relevance 
As noted, National and some of its policies were frequently targeted in the 
Progressives’ e-campaigning. This was partly motivated by job relevance. As the 
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team explained, in election campaigning or, in a broader context, politics, ‘it’s an 
integral and very significant part of the job [that] political parties take aim at their 
opponents’. The team further noted that in this election, some of the Progressives’ 
core election policies and political achievements were often under National’s 
attacks, for instance, National announced in the election that if in power, it 
intended to completely abolish the $700 million private-public research 
partnership that was set up by the Progressives and regarded as a key political 
achievement of the party. To that end, the team considered it ‘completely 
necessary and appropriate’ to attack National and some of its stances as part of 
Progressives’ campaigning. 
Another factor that dissuaded the Progressives’ campaign team from rebuilding a 
fundraising element with the party’s campaign resources for e-campaigning 
pertained to job relevance. More specifically, the team pointed out that its US 
counterparts had always enthusiastically devoted ‘a massive amount of campaign 
effort’ to soliciting campaign donations from many individual voters because 
‘that’s a huge part of election campaigning over there’. However, the team 
perceived that election campaigning in New Zealand ‘is mostly about promoting 
policies and rallying support; asking for money from multiple individual voters 
represents only a tiny part [of election campaigning]’. This, combined with the 
availability of the Progressives’ campaign resources, prompted the team to 
exclude online donation from the party’s revamped website. 
The Progressives’ campaign team indicated that its decision to forfeit social media 
in e-campaigning was informed by two factors. One, as noted, pertained to 
resource availability and the other job relevance. As the team pointed out, the 
Progressives ‘isn’t a broad church party’. On that note, the party’s voter base was 
small and specific. The team continued to note that in this election, it was 
predominantly young people who engaged in social media, such as Bebo, Facebook, 
and YouTube. They were not part of the Progressives’ target voters. Therefore, 
‘What’s the damn point of going to some place to preach where the majority of 
people aren’t even your target audience?’ said the team. Simply put, the exclusion 
of social media from the Progressives’ e-campaigning was partly due to the team’s 
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perception relating to the relevance of social media to the target audience of the 
party’s election campaign. 
Overall, job relevance motivated as well as discouraged the Progressives’ e-
campaigning utilisation. In other words, the impact of the factor on the 
Progressives’ e-campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. 
8.4.5 Output quality 
That National and some of its policies were frequently targeted in the Progressives’ 
e-campaigning was also inspired by output quality. As the team explained, despite 
the advent of e-campaigning, regular exposure in the mainstream media remained 
crucial. However, the team continued, the media was chiefly interested in the two 
major parties, small parties such as the Progressives barely got mentioned in the 
media, let alone on a regular basis. The team believed that ‘the best way’ to occupy 
a regular spot in the mainstream media during the entire election was to attack 
National and some of its policies in the Progressives’ e-campaigning. More 
specifically, by frequently attacking National over some of its ‘stupid election 
promises like selling Kiwibank’ on the Progressives’ campaign website, it could 
cause strong controversy. This could subsequently result in the Progressives being 
mentioned or even interviewed by different media outlets because of the 
perceived partiality of the media for controversy. In turn, the team added, more 
voters might want to ‘find out what [the Progressives] is on about’, thus boosting 
the traffic to the Progressives’ campaign website, which formed additional 
desirable outcomes. Simply put, National and some of its policies were frequently 
targeted in the Progressives’ e-campaigning partly because of three desirable 
outcomes perceived by the team, namely, regular exposure of the Progressives in 
the mainstream media, growing voter interest in the party, and increasing web 
traffic to the party’s campaign website. 
As noted, the content or activities beyond the Progressives’ election policies were 
sparse in the party’s e-campaigning. This, according to the party’s campaign team, 
was due to the perceived outcome. More specifically, the team noted that it wanted 
the attention of all visitors to the Progressives’ campaign website to be engaged 
by the party’s election policies above all. Further, the attention span of the average 
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voter pertaining to an election campaign was perceived as short. Consequently, 
any non-policy-related e-campaigning content or activities could perceivably 
distract visitors’ attention from the Progressives’ election policies, an undesirable 
outcome. To that end, the campaign team intentionally limited e-campaigning 
content or activities unrelated to the Progressives’ election policies in order to 
avoid derailing the main purpose of the party’s e-campaigning – promoting the 
Progressives’ election policies. 
The campaign team expressed that mobilising voters to attend any offline 
campaign event promoting the Progressives’ election policies was particularly 
excluded from the party’s campaign website because it was perceived to result in 
a ‘disastrous’ outcome. More specifically, the team believed that to mobilise voters 
to attend an offline event promoting the party’s election policies, it would have to 
refrain from publishing those policies on the party’s campaign website beforehand 
– otherwise, it would be repetitive, therefore wasting campaign resources and 
disincentivising voters from attending the event. On that note, ‘What’s going to 
happen’, asked the team, ‘when people come to [the Progressives’] website, 
wanting to learn about [the Progressives’] policies, only to be told [that] they won’t 
be able to find out anything unless they come to this offline meeting … or come 
back to the website after the meeting?’ ‘Most of them are going to roll their eyes 
and be pissed off; they won’t be bothered to visit the website ever again. That’s 
certainly not the outcome we would want,’ the team continued. It was also pointed 
out that in the overseas e-campaigns that the team closely followed, mobilising 
voters to participate in offline campaign events not only consumed campaign 
resources ‘enormously’ but also ‘failed badly’. That reinforced the team’s belief 
that online efforts to mobilise voters to attend offline campaign events would not 
lead to any desirable outcome, hence the exclusion. 
In all, output quality stimulated as well as dampened the Progressives’ e-
campaigning utilisation. That is, the impact of the factor on the Progressives’ e-
campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. 
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8.4.6 Summary 
The Progressives’ e-campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election was 
shaped by five factors in Table 2.2, namely, electoral regulations, resource 
availability, image, job relevance, and output quality. Each factor in essence 
represents a unique perspective, therefore, the Progressives’ e-campaigning 
utilisation has been explained from five perspectives. Various specific and 
contextual instances that occurred in the Progressives’ e-campaigning utilisation 
have been presented to illustrate the factors, lending valuable insights into this 
unique phenomenon. Table 8.2 highlights the five factors that influenced the 
Progressives’ e-campaigning utilisation. 
Table 8.2 The factors influencing the Progressives' e-campaigning utilisation 
Factor Dual impact Moderated by 
Electoral regulations ●  
Resource availability ● Image 
Image ●  
Job relevance ●  
Output quality ●  
 
As indicated in the table, the impact of any given factor on the Progressives’ e-
campaigning utilisation consisted of two facets: positive and negative. This means 
that each factor was an enabler as well as an inhibitor of the Progressives’ e-
campaigning utilisation. On one occasion, the impact of resource availability was 
moderated by another factor – image. Taken together, it suggests that the 
Progressives’ e-campaigning utilisation was complex, contextual, and dynamic. 
8.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented the key findings from the case study relating to the 
Progressives’ e-campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election. It has 
comprehensively analysed the breadth and depth of the Progressives’ e-
campaigning utilisation. Based on that, it has identified and illustrated in depth the 
five factors that influenced the Progressives’ e-campaigning utilisation. 
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Chapter 9 United Future’s e-campaigning 
utilisation 
9.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter presents the key findings from the final case study: United Future’s 
e-campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election. This chapter proceeds as 
follows: section 9.2 outlines the case background; then, section 9.3 and 9.4 answer 
the first and second research questions respectively; and last, section 9.5 
summarises this chapter. 
9.2 Case background 
United Future was founded in 2000 as a result of an amalgamation of two minor 
political parties, namely the United New Zealand Party and the Future New 
Zealand Party. United Future is underpinned by several principles collectively 
promoting ‘a fair, democratic and open society, founded on role of law, integrity 
and justice’. Despite being a vital support partner of the Labour-led government 
before the election, United Future positions itself as a centrist, liberal party, 
focusing on ‘New Zealand’s best interests’. The party occupied three seats in 
Parliament before the 2008 general election. 
Since its birth, United Future has been led by Peter Dunne. Unlike his party, Dunne 
was not a newcomer to New Zealand politics. He first entered Parliament in 1984 
as a Labour MP for the Ohariu electorate and has held the electorate since. Dunne 
left Labour in 1994. Following that, he became an independent MP and was then 
involved in two minor political parties prior to United Future. Dunne has held 
various ministerial portfolios under both National-led and Labour-led 
governments. 
A central campaign team with ‘only a handful of people’ was established in the 
election, overseeing and executing various facets of United Future’s election 
campaign. The campaign team noted that United Future fell significantly below the 
5 per cent party vote threshold in the 2005 general election, which was expected 
to continue in the 2008 election according to various opinion polls. Because of that, 
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United Future’s survival after the election was mainly reliant on Dunne getting re-
elected in his electorate. To that end, the candidate vote for Dunne formed a crucial 
focus in United Future’s election campaigning. The team emphasised that 
attracting party votes for United Future was not ‘off the table’ as they determined 
the number of the party’s list MPs in the next parliament. In other words, United 
Future contested both the party vote and the candidate vote. The team further 
suggested that United Future was ‘the party that probably used web-based 
campaigning least of all’, because the chief focus of the party’s e-campaigning was 
confined to ensuring all key campaign information – such as policy documents, 
news articles, and speeches – were expeditiously and correctly placed on the 
party’s website (www.unitedfuture.org.nz). This also suggests that United 
Future’s party website served as the only platform for the party’s e-campaigning. 
The team further pointed out that most of the content on United Future’s 
campaign website predated the campaign period. Figure 9.1 exhibits the home 
page of United Future’s campaign website. 
 
Figure 9.1 The home page of United Future's campaign website 
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9.3 United Future’s e-campaigning utilisation and 
its extent 
On the basis of the proposed e-campaigning framework, United Future’s e-
campaigning encompassed all five practices, namely, information dissemination, 
voter interaction and engagement, support mobilisation, targeted campaigning, 
and resource generation. Those practices were conducted to varying degrees. The 
analysis in this section is structured according to the practices. This section is 
concluded with a summary. 
9.3.1 Information dissemination 
Information dissemination was significant in United Future’s e-campaigning. In 
general, United Future’s campaign information was thorough and well-structured. 
Prominently featuring on United Future’s home page was an image of Dunne with 
the party’s campaign message: ‘In this tough time you need someone in Parliament 
who will put your needs ahead of party politics.’ Also note that United Future’s 
campaign comprised several campaign messages, which periodically rotated on 
the party’s website. The latest press release and campaign news were partially 
displayed at the centre of the home page. Upon clicking, the press release or the 
campaign news was rendered in full on a new page called ‘Latest News’, where all 
press releases, speeches, and news articles were collectively located. The news 
page comprised two main sections: one listing clickable entries and the other 
displaying the chosen entry in its entirety. Each entry was attached with a time 
stamp. Based on the time stamps, United Future’s campaign news, speeches, and 
press releases were frequently refreshed, especially in the lead-up to the election. 
Extensive party information was disseminated. More specifically, the ‘Principles’ 
page detailed the party’s mission and founding principles. The ‘Successes’ page 
highlighted a selection of the party’s political achievements, such as raising the 
driving age, extending daylight saving time, and ensuring stable government 
under MMP. Also on that page was a section called ‘What Others Are Saying’. The 
section was in essence a selection of opinion pieces penned by different 
recognised political commentators and published in different outlets during 2007. 
Those opinion pieces praised the political performance of United Future and its 
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leader, particularly for the party ensuring the stability and accountability of the 
Labour-led government. The contact information of the party and its board 
members was also detailed. 
All United Future’s election policies were put under ‘Our Policies’. The policy page 
comprised two main sections: one listing clickable policy topics and the other 
displaying the policy relating to the chosen topic in full. Despite being a minor 
party, United Future exhibited broad policy coverage. The policy page consisted of 
39 policy topics, ranging from ‘Climate Change’ to ‘Savings’. Each policy could be 
downloaded for offline viewing. The page also contained a document titled ‘The 
Dunne Report: Peter’s State of the Nation Perspective’, highlighting the party’s key 
election policies associated with tax reform, children, family, health care, and 
outdoor recreation. The link to the report also prominently featured on the home 
page. United Future’s key election policies were further promoted in the party’s 
campaign blogs penned by Judy Turner and Denise Krum, the deputy leader and 
the party president respectively. 
All United Future candidates’ biographies were provided under the ‘People’ page. 
In general, each biography contained a candidate’s photo, contact information, 
education and work background, and notable achievements. Information relating 
to the party’s offline support events was listed by region under ‘Get Involved’. 
A search function was included on United Future’s website, allowing the party’s 
comprehensive campaign information to be retrieved with keywords. Also note 
that United Future’s campaign information was disseminated almost entirely in 
text form. 
9.3.2 Voter interaction and engagement 
United Future’s efforts to interact and engage with voters in its e-campaigning 
were notable. The home page featured two recent opinion polls that were related 
to the election and conducted by United Future. One poll questioned: ‘Do you think 
it’s arrogant Clark & Key won’t debate with other leaders?’ The other asked: ‘Do 
you think this election campaign will be dignified?’ Each poll consisted of three 
options and a text button labelled ‘Vote Now’. After casting a vote, a new page 
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rendered. The page was called ‘Have Your Say’, where ‘you can read what others 
think on key issues, and you can let us know your views,’ said the party. In other 
words, the page entirely focused on voters. The party also stated on the page, ‘the 
only reason for our existence is to represent the voice of the people in our 
parliament. Any party that is not constantly in touch with the views of the people 
is simply not doing its job.’ The page allowed visitors to view both ‘current’ and 
previous polls. As depicted in Figure 9.2, if a current poll was selected, the context 
of the poll question was provided. In addition, visitors were allowed to comment 
and view others’ comments. After participating in a current poll, visitors were able 
to view its latest results. Visitors were unable to vote in previous polls; they could, 
however, view the results and comments of any previous poll. 
 
Figure 9.2 A current poll conducted by United Future 
United Future’s website published three campaign blogs penned by Dunne, Turner, 
and Krum. They all enabled visitors to post and view comments. In addition to the 
polls and blogs, visitors were able to comment on the party’s campaign news, 
speeches, and press releases. 
In general, United Future attracted a noticeable number of visitor comments in its 
polls, blogs, campaign news, speeches, and press releases. Also, the party 
exchanged comments with visitors on various topics, which, as a result, appeared 
to stimulate and maintain visitors’ participation. In order to post comments, 
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visitors were required to be registered and logged-in. All visitor comments were 
subject to the party’s moderation. It is worth noting that when visitors chose to 
post or view comments on a topic, they were directed to another page called 
‘Discussion Forum’, depicted in Figure 9.3. There, they could also post and view 
comments associated with other topics from the party’s polls, blogs, campaign 
news, speeches, and press releases. However, visitors were unable to start their 
own discussion topics, a major feature of a discussion forum. 
 
Figure 9.3 United Future's discussion forum 
Other instances relating to United Future’s online interaction and engagement 
with voters included directly emailing a candidate or board member by simply 
clicking on a link, and providing feedback to the party by completing a simple web 
form under the ‘Contact’ page. 
9.3.3 Support mobilisation 
Several elements on United Future’s website related to the party’s intention to 
generate and mobilise voter support. United Future enabled visitors to receive the 
latest campaign content with RSS. The content pertained to the party’s campaign 
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blogs and discussion forum. Furthermore, the party provided links for visitors to 
spread the party’s campaign news, speeches, press releases, and blogs to their 
friends via email. As noted, the website enabled visitors to download part of 
United Future’s campaign material, namely the party’s policy documents. 
Only one campaign video was deployed in United Future’s e-campaign, which was 
located on the home page of the party’s website. The video, professionally 
produced and near five minutes in length, featured Dunne concentrating on 
explaining in depth the significance and benefits of United Future returning to the 
next parliament; for instance, Dunne asserted that ‘We’re going to be the party that 
you can rely on to keep the government honest, on track, and worthy of your trust.’ 
Support mobilisation was also profoundly reflected in United Future’s campaign 
blog penned by Dunne, also referred to by the party as ‘Peter’s Position’. For 
instance, in a highly emotive blog post titled ‘Our Time Is Coming’, Dunne 
encouraged voters to lend United Future their support on polling day because, to 
name a few, the party offered ‘fresh ideas’, ‘put families and communities first’, 
and represented ‘a genuine beacon of hope for the future’. On the basis of some 
visitor comments it received, the post appeared to generate or mobilise voter 
support to some extent; for instance, ‘That’s certainly a clear set of good enough 
reasons for anyone to support United Future!’ 
9.3.4 Targeted campaigning 
During the campaign period, Dunne explicitly indicated that his party would 
support Labour’s chief opponent, National, to form the next government. It was 
unsurprising that Labour and some of its key policies were targeted in United 
Future’s e-campaigning. Notably, United Future’s only online campaign video 
began with targeting Labour. More specifically, Dunne expressed that ‘I’m one of 
those people who sat back over the last few years with increasing anger at the way 
in which the [Labour-led] government has stopped working with us, and it has 
started telling us what we have to do.’ In a press release promoting United Future’s 
tertiary education policy, United Future targeted one of Labour’s key campaign 
pledges relating to a universal student allowance, describing it as merely a short-
term solution. 
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Although United Future claimed to support National to lead the next government, 
it did not exclude this potential political partner from United Future’s targeted 
campaigning. For instance, in a press release Dunne targeted National’s income 
tax policy, describing it as complicated and unfair for some. He concluded by 
suggesting that ‘If Kiwis want a tax system that is simple and fair, and won’t break 
the bank, then they should vote United Future.’ Put differently, targeted 
campaigning at other political counterparts formed another means for United 
Future’s support mobilisation. In Dunne’s blog post titled ‘Memo to Helen Clark 
and John Key’, both Labour and National were targeted. More specifically, Dunne 
began the post by agreeing with both Clark and Key that trust was 
unprecedentedly pivotal in this election. He however argued that neither of the 
major parties should be completely trusted to govern alone because while in 
government over the years, they both ‘have become arrogant and have lost touch 
with ordinary New Zealanders’. Dunne then indicated that in stark contrast, 
United Future was entirely dependable for it had not ‘overplayed its hand, or lied 
to people’, but had consistently kept both major parties ‘honest and in check’. 
Though rare, two particular voter groups were targeted in United Future’s e-
campaigning. More specifically, in his blog post titled ‘A Simple Question’, Dunne 
suggested that votes for Labour or National were ‘wasted’ votes because ‘They’re 
the big guys who will be there anyway, whatever happens.’ He then indicated that 
‘The most important vote is the one for the little guy who will keep the big guy 
honest and on track.’ On that basis, Dunne concluded that votes should 
undoubtedly be cast for United Future. Put succinctly, both Labour and National 
voters were specifically targeted in United Future’s e-campaigning in order to 
increase its votes. 
9.3.5 Resource generation 
Visitors were strongly encouraged to become a member of United Future. As the 
party stated, ‘United Future makes a difference when our members make a 
difference.’ The main benefits of becoming a party member were also outlined, for 
instance, ‘You join this party because you know real people, with real names, and 
want to make a real difference in their lives. Unite with others around the country 
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in a cause that’s bigger than us all.’ It cost $15 to join United Future. It also involved 
completing a web form that solicited some personal information, namely, name, 
postal and email addresses, and a contact number. It is worth noting that online 
payment was not available. According to the website, once the web form had been 
completed and submitted, an email would be sent, advising payment options. 
Alternatively, visitors could download, print, and complete a membership form 
provided on the website, and post it to the party. 
Financial contributions towards United Future’s election campaign were also 
encouraged. The process was identical to that of becoming a party member. More 
specifically, donors were asked to complete and submit the same web form of 
becoming a party member. The party would then advise payment details by email. 
Alternatively, the membership form could be used for offline donations. 
9.3.6 Summary 
The table below summarises United Future’s e-campaigning utilisation and its 
extent with the proposed e-campaigning framework. It suggests that United 
Future’s e-campaigning focused most on targeted campaigning, closely followed 
by information dissemination. By comparison, resource generation was least 
focused on. 
Six areas of United Future’s e-campaigning utilisation deserve highlighting. First, 
although United Future’s campaign team indicated that the candidate vote for 
Dunne formed the chief focus of the party’s election campaigning in general, it was 
not reflected in the party’s e-campaigning. Rather, United Future’s e-campaigning 
appeared to solely concentrate on the party vote. Second, the political credibility 
and credentials of United Future and its leader penetrated deep into the party’s e-
campaigning. Third, United Future is the only party in this study that utilised 
opinion polls to interact and engage with voters. And the party exchanged 
comments with visitors, which seemed to stimulate and maintain voter interaction 
and engagement. Fourth, United Future is the second party in this study that 
opened multiple avenues, such as campaign news, speeches, press releases, 
campaign blogs, and opinion polls, for visitors to post comments. Fifth, multimedia 
content was rarely observed in United Future’s e-campaigning. And last, not only 
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its political opponents but also its potential ally was targeted in United Future’s e-
campaigning. Also note that a content element in United Future’s e-campaign is 
not captured by the proposed framework, namely means to encourage votes. 
Table 9.1 United Future's e-campaigning utilisation and its extent 
Campaign practice Content elements Present 
Information 
dissemination 
Political party's information ● 
Candidate biography ● 
Press releases ● 
Policy statements ● 
Campaign news ● 
Campaign events ● 
Speeches ● 
Contact information ● 
Information relating to the political party's other online 
presence 
 
Campaign blog without visitor comments allowed  
Voter interaction 
and engagement 
Instant chat or messaging  
Instant opinion polls ● 
Instant surveys  
Applications for interacting with the political party's policies  
Interactive calendar of campaign events  
Means to contact the political party ● 
Discussion forums ● 
Campaign blog with visitor comments allowed ● 
Means to provide feedback  ● 
Support 
mobilisation 
Means for voters to invite their peers to participate in 
campaign events 
 
Means to inform voters of electoral information  
Means for voters to receive campaign information and 
updates 
● 
Means for voters to connect with supporter groups  
Means for voters to download campaign material ● 
Means for voters to forward campaign material to others ● 
Means to encourage votes* ● 
Targeted 
campaigning 
Content targeted at political opponents ● 
Content targeted at political opponents' policies ● 
Content targeted at specific voter segments ● 
Resource generation 
Means to make donations ● 
Online merchandise shop  
Means to become a party member ● 
Means to become a volunteer  
Note: * Not present in the proposed e-campaigning framework 
 
As noted, United Future’s campaign team claimed that compared to its 
counterparts, the party probably exhibited the most limited e-campaigning 
utilisation during the election. There seems to be a discrepancy between that claim 
and the observation of this study. Such an apparent discrepancy, however, could 
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be largely explained by the team’s indication, as noted, that a considerable portion 
of the content on the website predated the election. 
9.4 The factors influencing United Future’s e-
campaigning utilisation 
United Future’s e-campaigning utilisation was attributable to six factors in Table 
2.2, namely, voters’ technology access, resource availability, subjective norm, 
image, output quality, and result demonstrability. The remainder of this section is 
organised according to those factors. This section is concluded with a summary. 
9.4.1 Voters’ technology access 
United Future’s online campaign video was one of the few elements specifically 
produced for the party’s e-campaigning, according to the campaign team. The 
element was considered by the team as ‘absolutely essential’ to United Future’s e-
campaigning. The presence of this essential element in United Future’s e-
campaign was in part prompted by voters’ technology access. As the team 
explained, in the previous election, broadband Internet was not widely accessible 
in New Zealand. It was therefore unsound for the team to pursue any online 
campaign video in the party’s e-campaigning as broadband Internet was required. 
This election, however, presented ‘a very different scenario’. The team noted that 
this election saw broadband Internet being accessible to a substantial number of 
New Zealand voters, making it ‘compelling and worthwhile’ for the team to deploy 
the online campaign video. Put succinctly, improved New Zealand voters’ access 
to broadband Internet incentivised the team to incorporate the video in e-
campaigning. 
While broadband Internet access in New Zealand presented a crucial opportunity 
for United Future’s e-campaigning utilisation in this election, it also served as a 
hindrance. As the team pointed out, broadband access was not optimal in the 
election. Notably, this Internet technology was still inaccessible in several parts of 
the country, particularly remote areas. Further, unlike other countries, broadband 
usage in New Zealand was highly restricted and expensive. Those limitations of 
broadband access consequently impacted on United Future’s e-campaigning 
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utilisation. For instance, the team had to reduce the rendition quality of the 
professionally-produced campaign video. Also, the team had to limit the presence 
of multimedia content in United Future’s e-campaign. 
In general, New Zealand voters’ broadband access encouraged as well as 
constrained United Future’s e-campaigning utilisation. In other words, the impact 
of the factor on United Future’s e-campaigning consisted of two facets: positive 
and negative. 
9.4.2 Resource availability 
As noted, United Future’s campaign team considered its e-campaigning utilisation 
in the election to be probably the lowest among all parliamentary parties, largely 
because it primarily focused on ensuring key campaign information was 
expeditiously and accurately disseminated on the party’s website. Such a narrow 
e-campaigning focus in part reflected the impact of resource availability. 
More specifically, the team had an extremely limited budget covering all aspects 
of United Future’s election campaign – online and offline, national and local. Over 
half of the campaign budget represented allocated funding from the Electoral 
Commission for producing and broadcasting United Future’s election 
programmes on television and radio. And the remainder almost entirely went to 
other traditional campaign activities. In other words, hardly any financial 
resources were present for the party’s e-campaigning in the election. Moreover, as 
a minor party, United Future had ‘only a handful of people’ undertaking the party’s 
election campaigning. While e-campaigning ‘might very well be resource-friendly, 
it’s certainly not resource-free’, said the team. On that note, United Future’s e-
campaigning primarily focused on ‘covering the basic stuff, [which was] making 
sure all important campaign documents were put on the website correctly and as 
soon as possible. Anything else was just an added bonus’. This, said the team, 
meant that the party’s e-campaigning was ‘static’, ‘minimal,’ and ‘very passive’, 
reflecting the amount of campaign resources available for United Future’s e-
campaigning. The team further suggested that it would have considered escalating 
United Future’s e-campaigning utilisation – such as producing more campaign 
 229 
videos or publishing more blog posts, had it had more campaign resources, namely, 
money, time, and campaign personnel. 
Put succinctly, the availability, or more precisely the unavailability, of campaign 
resources forced United Future’s campaign team to limit the primary focus of its 
e-campaigning utilisation to the extent that the party’s e-campaigning was 
described by the team as ‘static’, ‘minimal’, and ‘passive’. That is, the impact of 
resource availability on United Future’s e-campaigning utilisation was negative. 
9.4.3 Subjective norm 
A key characteristic of the election, according to the campaign team, pertained to 
the emergence of various trends in e-campaigning. Some of them influenced 
United Future’s e-campaigning utilisation. Notably, the team felt a new trend, both 
nationally and internationally, that political parties and candidates produced their 
own online videos for ‘all sorts of things related to election campaigning’. Under 
the influence of that trend, the team perceived that it was ‘absolutely essential’ to 
deploy at least one campaign video of its own on the party’s website in the election, 
or the party ‘would be on the back foot’. That, together with the dramatically 
increased broadband Internet access in New Zealand, propelled the team to 
present the online campaign video that featured Dunne primarily mobilising voter 
support. 
Campaign blogging was another e-campaigning trend influencing United Future’s 
e-campaigning utilisation. More specifically, the team noticed an unprecedented 
phenomenon that campaign blogging formed a major constituent of many parties’ 
e-campaigning in the election. It further convinced the team that campaign 
blogging had to be present and active in United Future’s e-campaigning despite 
resource availability having already been the major constraint. As indicated, 
United Future’s e-campaigning consisted of three campaign blogs, collectively 
focusing on information dissemination, voter interaction and engagement, 
support mobilisation, and targeted campaigning. This instance suggests that the 
impact of resource availability was moderated by subjective norm. 
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The campaign team added that it was highly selective in adopting any e-
campaigning trend, because ‘election campaigning of any kind is less about 
starting or going for new technological trends and more about getting core 
messages out to voters, engaging with them, and, hopefully, winning their support.’ 
As indicated, the primary focus of United Future’s e-campaigning in this election 
was set on information dissemination, which almost certainly rendered the party’s 
e-campaigning ‘static’, ‘minimal’, and ‘passive’. Nevertheless, the team was 
unconcerned by that, partly due to the impact of subjective norm. As the team 
explained, most of United Future’s supporters and target voters ‘don’t just sit on 
the computer all day and all night’; rather, ‘they watch mainstream TV, listen to 
the radio, read the newspaper, and do other things.’ Because of that, the team did 
not sense an expectation among the party’s supporters and target voters that it 
had to deliver an extensive and expansive e-campaign. To that end, the team 
remained unperturbed if United Future’s e-campaign appeared ‘static’, ‘minimal’ 
and ‘passive’ to the public. 
In short, subjective norm encouraged and dissuaded United Future’s e-
campaigning utilisation. In other words, the impact of the factor on United 
Future’s e-campaigning consisted of two facets: positive and negative. As 
illustrated, the norms perceived by the campaign team originated from e-
campaigning trends, competitive pressure, or external expectations sensed by the 
team. It is worth noting the instance pertaining to campaign blogging for it 
suggests that the impact of resource availability was moderated by another factor 
– subjective norm. Also, it can be inferred from the team’s perception relating to 
the essence of election campaigning that e-campaigning, as a form of election 
campaigning, is shaped by campaign practices, such as information dissemination, 
and voter interaction and engagement, as opposed to emergent technologies or 
applications. This resonated with the stance taken in this study. 
9.4.4 Image 
Among all pages under United Future’s website, ‘Have Your Say’ particularly 
attracted attention in that it entirely focused on voters. More specifically, the page 
encouraged voters to express and exchange opinions on various topics through 
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voting in opinion polls or commenting. The page had existed before the campaign 
period. In other words, it was not specifically intended for United Future’s e-
campaigning. However, it was turned into a campaign vehicle for the party in the 
election. That was partly due to the team’s consideration over United Future’s 
image. As the team explained, in order to gain voter support, it was crucial for 
United Future to be seen as a party that ‘listens to people’, ‘stays closely connected 
with people’, and ‘put people at centre stage’. The ‘Have Your Say’ page was 
perceived by the team to be instrumental in achieving that. Consequently, the page 
was retained and became a major constituent of United Future’s e-campaigning. 
United Future was one of the few parties in this study that not only encouraged 
but also participated in commenting on various topics. This reflected 
considerations relating to the party’s image. As the team indicated, participating 
in comment exchange with voters was an ongoing and, more importantly, 
resource-intensive undertaking. It was not advisable according to the campaign 
resources available to the party. However, it could have appeared to be merely ‘a 
PR exercise’, had visitors not received any acknowledgement or response in 
return from the party. To that end, the party actively participated in exchanging 
comments with voters on various topics to ensure a positive public perception of 
its online interaction and engagement with voters. 
As noted, extensive information pertaining to United Future’s background was 
disseminated on the party’s website. This, according to the team, was deliberate, 
motivated by the team’s concern over the party’s image. As the team explained, 
the Future New Zealand party, a founding party of United Future, was deeply 
rooted in Christianity. Because of that, a false perception was held by a 
conspicuous number of voters that United Future was naturally a ‘religious’, 
‘conservative’, and ‘dogmatic’ party. The team found such a misconception to be 
especially damaging to the party’s ‘brand’, which could then lead to a loss of 
considerable new support for the party. Under such circumstances, a significant 
portion of United Future’s e-campaign was devoted to describing at length the 
party’s mission, vision, values, principles, and policy orientation, as the team 
believed that it would demonstrate the party to be in fact ‘secular’, ‘modern’, and 
‘liberal’. 
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In all, image propelled United Future’s e-campaigning utilisation. In other words, 
the impact of the factor on United Future’s e-campaigning was positive. It is worth 
highlighting the instance where United Future actively participated in comment 
exchange with voters for it suggests that the impact of resource availability was 
moderated by another factor – image. 
9.4.5 Output quality 
The opinion polls in United Future’s e-campaign provided different questions for 
visitors to vote on and discuss. The approach to defining the poll questions was 
chiefly prompted by output quality. More specifically, the team revealed that the 
poll questions were derived from recent political affairs featuring in New 
Zealand’s mainstream news media; for instance, the poll question ‘Do you think 
it’s arrogant that Clark & Key won’t debate with other leaders?’ stemmed from a 
news article published in The New Zealand Herald that both major party leaders 
unanimously refused to be joined by their minor counterparts in an important 
televised election debate. Such an approach, the team believed, would render the 
opinion polls ‘fresh’, ‘topical’, and ‘widely familiar’, ultimately leading to increased 
voter participation. 
A significant portion of United Future’s e-campaign was targeted at the party’s 
counterparts and some of their key election policies. That, according to United 
Future’s campaign team, was driven by output quality. More specifically, the team 
perceived it to be essential to ‘mention’ other parties or their policies in some 
important campaign messages, such as United Future’s shifting support from 
Labour to National to form the next government, as it contextualised those 
messages, thereby strengthening their persuasiveness and intelligibility. 
As noted, the candidate vote for Dunne formed the central focus of United Future’s 
election campaigning in general, as the party’s survivability after the election 
hinged chiefly on Dunne’s re-election in his electorate. The focus, however, was 
not observed in United Future’s e-campaigning. That, according to the campaign 
team, was informed by output quality. More specifically, the team believed that 
Dunne held ‘a much better chance’ of winning his electorate by engaging in 
traditional campaigning – such as visiting the malls, and appearing in the 
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community newspapers and community radio – rather than ‘sitting behind the 
computer screen’. In other words, the team perceived that traditional campaigning 
offered a significantly better outcome for Dunne’s re-election than did e-
campaigning. To that end, United Future’s e-campaigning barely touched on 
Dunne’s candidacy. 
In sum, output quality propelled and discouraged United Future’s e-campaigning 
utilisation. That is, the impact of the factor on United Future’s e-campaigning 
consisted of two facets: positive and negative. 
9.4.6 Result demonstrability 
A major difference between offline and online campaigning, according to United 
Future’s campaign team, lied within result demonstrability. ‘At the end of the day, 
election campaigning is about getting votes,’ the team explained. ‘So when you 
engage with voters in face-to-face settings,’ the team continued, ‘you normally can 
get a clear sense if you’re going to get their support or not, but that’s not really the 
case in Internet campaigning.’ That, said the team, formed another reason that 
United Future focused its e-campaigning on ‘the basics’, and ‘put most energy and 
resources into offline campaigning’. 
The team continued to suggest that the impact of result demonstrability was 
relative to resource availability. As the team put it, ‘If you have lots of resources, 
you could give most things [related to e-campaigning] a go and be less concerned 
about whether you’re going to see anything concrete out if it … But it’s a totally 
different story if you have very limited resources.’ This suggests that the impact of 
result demonstrability on e-campaigning utilisation could be moderated by 
resource availability. 
Put succinctly, result demonstrability discouraged United Future’s e-campaigning 
utilisation. In other words, the impact of the factor on United Future’s e-
campaigning was negative. It is worth highlighting the relation between result 
demonstrability and resource availability as suggested by the team. 
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9.4.7 Summary 
United Future’s e-campaigning utilisation was shaped by six factors in Table 2.2, 
namely, voters’ technology access, resource availability, subjective norm, image, 
output quality, and result demonstrability. Each factor in essence represents a 
unique perspective, therefore, United Future’s e-campaigning utilisation has been 
explained from six perspectives. Various specific and contextual instances that 
occurred in United Future’s e-campaigning utilisation have been presented to 
illustrate the factors, lending valuable insights into this unique phenomenon. 
Table 9.2 highlights the six factors that influenced United Future’s e-campaigning 
utilisation. 
Table 9.2 The factors influencing United Future's e-campaigning utilisation 
Factor Dual impact Moderated by 
Voters' technology access ●  
Resource availability  Subjective norm, image 
Subjective norm ●  
Image   
Output quality ●  
Result demonstrability  Resource availability 
 
As noted in the table, the impacts of half of the factors, such as voters’ technology 
access, consisted of two facets: positive and negative. This means that those 
factors served as enablers as well as inhibitors of United Future’s e-campaigning 
utilisation. The impacts of some factors, such as resource availability, were 
moderated by other factors, such as subjective norm. Taken together, it suggests 
that United Future’s e-campaigning utilisation was complex, contextual, and 
dynamic. 
9.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented the key findings from the case study relating to United 
Future’s e-campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general election. It has 
comprehensively analysed the breadth and depth of United Future’s e-
campaigning utilisation. Based on that, it has identified and illustrated in depth the 
six factors that influenced United Future’s e-campaigning utilisation. 
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Chapter 10 Cross-case analysis 
10.1 Chapter introduction 
Based on the previous case studies of the six parliamentary parties’ e-campaigning 
utilisation in the 2008 general election, this chapter conducts a cross-case analysis. 
In contrast to the microscopic view adopted in the case studies, a broad view is 
taken in this chapter, aiming to identify notable, emergent themes, patterns, 
similarities, or differences across the six cases. This chapter is organised according 
to the research questions of this study. More specifically, section 10.2 pertains to 
the six parties’ e-campaigning utilisation and section 10.3 the factors influencing 
those parties’ e-campaigning utilisation. This chapter is concluded with a chapter 
summary. 
10.2 The political parties’ e-campaigning 
utilisation 
The analysis in this section is organised according to the five campaign practices 
in the proposed e-campaigning framework, namely, information dissemination, 
voter interaction and engagement, support mobilisation, targeted campaigning, 
and resource generation. The analysis is concluded with a brief summary. 
10.2.1 Information dissemination 
Disseminating campaign information was a prominent practice across all political 
parties, based on the number of related content elements observed and the 
frequency of those elements being refreshed during the campaign period. All 
parties’ e-campaigns featured press releases, policy statements, campaign news, 
speeches, and contact information. Most parties provided party information, 
candidate biographies, and campaign events. It is worth noting that minor parties, 
such as United Future, tended to emphasise their values, principles, and political 
achievements. If applicable, parties also indicated their other online presence, 
such as Facebook. Multimedia, particularly online video, was used by all parties to 
broadcast campaign information, such as election policies. Nearly all parties also 
promoted their campaign information through blogging. Further, most party 
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leaders actively participated in campaign blogging in this election, which was 
unprecedented. National was the only party that used online videos for campaign 
blogging. 
10.2.2 Voter interaction and engagement 
All parties attempted to interact and engage with voters in their e-campaigning. 
Compared to other practices, such as information dissemination, voter interaction 
and engagement did not appear to be pivotal in any party’s e-campaigning. Major 
parties’ online voter interaction and engagement centred on key election policies 
while minor parties’ on direct dialogues with and between voters. Among the 
parties that blogged in the election, only minor parties enabled reader 
commenting. A few minor parties, such as ACT, also enabled reader commenting 
in other areas of their e-campaigns, such as campaign news and speeches. Some 
minor parties, such as the Progressives, not only encouraged but also keenly 
participated in commenting. This, however, was not observed in major parties’ e-
campaigns. In general, the number of visitor comments was limited in any party’s 
e-campaign. Only one minor party’s e-campaign featured opinion polls. Only two 
minor parties included discussion forums in their e-campaigns. Social media, such 
as Facebook, debuted as part of most parties’ e-campaigning in this election. 
However, it was primarily for broadcasting campaign information; in other words, 
the interactive nature of social media was barely exploited by any party. 
10.2.3 Support mobilisation 
All parties exhibited efforts to mobilise voter support to markedly varying degrees 
in their e-campaigns. Every party encouraged votes, commonly observed in 
campaign news, speeches, blogs, or online videos. Most parties urged visitors to 
enrol as voters, subscribe to campaign updates, download campaign material, and 
spread their campaigns to others. It is worth noting that Web 2.0 services, such as 
RSS, were used for campaign subscription or promulgation by a small number of 
parties. The campaign material available for download varied, ranging from a 
campaign billboard to policy documents. No parties encouraged visitors to invite 
others to participate in offline campaign events. Only two parties, namely National 
and the Greens, enabled visitors to endorse them online or offline and connect 
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with supporter groups. The Greens was the only party that encouraged voters to 
create and share online campaign material. 
10.2.4 Targeted campaigning 
All political parties targeted others and their key election policies in e-
campaigning. This was commonly found in campaign news, speeches, and press 
releases. Labour’s targeted campaigning at National as well as Key was 
particularly notable as it was also identified in many other areas such as the 
party’s online videos and campaign blog. Further, only minor parties targeted 
their opponents as well as allies. Irrespective of its diverse manifestations, parties’ 
targeted campaigning at their counterparts all aimed at growing their own 
political appeal while dimming their counterparts’. 
Specific voter segments were also targeted in most parties’ e-campaigns. This was 
observable in diverse areas, such as speeches, campaign blogs, or campaign 
segments in other languages. National was the only party that dedicated a sub-site 
to each particular voter segment, for instance, the SuperBlues site was dedicated 
to National’s supporters aged 60 and above. Nearly all minor parties’ e-campaigns 
consisted of segments targeted at specific voters. Further, political counterparts 
and their policies tended to be the focus of parties’ targeted campaigning. 
10.2.5 Resource generation 
Most parties’ e-campaigns consisted of soliciting financial donations, expanding 
party membership, and recruiting campaign volunteers. Their approaches were 
generally identical, passive, and conventional, which primarily relied on visitors 
taking the initiative to complete and submit relevant web forms. The Greens was 
the only party that included an online store in e-campaigning to generate further 
financial resources. 
10.2.6 Summary 
The cross-case analysis of the six political parties’ e-campaigning utilisation is 
summarised in Table 10.1. 
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Table 10.1 The six political parties' e-campaigning utilisation in the election 
Campaign practice Content elements N L G A P U 
Information 
dissemination 
Political party's information ●  ●  ● ● 
Candidate biography ● ● ● ●  ● 
Press releases ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Policy statements ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Campaign news ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Campaign events ●  ● ●  ● 
Speeches ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Contact information ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Information relating to the political 
party's other online presence 
● ● ● ●   
Campaign blog without visitor comments 
allowed 
● ●     
Voter interaction and 
engagement 
Instant chat or messaging       
Instant opinion polls      ● 
Instant surveys       
Applications for interacting with the 
political party's policies 
● ●     
Interactive calendar of campaign events ●  ●    
Means to contact the political party ●  ● ● ● ● 
Discussion forums     ● ● 
Campaign blog with visitor comments 
allowed 
  ● ●  ● 
Means to provide feedback ● ● ●  ● ● 
Support mobilisation 
Means for voters to invite their peers to 
participate in campaign events 
      
Means to inform voters of electoral 
information 
● ● ● ●   
Means for voters to receive campaign 
information and updates 
● ● ●   ● 
Means for voters to connect with 
supporter groups 
●  ●    
Means for voters to download campaign 
material 
● ● ● ●  ● 
Means for voters to forward campaign 
material to others 
● ● ●   ● 
Means for voters to endorse the political 
party* 
●  ●    
Means to encourage votes* ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Targeted campaigning 
Content targeted at political opponents ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Content targeted at political opponents' 
policies 
● ● ● ● ● ● 
Content targeted at specific voter 
segments 
●   ● ● ● 
Resource generation 
Means to make donations ● ● ● ●  ● 
Online merchandise shop   ●    
Means to become a party member ●  ● ●  ● 
Means to become a volunteer ● ● ● ●   
Note: * Not present in the proposed e-campaigning framework; N: National; L: Labour; G: the 
Greens; A: ACT; P: the Progressives; U: United Future 
 
Overall, despite the underlying technologies and applications being almost 
identical, the six political parties’ e-campaigning utilisation in the 2008 general 
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election varied discernibly beyond information dissemination and targeted 
campaigning at political counterparts. All parties in this election introduced online 
videos, blogs, and social media in their e-campaigning, primarily for information 
dissemination. However, instances of innovative or creative e-campaigning 
beyond information dissemination were generally rare. 
10.3 The factors influencing the parties’ e-
campaigning utilisation 
The six parties’ e-campaigning utilisation reflected the impacts of various factors, 
namely, election type, electoral regulations, voters’ technology access, resource 
availability, subjective norm, image, job relevance, output quality, result 
demonstrability, and perceived ease of use. The analysis in this section is 
organised according to those factors and concluded in a brief summary. 
10.3.1 Election type 
Half of the parties – namely, National, Labour, and the Greens – suggested that the 
election being party-led affected their e-campaigning utilisation. The major 
parties generally considered that party-led elections hindered e-campaigning 
utilisation while their minor counterpart perceived the opposite. Only one party, 
namely Labour, experienced both sides of the impact of election type. In one case, 
namely National’s e-campaigning, the impact of election type was moderated by 
another factor, namely result demonstrability. 
10.3.2 Electoral regulations 
Most parties indicated that their e-campaigning utilisation was influenced by 
electoral regulations. The impact of the factor consisted of two aspects: positive 
and negative. In other words, electoral regulations could propel and also dampen 
e-campaigning utilisation. However, only half experienced the positive aspect. 
Despite New Zealand general elections being governed by various electoral laws 
and regulations, only the EFA 2007 was noted by the parties. This, according to 
some parties, was largely due to the novelty and, more importantly, the ambiguity 
of the Act. In one case, namely National’s e-campaigning, the impact of electoral 
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regulations was moderated by another factor, namely subjective norm. This, 
however, was not observed in other cases. 
10.3.3 Voters’ technology access 
Nearly all parties expressed that voters’ technology access served a noticeable role 
in their e-campaigning utilisation. In particular, they all found that New 
Zealanders’ access to broadband Internet in this election cycle markedly 
stimulated e-campaigning utilisation; however, they also noted that New Zealand 
broadband access in the election was attached with several limitations, which in 
turn dampened their e-campaigning utilisation. That is, the impact of voters’ 
technology access was double-sided. In addition to broadband Internet, voters’ 
access to mobile technologies was touched on by some parties. In three cases, the 
impact of voters’ technology access was moderated by another factor. More 
specifically, the impact of voters’ technology access was moderated by resource 
availability in National’s e-campaigning, by electoral regulations and resource 
availability in Labour’s, and by resource availability in ACT’s. 
10.3.4 Resource availability 
All parties evinced that their e-campaigning utilisation was profoundly influenced 
by the availability of their campaign resources, namely, time, human, and financial 
resources. Most parties were propelled by their limited campaign resources to 
embrace e-campaigning. On the other hand, all parties indicated that the presence 
of their campaign resources inhibited sophisticated or full e-campaigning 
utilisation. In short, the impact of resources availability was two-faceted to almost 
all parties. Both the major parties attributed the limited interaction and 
engagement with voters in their e-campaigning primarily to resource availability. 
In three cases the impact of resource availability was moderated by another factor. 
More specifically, the impact of resource availability was moderated by result 
demonstrability and subjective norm in National’s e-campaigning, by image in the 
Progressives’, and by subjective norm and image in United Future’s. 
 241 
10.3.5 Subjective norm 
Almost all parties’ e-campaigning utilisation reflected the impact of subjective 
norm. Over half of those parties pointed out that the impact on their e-
campaigning utilisation was both positive and negative, while the remainder 
observed only the positive side of the impact. The subjective norms noted in the 
case studies were generally formed by perceived trends, competitive pressure, or 
perceived voter expectations. In three cases the impact of subjective norm was 
moderated by another factor. More specifically, the impact of subjective norm was 
moderated by resource availability, image, and job relevance in National’s e-
campaigning, by electoral regulations and resource availability in Labour’s, and by 
resource availability in ACT’s. 
10.3.6 Image 
All parties acknowledged that their e-campaigning utilisation was partly affected 
by consideration of political image. The impact induced by image on most parties’ 
e-campaigning utilisation was twofold; that is, consideration of political image 
both stimulated and constrained those parties’ e-campaigning utilisation. It is 
worth noting that the major parties limited, while minor parties embraced, online 
interaction with voters, due in large part to this factor. In one case, namely 
Labour’s e-campaigning, the impact of image was moderated by another factor, 
namely subjective norm. 
10.3.7 Job relevance 
Most parties suggested that their e-campaigning utilisation was influenced by job 
relevance. Almost all of them discerned two facets of the impact; in other words, 
their e-campaigning utilisation was encouraged as well as discouraged. Both 
major parties further noted that perceptions relating to job relevance were 
subjective, contextual, and evolving. That is, a particular e-campaigning idea or 
approach could be deemed irrelevant by one party but otherwise by another; 
further, a particular e-campaigning idea or approach could be perceived 
inapplicable in one election but otherwise in another. In one case, namely Labour’s 
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e-campaigning, the impact of job relevance was moderated by another factor, 
namely subjective norm. 
10.3.8 Output quality 
All parties indicated that output quality affected their e-campaigning utilisation. 
They all encountered two sides of the impact induced by output quality; that is, 
output quality not only motivated but also restricted all parties’ e-campaigning 
utilisation. In one case, namely the Greens’ e-campaigning, the impact of output 
quality was moderated by another factor, namely resource availability. 
10.3.9 Result demonstrability 
Most parties noted that result demonstrability played a role in their e-
campaigning utilisation. Half of them observed both positive and negative sides of 
the impact induced by result demonstrability. The majority of the parties were 
wary of reacting to any implications relating to result demonstrability alone, 
primarily due to the lack of comprehensive knowledge of e-campaigning. It is 
worth noting that the result demonstrability of a new e-campaigning idea or 
approach tended to attract more attention from the parties. One party, namely 
United Future, suggested that the impact of result demonstrability could be 
moderated by resource availability. 
10.3.10 Perceived ease of use 
Half of the parties, both major and one minor, disclosed that their e-campaigning 
utilisation was influenced by perceived ease of use. The major parties experienced 
both positive and negative sides of the impact. Compared to their counterparts, 
the parties that observed the influence induced by perceived ease of use exhibited 
a greater extent of e-campaigning utilisation overall. Put differently, the impact of 
perceived ease of use did not seem to be apparent to parties with relatively limited 
e-campaigning utilisation. 
10.3.11 Summary 
The cross-case analysis of the factors influencing the six political parties’ e-
campaigning utilisation was encapsulated in Table 10.2 and Table 10.3. In general, 
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each political party’s e-campaigning utilisation, irrespective of its extent, was 
shaped by various factors. Among them, voters’ technology access, resource 
availability, subjective norm, image, and output quality were particularly 
prominent. The impact induced by every factor consisted of two facets: positive 
and negative. This, however, was not experienced by all parties. The analysis also 
indicates that the impact of any factor except perceived ease of use was subject to 
the moderation of another factor, which, again, was not experienced by all parties. 
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Table 10.2 The factors influencing the parties' e-campaigning utilisation (part 1) 
Factor 
National Labour the Greens 
Present 
Dual 
impact 
Moderated by Present 
Dual 
impact 
Moderated by Present 
Dual 
impact 
Moderated by 
Election type ●  Result demonstrability ● ●   ●    
Electoral 
regulations 
●  Subjective norm ● ●   ●    
Voters' technology 
access 
● ● Resource availability ● ● 
Electoral regulations, 
resource availability 
● ●   
Resource 
availability 
● ● 
Result demonstrability, 
subjective norm 
● ●   ● ●   
Subjective norm ●  
Resource availability, 
image, job relevance 
● ● 
Electoral regulations, 
resource availability 
● ●   
Image ● ●   ● ● Subjective norm ● ●   
Job relevance ●    ● ● Subjective norm ● ●   
Output quality ● ●   ● ●   ● ● 
Resource 
availability 
Result 
demonstrability 
● ●   ● ● 
Voters' technology 
access, resource 
availability 
●    
Perceived ease of 
use 
● ●   ● ●   ●    
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Table 10.3 The factors influencing the parties' e-campaigning utilisation (part 2) 
Factor 
ACT the Progressives United Future 
Present 
Dual 
impact 
Moderated by Present 
Dual 
impact 
Moderated by Present 
Dual 
impact 
Moderated by 
Election type             
Electoral regulations     ● ●       
Voters' technology 
access 
● ● 
Resource 
availability 
    ● ●   
Resource availability ● ●   ● ● Image ●  
Subjective norm, 
image 
Subjective norm ●  
Resource 
availability 
    ● ●   
Image ●    ● ●   ●    
Job relevance     ● ●       
Output quality ● ●   ● ●   ● ●   
Result demonstrability         ●  
Resource 
availability 
Perceived ease of use             
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10.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter has conducted a cross-case analysis. More specifically, it has 
highlighted the themes and trends of the six parties’ e-campaigning utilisation in 
the 2008 election. It has also identified the patterns relating to the factors that 
influenced the six parties’ e-campaigning utilisation in the election. 
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Chapter 11 Discussion 
11.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter presents a discussion focusing on the two research questions, based 
on the main findings from both academic literature and the empirical data. More 
specifically, section 11.2 and section 11.3 pertain to the first and second research 
questions respectively. This chapter is concluded with a brief summary. 
11.2 The political parties’ e-campaigning 
utilisation 
This section is organised on the basis of the e-campaigning framework proposed 
in this study. More specifically, the discussion pertaining to the six political parties’ 
e-campaigning utilisation is arranged according to the five campaign practices in 
the framework, namely, information dissemination, voter interaction and 
engagement, support mobilisation, targeted campaigning, and resource 
generation. This section is concluded with a brief summary, including any 
suggested change to the proposed framework resulting from the discussion. 
11.2.1 Information dissemination 
Scholars observe that overall, information dissemination is the most prominent in 
e-campaigning (e.g., Bentivegna, 2008; Gibson & McAllister, 2008; Lilleker et al., 
2011; Ward, Gibson, et al., 2008). This observation is shared by this study. All 
associated content elements have been identified. However, rarely did a party 
exhibit all content elements associated with information dissemination. 
This study has found that in order to confine visitors’ limited attention to their 
election policies, some parties, such as the Progressives, intentionally reduced 
other campaign information or the extent of other campaign practices. This 
finding is not present in the literature and therefore extends the understanding of 
e-campaigning. 
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11.2.2 Voter interaction and engagement 
Except ‘instant chat or messaging’ and ‘instant surveys’, all content elements 
related to voter interaction and engagement in the framework have been found in 
this study. However, all parties under study exhibited sparse content elements 
associated with this practice in their e-campaigns; that is, online voter interaction 
and engagement in general was limited. This supports the findings noted by Ward, 
Owen, et al. (2008). 
This study has found that in online voter interaction and engagement, the major 
parties focused on key election policies while minor parties on direct dialogues 
with and between voters. This study has further discovered that most minor party 
leaders keenly participated in direct dialogues with voters, in stark contrast to 
their major counterparts. Collectively, it appears that minor parties tended to 
embrace online interaction with voters more openly and keenly than their major 
counterparts. However, both major parties revealed in interviews that they were 
also highly interested in conversing or discussing with voters in their e-campaigns. 
That remained as an intention in the end, according to the parties, primarily 
because of resource availability. 
Some scholars note that political parties or candidates generally tend to avoid 
interaction with voters in their e-campaigning, predominantly due to the concern 
that it could attract abuse or attacks from their opponents or opponents’ 
supporters, consequently derailing their own campaign agendas (e.g., Coleman, 
2001; Gibson & Ward, 2012; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). Such concern was shared 
by some parties in this study, National, for instance. However, rather than 
desisting from online interaction with voters, they employed online moderation 
to tackle the concern. 
Boas (2008) points out that when a party’s or candidate’s online interaction and 
engagement with voters is carefully framed so that it is closely aligned with the 
party’s or candidate’s ideology and causes, such interaction and engagement lacks 
openness and is propaganda in disguise. Most parties in this study embraced 
conversations and discussions with voters in their e-campaigns. However, those 
conversations and discussions were generally aimed at promoting the parties and 
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their key election policies. In accordance with Boas’ view, those parties’ online 
conversations and discussions with voters could be perceived as propaganda in 
disguise. 
Most parties in this study introduced emergent social media, such as Facebook, as 
part of their e-campaigning in this election. As mentioned, it was chiefly for 
information dissemination; the interactive nature of social media remained 
largely unexploited. The same is noted by Gibson and Cantijoch (2011) as well as 
Karlsson et al. (2013). 
11.2.3 Support mobilisation 
Support mobilisation has been identified in this study, so have all related content 
elements except ‘means for voters to invite their peers to participate in campaign 
events’. However, rarely did a party in this study extensively mobilise voter 
support in e-campaigning. None of the instances noted in the literature depicting 
the innovative use of social media for support mobilisation in the US (e.g., Bimber, 
2014; Gibson, 2012; Graf, 2008; S. Hill, 2009) or anything similar has been 
observed in this study. That said, some parties in this study, such as United Future, 
rallied support with their campaign blogs. This bears some resemblance to Dean’s 
use of blogging for generating and mobilising voter support in a US election, an 
exemplar of support mobilisation with ICTs noted in the literature (Bimber, 2014; 
Gibson, 2012; Gibson & Rommele, 2005; Graf, 2008). 
In the literature, specific instances of support mobilisation in e-campaigning are 
generally sparse and mostly confined to the US context (e.g., Gibson, 2012; Gibson 
& Ward, 2012; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). Therefore, the associated understanding 
is limited. This study has presented various detailed instances of support 
mobilisation, accordingly deepening the understanding of this practice. Among 
those instances, two particularly deserve highlighting because of their creativity: 
one pertains to National encouraging voters to obtain and play its campaign song 
in order to show their support, the other pertains to the Greens inviting voters to 
create web banners endorsing the party and share those banners through the 
party’s website. Those two instances also represent means for party endorsement. 
However, this element, means for voters to endorse the party, is not present in the 
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proposed framework. It therefore suggests the first area of change to the 
framework. In this study, every party’s e-campaign consisted of an element that 
urged voters to cast their votes for the party. This element is clearly associated 
with support mobilisation yet not captured in the proposed framework, therefore 
suggesting a second area of change to the framework. 
Gibson (2012) notes that political scientists in general remain sceptical about the 
mobilisation effects produced by ICTs, despite some studies claiming that there is 
a strong association between e-campaigning and a higher share of votes. One party 
in this study, namely the Progressives shared this scepticism. More specifically, 
the party’s campaign team rejected any online mobilisation in the election because 
it perceived that this particular campaign practice would not lead to any 
favourable outcome. 
11.2.4 Targeted campaigning 
This study has found that targeted campaigning at other political parties as well 
as their policies, also referred to as negative campaigning, was strongly present in 
parties’ e-campaigning. In particular, it is worth highlighting ‘John Key Double 
Talk’, part of Labour’s targeted campaigning at the credibility of the National 
leader, as it strongly resembles McCain’s targeted campaigning at Obama’s 
credibility in the 2008 US presidential election as observed by Stirland (2008) and 
noted in section 2.3.3.4. It is also worth noting the interactive web application 
deployed by Labour to target National’s election policies pertaining to income tax 
and KiwiSaver for its creativity. 
Although targeted campaigning at political opponents and their policies is 
considered to be common in e-campaigning, specific examples of this practice are 
generally limited in the literature. This study has detailed various instances of 
targeted campaigning at other political parties and their policies in cyberspace. 
This therefore enriches the associated knowledge. 
It is suggested that political parties’ or candidates’ negative campaigning may 
depress voter turnout (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002). The parties under study did 
not appear to share that view. More specifically, all parties indicated that while 
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targeting political rivals and, more importantly, their policies, could be at times 
perceived as negative by some, it was widely expected from voters to be a vital 
function of a politician or party. 
This study has found that some political parties, such as ACT, targeted both 
opponents and allies; however, only the former are captured in the proposed 
framework. This suggests a third area of change to the framework. 
This study has observed targeted campaigning at particular voter segments, also 
known as narrowcasting, in parties’ e-campaigning. It is noted in the literature 
that narrowcasting is commonly conducted by focusing on issues that are of 
particular interest to target voters (Bimber, 2014; S. Hill, 2009; Ward, Owen, et al., 
2008). This has been observed in National’s e-campaign; for instance, National 
targeted its supporters aged 60 and over by deploying a dedicated sub-site called 
SuperBlues, focusing solely on the party’s policies especially relevant to senior 
citizens, such as aged care. United Future’s and the Progressives’ narrowcasting is 
also noteworthy for representing a variant of the practice. More specifically, both 
minor parties targeted beyond, as opposed to within, their own voter bases – 
United Future targeted both National’s and Labour’s voter bases and the 
Progressives targeted New Zealand First’s voter base. The tailored campaign 
messages delivered by both parties simply urged the targeted voters to switch 
their votes to the parties as opposed to focusing on any specific issues particularly 
significant to them. Taken together, therefore, both parties’ narrowcasting aimed 
to expand their existing voter bases as opposed to maximising the impact of 
information dissemination. This alternative form of narrowcasting, however, is 
not commonly noted in the literature. 
This study has found that parties targeted particular voter segments with 
ubiquitous, simple web technologies and applications, such as blogs, instead of 
unique, sophisticated ones as observed in Obama’s e-campaigning in 2008 (e.g., 
Bimber, 2014). This, according to some of the parties, was chiefly due to resource 
availability. 
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11.2.5 Resource generation 
Resource generation and all associated content elements have been observed in 
this study. However, rarely did all content elements related to this practice feature 
in a party’s e-campaign. 
In the literature, resource generation, particularly fundraising, is an intriguing 
aspect of e-campaigning, as it often exhibits creativity, diversity, and compelling 
results (e.g., Bimber, 2014; S. Hill, 2009). For instance, as noted in section 2.3.3.5, 
Edwards, a candidate in the 2008 US Democratic primaries, raised campaign 
donations of $300,000 within a week from a video that he posted on YouTube 
featuring him and his campaign strategist making a pecan pie. 
In stark contrast, this study has hardly discerned any creativity or diversity in 
parties’ online resource generation. More specifically, all parties raised campaign 
resources online with generally identical, passive, and conventional approaches 
that relied on visitors taking the initiative to complete and submit relevant web 
forms, except the Progressives and the Greens – the former excluded resource 
generation from its campaign website and the latter generated campaign 
resources from its online merchandise store as well. While the parties in this study 
were all content with the results of their online resource generation, those results, 
according to the parties, were incomparable with many of their overseas 
counterparts’, especially Obama’s. Put shortly, in this study, rarely did a party’s 
online resource generation exhibit creativity, diversity, or compelling results. 
11.2.6 Summary 
The above discussion encompasses various aspects that support, contradict, or 
extend the existing knowledge relating to e-campaigning utilisation. Moreover, 
this study reinforces the observations in the literature that e-campaigning 
utilisation varied within the same election, and innovative e-campaigning beyond 
the US context is the exception rather than the norm. 
While the proposed framework in general is empirically relevant, accurate, and 
adequate, three minor areas of change have been suggested in order to enhance 
the framework. First, ‘means for voters to endorse the political party’ should be 
 253 
incorporated as a content element for support mobilisation. Second, ‘means to 
encourage votes’ should be incorporated as another content element for the same 
practice. Third, both ‘content targeted at political opponents’ and ‘content 
targeted at political opponents’ policies’ should be respectively rephrased as 
‘content targeted political counterparts’ and ‘content targeted at political 
counterparts’ policies’, in order to reflect the phenomenon that has been observed 
in this study where not only political opponents or their policies but also political 
allies or their policies were targeted. Table 11.1 depicts the revised framework for 
e-campaigning utilisation. 
Table 11.1 Revised e-campaigning framework 
Campaign practice Content elements 
Information dissemination 
Political party's information 
Candidate biography 
Press releases 
Policy statements 
Campaign news 
Campaign events 
Speeches 
Contact information 
Information relating to the political party's other online presence 
Campaign blog without visitor comments allowed 
Voter interaction and 
engagement 
Instant chat or messaging 
Instant opinion polls 
Instant surveys 
Applications for interacting with the political party's policies 
Interactive calendar of campaign events 
Means to contact the political party 
Discussion forums 
Campaign blog with visitor comments allowed 
Means to provide feedback 
Support mobilisation 
Means for voters to invite their peers to participate in campaign 
events 
Means to inform voters of electoral information 
Means for voters to receive campaign information and updates 
Means for voters to connect with supporter groups 
Means for voters to download campaign material 
Means for voters to forward campaign material to others 
Means for voters to endorse the political party 
Means to encourage votes 
Targeted campaigning 
Content targeted at political counterparts 
Content targeted at political counterparts' policies 
Content targeted at specific voter segments 
Resource generation 
Means to make donations 
Online merchandise shop 
Means to become a party member 
Means to become a volunteer 
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11.3 The factors influencing the parties’ e-
campaigning utilisation 
This section is organised according to the factors that influenced the six political 
parties’ e-campaigning utilisation in this study, namely, election type, electoral 
regulations, voters’ technology access, resource availability, subjective norm, 
image, job relevance, output quality, result demonstrability, and perceived ease of 
use. This section is concluded with a brief summary. 
11.3.1 Election type 
It is believed in the literature that e-campaigning utilisation is influenced by 
election type, party- or candidate-led (e.g., Anstead & Chadwick, 2009; Gibson & 
Ward, 2012; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). Notably, Anstead and Chadwick (2009) 
theorise that in party-led elections, campaign teams can capitalise on their parties’ 
long-established public profiles, mostly offline communication networks, party 
membership, and stable resources for election campaigning, thereby dampening 
e-campaigning utilisation. In stark contrast, according to Anstead and Chadwick, 
the absence or limited presence of public profiles, offline communication 
networks, permanent loyalists, and stable resources for election campaigning in 
candidate-led elections propels e-campaigning utilisation in order to rapidly 
establish those critical campaign elements. It can be inferred from Anstead and 
Chadwick’s theory that the impact of election type on e-campaigning utilisation 
consists of two sides: positive and negative, and only the negative side is present 
in party-led elections. 
The impact of election type has been identified in this study. Some parties, such as 
National, indicated that party-led elections discouraged e-campaigning utilisation. 
However, their rationale differs from Anstead and Chadwick’s (2009). More 
specifically, those parties pointed out that party-led elections typically entailed a 
more complex and hierarchical decision-making process, which often depressed 
e-campaigning utilisation by causing distractions, frustration, or delay. Some 
parties, such as the Greens, observed that party-led elections were in fact 
beneficial to e-campaigning utilisation. According to those parties, it was the 
distinguishing features of party-led elections, party membership in particular, that 
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enabled them to broaden their e-campaigning vision and alleviate their internal 
resource gaps. This finding is irreconcilable with Anstead and Chadwick’s premise 
that the prominence of party profiles, communication networks, party 
membership, and stable resources in party-led elections dampens e-campaigning 
utilisation, and the common belief that the impact of party-led elections on e-
campaigning utilisation is only negative. 
This study has observed in one instance that the impact of election type was 
moderated by another factor. More specifically, there was an occasion in 
National’s e-campaigning where the negative impact of party-led elections was 
moderated by result demonstrability. That the impact of election type is subject to 
the moderation of another factor, however, is not present in the literature. 
11.3.2 Electoral regulations 
It is commonly considered in the literature that e-campaigning utilisation is 
shaped by electoral regulations (e.g., Anstead, 2008; Gibson et al., 2008; Kluver, 
2008; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). For instance, in the US, electoral regulations 
prohibit institutional campaign donations and impose a strict limit on an 
individual’s campaign donations. Further, spending on election campaigning is 
uncapped. These accordingly motivate the campaign teams to embrace online 
fundraising (Anstead, 2008). In the UK, electoral regulations permit institutional 
campaign donations and do not impose any limit on campaign donations. However, 
strict spending caps are imposed on election campaigning. These, as a result, 
discourage the campaign teams from fully engaging in Internet fundraising 
(Anstead, 2008). Those examples also suggest that the impact of electoral 
regulations on e-campaigning utilisation comprises two facets: positive and 
negative. 
The majority of the parties in this study discerned the impact of electoral 
regulations. Rarely, the factor propelled some parties’ e-campaigning utilisation. 
For instance, the Progressives’ deployment of a new website specifically for its e-
campaign was partly stimulated by the EFA 2007. However, the factor mostly 
dampened e-campaigning utilisation. Notably, Labour restricted voter interaction 
and engagement in its e-campaigning because of the election spending cap. 
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In National’s e-campaigning, the negative impact of electoral regulations was 
moderated by subjective norm. In other words, the impact of electoral regulations 
could be moderated by another factor. This finding is not present in the literature. 
11.3.3 Voters’ technology access 
It is suggested in the literature that e-campaigning utilisation is guided by voters’ 
technology access (e.g., Dader, 2008; Hameed, 2007; Wlezien, 2014). More 
specifically, a high level of technology access tends to elevate e-campaigning 
utilisation, conversely, a low level of technology access often depresses e-
campaigning utilisation (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). For instance, in countries such 
as Indonesia and Spain where voters’ access to ICTs is low or modest, e-
campaigning utilisation is limited; in countries such as the UK and the US where 
levels of technology access are high, expansive e-campaigning utilisation is 
commonly observed (Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). It can be inferred that the impact 
of voters’ technology access comprises two sides: positive and negative. 
Nearly all parties in this study indicated that voters’ technology access was a 
crucial factor in their e-campaigning utilisation. All those parties found that the 
rapid increase of broadband access in the country just before the election 
incentivised them to incorporate online videos for the first time or more online 
videos in their e-campaigning. The Greens further indicated that increased 
broadband access was a key stimulus for its innovative approach to support 
mobilisation that encouraged voters to create and share their own Green web 
banners. But meanwhile, all those parties suggested that voters’ technology access 
restricted their e-campaigning utilisation. Notably, Labour revealed that it did not 
pursue a more interactive, personalised, and seamless e-campaign operating on a 
smartphone in the election because the number of voters with access to the 
technology was fractional. 
It is pointed out in the literature that e-campaigning utilisation in Singapore is 
restricted despite voters’ technology access being rated high (Kluver, 2008; Ward, 
Owen, et al., 2008). This is considered to be attributable to Singapore’s stringent 
electoral regulations (Kluver, 2008; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). It can be inferred 
that the impact of voters’ technology access is subject to the moderation of another 
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factor. This is evident in this study. For instance, the high level of mobile phone 
access in New Zealand stimulated Labour to consider deploying a text campaign 
as part of the party’s e-campaigning. That was not realised in the end due in part 
to the EFA 2007. 
11.3.4 Resource availability 
It is widely recognised in the literature that a party’s or candidate’s e-campaigning 
utilisation strongly hinges on the campaign resources available to the party or 
candidate (e.g., Margolis et al., 2003; Small, 2008; Ward, Owen, et al., 2008). There 
are two main theses, namely equalisation and normalisation, concerning the 
impact of resource availability on parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation. 
The equalisation thesis holds that parties or candidates with limited campaign 
resources tend to embrace e-campaigning more expansively and extensively 
(Gibson & McAllister, 2014; Small, 2008). In stark contrast, the normalisation 
thesis argues that a high level of campaign resources encourages, whereas a low 
level of campaign resources discourages, e-campaigning utilisation (Gibson & 
McAllister, 2014; Margolis et al., 2003; Small, 2008). Accordingly, it is asserted that 
major parties’ e-campaigning utilisation is considerably more expansive and 
sophisticated than their minor counterparts’ because major parties possess a 
significant resource advantage. It can be inferred that the impact of resource 
availability on e-campaigning utilisation includes two facets: positive and negative. 
All parties in this study indicated that their e-campaigning utilisation was 
considerably shaped by the availability of their campaign resources. Almost all 
parties expressed that their e-campaigning utilisation was motivated by the lack 
of campaign resources, seemingly supporting the equalisation thesis. However, 
such motivation was brief or highly limited. As those parties further engaged in e-
campaigning, they all found that advanced, professional, sophisticated e-
campaigning required immense campaign resources, and their e-campaigning 
utilisation was substantially undermined by resource poverty. Thus, this study 
supports the premise that a high level of campaign resources encourages, whereas 
limited campaign resources discourages, e-campaigning utilisation. On that note, 
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some political scientists’ argument, noted by Small (2008), that the normalisation 
thesis is less visible in party-led elections is not evident in this study. 
This study has observed that major parties’ e-campaigns appeared to be more 
advanced and sophisticated than their minor counterparts’ in some aspects, take, 
for instance, National’s targeted campaigning at specific voters, Labour’s targeted 
campaigning at National and Key, and National’s and Labour’s online applications 
for voters to interact with the parties’ key policies. However, in other areas minor 
parties’ e-campaigns seemed more advanced and sophisticated than their major 
counterparts’, such as United Future’s online opinion polls and discussion forum, 
and the Greens’ online merchandise shop. Taken together, therefore, the assertion 
that major parties’ e-campaigning utilisation in general is more expansive and 
sophisticated than their minor counterparts’ is not completely supported in this 
study. 
In this study both major parties strongly refuted that they possessed any 
significant resource advantage over their minor counterparts, contrary to 
common belief in the literature. This study has identified three aspects to 
understand this contradiction. First, according to both National’s and Labour’s 
campaign teams, e-campaigning was considered to be resource-friendly by many 
senior party members. Those members did not realise that the resource-
friendliness of e-campaigning was only superficial, and advanced, professional, 
sophisticated e-campaigning was in fact resource-intensive. Second, according to 
Labour’s campaign team, e-campaigning was perceived to be a temporary event 
with a short-term focus within the party. Last, according to both parties’ campaign 
teams, campaign resources were finite, and offline campaigning was increasingly 
expensive and still took precedence over e-campaigning. Each aspect not only 
constrained the allocation of campaign resources for e-campaigning utilisation but 
also hindered further resource commitment, thereby diminishing any potential 
resource advantage. It is also worth pointing out that the last aspect echoes Ward, 
Owen, et al.’s assertion (2008, p. 267) that when political parties or candidates are 
forced to ‘choose between traditional and new modes of campaigning in the 
allocation of resources’, the latter, such as e-campaigning, often ranks ‘relatively 
low in the priority list’. 
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It is worth reiterating the claim made by National’s campaign team that had its 
campaign resources been comparable in scale to some of its overseas counterparts’ 
such as Obama’s, National’s e-campaign would have been no less creative than 
theirs. This presents a perspective for understanding the scarcity of innovative e-
campaigning in the election. 
This study has found that the impact of resource availability on e-campaigning 
utilisation is subject to the moderation of another factor, which is not present in 
the literature. For example, National’s campaign team did not initially intend to 
host campaign videos on its own because of resource availability. This was 
moderated by the strong advice from National’s senior members and focus groups 
– in other words, subjective norm. 
11.3.5 Subjective norm 
Based on Venkatesh and Davis’ (2000) reasoning, this factor suggests that how e-
campaigning is utilised by a campaign team is guided by the team’s perception 
relating to how people who are important to the team behave or what they suggest. 
This implies that the impact of subjective norm consists of two facets: positive and 
negative. 
Almost all parties in this study observed the impact of subjective norm on their e-
campaigning utilisation. They all suggested that some parts of their e-campaigning 
were motivated by the factor. For instance, Labour’s campaign team perceived 
that targeted campaigning at political opponents was widely practised by its 
overseas counterparts and accepted by many voters, this consequently inspired 
the party to fiercely and extensively attack National and Key in its e-campaigning. 
Half of the parties in this study claimed that they were discouraged to employ 
some e-campaigning approaches because of the factor. For instance, although 
Twitter became increasingly popular in New Zealand during the election, the 
Greens’ campaign team did not perceive that it was widely expected by the party’s 
supporters to feature the social media as part of the Greens’ e-campaign; Twitter 
was consequently excluded. 
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This study has distinguished three types of ‘people’ whose opinions or behaviour 
mattered to the campaign teams, namely, political rivals, overseas counterparts, 
and voters. It is worth noting that references to subjective norm in existing e-
campaigning studies feature only the first type, namely political rivals (e.g., 
Dezelan et al., 2014; Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2002; Gibson, 2012). 
Farrell and Schmitt-Beck (2002) theorise that competitive pressure motivates 
innovative and polished e-campaigning. While it is not evident in this study that 
competitive pressure inspires innovative e-campaigning, some parties, such as the 
Greens, indicated that mounting competitive pressure propelled them to 
professionalise and sophisticate their e-campaigns. Thus, Farrell and Schmitt-
Beck’s theory pertaining to the impact of competitive pressure on e-campaigning 
utilisation is partially supported by this study. 
It is worth reiterating the remark of the Greens’ campaign team that campaign 
teams’ e-campaigning utilisation mirrored technology utilisation in commercial 
sectors; that is, instead of being innovative, the majority tended to follow. This 
comment not only indicates the role of subjective norm in e-campaigning 
utilisation but also presents an alternative perspective for understanding the 
sparsity of innovative e-campaigning in the election. 
Venkatesh and Davis (2000) suggest that the impact of subjective norm is subject 
to the moderation of voluntariness and experience. This does not appear evident 
in this study. However, this study has discovered that the impact of subjective 
norm could be moderated by another factor. For instance, ACT’s campaign team 
sensed a strong expectation from its supporters that the party would deliver a 
more expansive and creative e-campaign, however, resource poverty hindered the 
team from fulfilling the expectation; in other words, the impact of subjective norm 
was moderated by resource availability. 
11.3.6 Image 
Based on Venkatesh and Davis’ (2000) reasoning, this factor suggests that how e-
campaigning is utilised by a campaign team is shaped by the team’s perception 
relating to the resulting impact on the political image of the party with which the 
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team associates. This implies that the impact of image consists of two sides: 
positive and negative. 
This study has found that image played a profound role in e-campaigning 
utilisation. All parties indicated that this factor motivated various aspects of their 
e-campaigning utilisation. For instance, ACT attacked its close ally National in its 
e-campaign because the party perceived that it would promote an image to the 
public that despite being minor, the party was independent in its views and not 
hesitant to take a stand. Most parties claimed that concern over their political 
image deterred them from considering certain e-campaigning approaches. For 
instance, the Progressives decided not to promote all of its election policies in its 
e-campaign because the party perceived that it would have ‘instantly looked like 
a political party with very little credibility’ otherwise. This study has shown that 
in the context of e-campaigning, the factor image pertains to public perception, 
appearance, appeal, brand, or credibility. 
It is suggested in e-campaigning research that consideration of political image 
forms a driver of professional, sophisticated e-campaigning. This study concurs. 
For instance, all campaign videos in the Progressives’ e-campaign were 
professionally produced and highly polished, owing to the perception that it would 
promote the Progressives as a conscientious, sharp, and polished party to the 
voting public. 
Venkatesh and Davis (2000) hold that image is influenced by subjective norm. This 
does not appear to be evident in this study. However, this study has found that the 
impact of image is subject to the moderation of another factor. For instance, 
initially, Labour’s campaign team did not intend to incorporate Facebook in its e-
campaigning because that was believed to potentially damage Labour’s image. 
This, however, was changed in the end because the team sensed a strong 
expectation from voters to do so – in other words, the impact of image was 
moderated by subjective norm. 
 262 
11.3.7 Job relevance 
Based on Venkatesh and Davis’ (2000) reasoning, this factor suggests that how e-
campaigning is utilised by a campaign team is informed by its applicability as 
perceived by the team. This implies that the impact of job relevance on e-
campaigning utilisation comprises two dimensions: positive and negative. 
Most parties in this study acknowledged that their perceptions relating to job 
relevance influenced their e-campaigning utilisation. Most of them indicated that 
this factor encouraged various aspects of their e-campaigning. For instance, the 
Progressives believed that it was essential for a political party to take aim at their 
opponents, especially in an election. This judgement resulted in the Progressives 
extensively attacking National in its e-campaigning. Most parties also suggested 
that their judgements relating to job relevance discouraged them from conducting 
e-campaigning in certain ways. For instance, National believed that despite their 
popularity, Bebo, Myspace, and LinkedIn bore no relevance to the purpose of 
election campaigning. Consequently the party did not campaign on those social 
networking sites. 
Venkatesh and Davis (2000) note that the impact of job relevance is subject to the 
moderation of output quality. This has not been observed in this study. That said, 
this study has found on one occasion in Labour’s e-campaigning that the impact of 
job relevance was moderated by another factor. More specifically, the party did 
not initially intend to incorporate Facebook as part of its e-campaigning because 
the social networking site was deemed highly irrelevant to election campaigning. 
This, however, was overturned in the end as Labour sensed a strong expectation 
from voters to do so – in other words, the impact of job relevance was moderated 
by subjective norm. 
11.3.8 Output quality 
Based on Venkatesh and Davis’ (2000) reasoning, this factor suggests that how e-
campaigning is utilised by a campaign team is affected by how well it performs as 
perceived by the team. This implies that the impact of output quality on e-
campaigning utilisation consists of two facets: positive and negative. 
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All parties in this study experienced the impact of output quality on their e-
campaigning utilisation. They all indicated that this factor motivated parts of their 
e-campaigning. For instance, ACT disseminated its key election policies also in 
Chinese because that was believed to best allow the party to develop a bond and 
trust with Chinese voters. Meanwhile, all parties suggested that their perceptions 
of output quality dampened their e-campaigning utilisation. For instance, United 
Future did not believe e-campaigning would outperform, or perform as well as, 
offline campaigning in securing party leader Dunne’s hold of his electorate. 
Consequently, despite being the core focus of United Future’s election 
campaigning, Dunne’s candidacy was absent from United Future’s e-campaigning. 
This study has identified on one occasion in the Greens’ e-campaigning that the 
impact of output quality was subject to the moderation of another factor, which is 
not present in the literature. More specifically, the Greens believed that 
campaigning in the newspaper produced the strongest impact. However, the party 
did not have sufficient resources to fund that; consequently, the party opted for e-
campaigning – in other words, the impact of output quality was moderated by 
resource availability. 
11.3.9 Result demonstrability 
Based on Venkatesh and Davis’ (2000) reasoning, this factor suggest that how e-
campaigning is utilised by a campaign team is influenced by how tangible the 
results are to the team. This implies that the impact of result demonstrability on 
e-campaigning utilisation comprises two sides: positive and negative. 
Over half of the parties in this study suggested that their e-campaigning utilisation 
was affected by result demonstrability. Almost all of them indicated that segments 
of their e-campaigns were encouraged by this factor. For instance, online videos 
were extensively utilised in National’s e-campaign because they produced tangible 
results. Some parties also suggested that result demonstrability discouraged their 
e-campaigning utilisation. For instance, United Future felt that in contrast to 
offline campaigning, e-campaigning often did not clearly indicate its impact to the 
party; consequently, the party restricted its e-campaigning utilisation and 
primarily engaged in offline campaigning. 
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This study has found that result demonstrability chiefly applied to a novel 
technology, application, or e-campaigning approach. This suggests a limited scope 
of influence pertaining to this factor. Some parties in this study, such as the Greens, 
pointed out that their knowledge relating to when, where, and how to discern the 
results or impact of e-campaigning was highly limited; also, many aspects of e-
campaigning did not usually produce tangible results but were still essential. 
Therefore, those parties were wary of reacting to result demonstrability alone. 
It is worth reiterating the remark of United Future’s campaign team that ‘If you 
have lots of resources, you could give most things [related to e-campaigning] a go 
and be less concerned about whether you’re going to see anything concrete out of 
it. But it’s a totally different story if you have very limited resources.’ This suggests 
that the impact of result demonstrability could be moderated by resource 
availability. 
11.3.10 Perceived ease of use 
Based on Venkatesh and Davis’ (2000) reasoning, this factor suggests that how e-
campaigning is utilised by a team is orientated by how free of effort it is as 
perceived by the team. This implies that the impact induced by perceived ease of 
use on e-campaigning utilisation involves two facets: positive and negative. 
Half of the parties in this study observed the impact of perceived ease of use. They 
all indicated that parts of their e-campaigning utilisation were encouraged by this 
factor. For instance, online videos were extensively utilised in National’s e-
campaign because they were perceived by the party’s campaign team to be simple 
and straightforward to produce and deploy. Some parties also claimed that their 
e-campaigning utilisation was limited by perceived ease of use. For instance, 
Labour found it challenging to shift the interest and focus of ‘Facebookers’ from 
socialising with others to engaging with the party’s election campaign; 
consequently, Labour’s campaigning on Facebook was extremely limited. 
As noted, TAM research is divided on the relevance of perceived ease of use when 
the target technology or system is Internet-based (Y. Lee et al., 2003). More 
specifically, some assert that Internet-based technologies or systems are general-
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purpose and therefore inherently relatively easy to use; consequently, perceived 
ease of use is inconsequential. Others disagree, arguing that perceived ease of use 
remains relevant in the Internet context when specialist tasks, such as online 
purchasing, are being performed. This counterargument is supported by this 
study – as noted, half of the parties in this study reported that their e-campaigning 
utilisation was informed by perceived ease of use. 
11.3.11 Summary 
The discussion above pertains to the factors that influenced the e-campaigning 
utilisation of the six political parties in this study. It encompasses various aspects 
that support, contradict, or extend the current knowledge of e-campaigning and 
IS. Notably, this study has discovered that long-established public profiles and 
offline communication networks, party membership, and stable resources 
encouraged, as opposed to dampened, e-campaigning utilisation; resource 
poverty stimulated e-campaigning utilisation only superficially; major parties did 
not deliver more advanced and sophisticated e-campaigns in all practices than 
their minor counterparts; major parties did not necessarily possess a significant 
resource advantage over their minor counterparts in e-campaigning; the scarcity 
of innovative e-campaigning was related to two factors, namely resource 
availability and subjective norm; image was a driver of professional, sophisticated 
e-campaigning; and perceived ease of use remained relevant in the Internet 
context when specialist tasks were performed. 
The impact of any given factor in this study has been found to consist of two facets: 
positive and negative, which, however, was not experienced by all parties. This 
suggests that each factor could be an enabler as well as an inhibitor of e-
campaigning utilisation, depending on the campaign team and context. Put 
differently, the duality of the impact induced by any factor in this study is 
organisational and contextual. Furthermore, this study has discovered that the 
impact of any given factor except perceived ease of use was subject to the 
moderation of another factor, again, depending on the campaign team and context. 
Taken together, it evinces that e-campaigning utilisation is complex, contextual, 
diverse, and dynamic. In general, the ten factors in this study are empirically 
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relevant, accurate, and adequate. This study has also demonstrated that a 
multidisciplinary approach is crucial to adequately explain e-campaigning 
utilisation; in other words, it is highly insufficient to rely on the political science 
or IS discipline alone to understand factors influencing e-campaigning utilisation. 
11.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented a discussion focusing on the two research questions, 
based on the main findings from both academic literature and the empirical data. 
The discussion in section 11.2 has addressed the first research question, and the 
discussion in section 11.3 has addressed the second research question. Any 
suggested changes to the initial conceptualisation of e-campaigning have also been 
covered. 
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Chapter 12 Conclusion 
12.1 Chapter introduction 
This is the final thesis chapter. It proceeds as follows: section 12.2 illustrates the 
contributions of this study; section 12.3 outlines the limitations; section 12.4 
suggests avenues for future e-campaigning research; and last, section 12.5 
presents concluding remarks. 
12.2 Research contributions 
This comprehensive empirical study contributes to both academic research and e-
campaigning practitioners. This section is structured accordingly. 
12.2.1 Contributions to academic research 
This study contributes to scholarly research in six areas. First, it is recognised that 
due to its nature, e-campaigning research can greatly benefit from involving other 
technology-related disciplines such as IS (McGrath et al., 2012; Norris, 2001; 
Wattal et al., 2010). However, e-campaigning studies so far have been conducted 
almost solely by political scientists. This study is one of the few that responds to 
calls for a multidisciplinary approach in e-campaigning research by adopting both 
the political science and IS disciplines. As a result, it has provided fresh and unique 
insights, especially concerning factors that influence e-campaigning utilisation. 
Second, although e-campaigning research began about two decades ago, empirical 
knowledge of the phenomenon is limited. Notably, differing from other social 
phenomena, the e-campaigning phenomenon occurs only periodically with 
considerably long intervals in between. In other words, access to the e-
campaigning phenomenon is highly restricted. Further, existing empirical e-
campaigning studies are highly geographically concentrated (Ward, Owen, et al., 
2008). More specifically, most empirical e-campaigning studies in the literature 
focus on European and US contexts. This study is not only empirical but also 
situated in New Zealand, a small democracy rarely investigated in existing e-
campaigning research. This is therefore a valuable contribution to e-campaigning 
research. 
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Third, political parties’ or candidates’ campaign teams are an integral component 
of the e-campaigning phenomenon. It is therefore crucial to involve them as 
research participants in e-campaigning studies, particularly the ones that pertain 
to explaining e-campaigning utilisation, in order to gain insights into the 
phenomenon. However, little prior e-campaigning research has done so. This, 
according to Lilleker and Vedel (2013), is chiefly due to the difficulty in accessing 
campaign teams. This study has involved six of eight possible campaign teams, 
including all the major parties’, in the election under research. Therefore, the 
empirical understanding offered by this study, particularly concerning factors that 
influence e-campaigning utilisation, is highly comprehensive, inclusive, and 
representative, which forms a significant contribution to scholarly research. 
Fourth, as demonstrated comprehensively in the Discussion chapter, this study 
confirms, contradicts, as well as extends the existing understanding of e-
campaigning, which constitutes another major contribution to scholarly research. 
For instance, in line with existing e-campaigning research, this study has found 
that e-campaigning utilisation varied noticeably within the same election, even in 
a small, arguably homogeneous democracy, namely New Zealand, with relatively 
equal access to technologies. In stark contrast to common belief in existing e-
campaigning research, this study has illustrated that party-led elections could be 
beneficial to e-campaigning utilisation. Largely novel in existing e-campaigning 
research, this study has discovered that among the factors that influenced the 
political parties’ e-campaigning in the election, the impact of any given factor 
except perceived ease of use was subject to the moderation of another factor, 
depending on the campaign team and context; put differently, this study has found 
e-campaigning utilisation to be highly dynamic and the associated dynamics to be 
immensely contextual, organisational, and therefore unpredictable. 
Fifth, a conceptual framework is essential to understand, describe, and compare 
increasingly complex and sophisticated e-campaigns. Various e-campaigning 
frameworks can be found in the literature. They, however, exhibit three main 
issues, namely, a lack of academic rigour, the orientation of campaign practices, 
and variation in the coverage of campaign practices. These issues potentially 
undermine research and knowledge relating to campaign teams’ e-campaigning 
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utilisation. This study has proposed a new framework, based on an extensive 
review of existing studies, addressing the three identified issues. The a priori 
framework has then been used to frame comprehensive empirical data analysis 
and subsequently extended and refined. Put differently, this study has devised a 
framework that is theoretically-based, empirically grounded, extensible, and built 
on a uniquely comprehensive and representative evidence base. The framework 
proposed in this study therefore has a superior theoretical and empirical 
grounding to previous frameworks and can be employed with confidence to 
analyse subsequent e-campaigns. 
Last, from both e-campaigning and IS literature, this study has identified ten 
factors to explain campaign teams’ e-campaigning utilisation. While both external 
and internal factors have been considered, this study has particularly focused on 
the latter. To that end, it has alleviated an issue identified by this study as well as 
Marcinkowski and Metag (2014) that existing factors in e-campaigning research 
are chiefly external to campaign teams, consequently, they are inadequate for 
explaining e-campaigning utilisation within the same election. Further, the ten 
factors have been empirically studied. Collectively, it represents another 
contribution of this study to e-campaigning research because the factors presently 
in e-campaigning research are highly limited, mainly external, and mostly 
hypothetical. 
12.2.2 Contributions to e-campaigning practitioners 
Half of the campaign teams in this study noted that e-campaigning evaluation was 
vital, yet their evaluations were narrow, unsophisticated, and unreliable. This, 
according to them, was largely due to the lack of a robust and holistic view of e-
campaigning. The e-campaigning framework proposed in this study is based on a 
comprehensive review of scholarly studies and has been empirically applied, it 
therefore could serve as an instrument for campaign teams to conduct more 
robust and holistic assessments of e-campaigning. 
The e-campaigning framework proposed in this study could also serve as an 
instrument for campaign teams to systematically plan and implement their e-
campaigns. Further, this study has identified and discussed a wide range of factors 
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influencing e-campaigning utilisation, which could inform the planning and 
implementation of e-campaigns. 
12.3 Research limitations 
This study consists of four main limitations. First, this study focuses on one 
election cycle within one country as well as only one form of election – party-led. 
Thus, the generalisability of the empirical findings is restricted. 
Second, Lilleker and Vedel (2013, p. 405) point out that although content analysis 
is most frequently employed for analysing e-campaigns, a notable limitation is that 
‘it can only categorise features and make assumptions about the experiences that 
are enabled but not necessarily realised; it remains more difficult to assess what 
experiences are actually provided.’ This limitation could be addressed by 
including voter perspectives. Since this study employs content analysis and 
excludes voter perspectives, the limitation indicated by Lilleker and Vedel is 
present. 
Third, new content elements, campaign practices, and factors influencing e-
campaigning utilisation are likely to continue to emerge, based on technology, 
political practices (although these have been surprisingly stable even in 
technology-mediated environments), or the introduction of a new theoretical lens. 
Therefore, neither the e-campaigning framework proposed in this study nor the 
factors discussed in this study should be considered as exhaustive or ‘finished’ in 
other words. 
Last, the ten factors influencing e-campaigning utilisation considered in this study 
are for explaining e-campaigning utilisation only. As demonstrated extensively in 
this study, it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict e-campaigning utilisation with 
those factors because e-campaigning utilisation is complex, contextual, diverse, 
and dynamic. 
12.4 Avenues for future research 
Based on the findings, contributions, and limitations of this study, several avenues 
for future research are illuminated. First, more empirical e-campaigning studies 
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should be conducted, especially with a multidisciplinary approach, in different 
contexts, on different levels, and involving campaign teams or voters as research 
participants. Second, the e-campaigning framework proposed in this study should 
be applied in further empirical research in order to assess its empirical relevancy, 
accuracy, and adequacy. Third, longitudinal e-campaigning studies should be 
considered in order to chart both the evolution and consequences of e-
campaigning. Further, in explaining the six parliamentary parties’ e-campaigning 
utilisation in the 2008 New Zealand general election, this study has empirically 
explored the factors that influenced those parties’ e-campaigning utilisation, their 
different impacts, their various interactions, as well as the associated contexts. 
However, this study has not ultimately formulated a new theory or a causal model. 
This is quite appropriate considering that, as noted, research pertaining to factors 
influencing parties’ or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation is still in its infancy 
and the factors commonly noted in existing e-campaigning research, namely, 
election type, electoral regulations, voters’ technology access, and resource 
availability, are mostly theoretically-based only. Subsequent research should 
continue to empirically investigate factors that influence parties’ or candidates’ e-
campaigning utilisation – either those in this study or new factors, their impacts, 
their possible interactions, their associated contexts, and possible new entities 
within the e-campaigning phenomenon. And with that as well as the empirical 
understanding offered by this study, subsequent e-campaigning research should 
posit a new theory or a causal model that explains (as demonstrated 
comprehensively in this study, it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict) parties’ 
or candidates’ e-campaigning utilisation. A theory or a causal model that is 
empirically grounded, or with an empirical dimension, in other words, is 
immensely significant and beneficial. Notably, it could enable positivist or 
postpositivist researchers to better discern or comprehend the fundamental 
structure of the e-campaigning phenomenon; it could also serve as a fine 
instrument for constructivist researchers to discover or interpret different 
realities relating to the e-campaigning phenomenon. 
This study has demonstrated that IS can provide unique and valuable insights into 
the e-campaigning phenomenon. Therefore, more IS scholars should join their 
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political science colleagues in future e-campaigning research, particularly in areas 
concerning knowledge management and sharing, outsourcing, and virtual 
collaboration. Seen from another perspective, the characteristics of e-
campaigning as highly situated, temporary, and occurring at intervals separated 
by long periods of time with little or no activity represent a unique form of IS to 
those that exist in the more usually studied organisational context. There are likely 
to be unique IS challenges in the management of e-campaigning, for instance, in 
knowledge retention, organisational learning, and technology maturity, which 
also warrant further study. 
12.5 Concluding remarks 
E-campaigning research began in the 1990s when Clinton deployed a website for 
his first presidential election campaign. Yet, the e-campaigning phenomenon 
remains largely unexplored and unexplained, mainly due to limited access to the 
e-campaigning phenomenon, the narrow and geographical concentration of e-
campaigning research, the quickening pace of technological advancement, the 
accessibility of campaign teams as research participants, and a dearth of 
multidisciplinary research. Because of that, this study has empirically explored 
and explained six parliamentary parties’ e-campaigning utilisation in the 2008 
New Zealand general election with both political science and IS perspectives and 
a qualitative multiple-case research approach. 
This study has discovered that the six parties’ e-campaigning utilisation varied 
markedly beyond information dissemination and targeted campaigning at 
political counterparts, despite the underlying technologies and applications being 
almost identical. It has also found that innovative e-campaigning was the 
exception rather than the norm. While social media, such as Facebook, was 
introduced as part of almost all parties’ e-campaigning, it was chiefly intended for 
information dissemination, its interactive nature was hardly exploited. In online 
voter interaction and engagement, the major parties focused on key election 
policies while their minor counterparts on dialogues with and between voters. 
Many parties also targeted specific voter segments in their e-campaigning, 
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however, the level of sophistication varied widely. Resource generation exhibited 
the least creativity in almost all parties’ e-campaigning. 
Interestingly, campaign practices in all parties’ e-campaigning appeared to be 
stable, with the practices adopted by the various parties all well recognised from 
political science literature. However, the application of ICTs to those practices was 
very diverse. This then raises an interesting question: Are political parties just 
continuing to do what they know and understand, with a bit of technology ‘thrown 
in’, rather than genuinely harnessing opportunities for new forms of election 
campaigning? 
This study has illustrated that e-campaigning utilisation is attributable to diverse 
factors, both external and internal to campaign teams, both objective and 
subjective, and both technology-related and non-technology-related. This clearly 
indicates that any adequate explanation for e-campaigning utilisation is 
multifactorial and, more importantly, a multidisciplinary approach is pivotal to 
investigating the e-campaigning phenomenon. The impact of any given factor in 
this study consists of both positive and negative sides. This, however, was not 
experienced by every party under study, meaning that a given factor in this study 
can be an enabler or inhibitor of e-campaigning utilisation and it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to predict. Further, this study has demonstrated that the impact of 
almost any given factor is subject to the moderation of another factor. However, it 
is virtually impossible to predict which factor will moderate the impact of another 
factor and when. Taken together, it evinces that e-campaigning utilisation is 
complex, contextual, diverse, and dynamic. 
While the complex, contextual, diverse, and dynamic nature of the e-campaigning 
phenomenon undermines the generalisability of the empirical findings of any e-
campaigning study irrespective of the research approach being employed, it 
makes each empirical e-campaigning study unique and it also makes e-
campaigning research at large infinite, intriguing, and enlightening. 
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Appendix 1: An example of an e-campaigning framework 
Below is an example of an e-campaigning framework developed by Schweitzer 
(2008a). 
Categories Website elements 
Information 
Items on the political system Items on campaign organisation/strategy 
Items on the election system Download of party documents 
Items of the party history Current party news 
Items of the party organisation Dossiers on background topics 
Items on party members Newsletter 
Items on the election program Event calendar 
Items on party conventions Press releases 
Items on junior party 
organisations Local candidates 
Items on party 
projects/foundations Campaign coverage 
Items on canvassing tour Party members in the media 
  Times of party broadcast slots 
Interactivity 
Online fundraising/donations Online opinion polls 
Online membership Discussion forums/news groups 
Online friendraising Weblogs 
E-volunteers Chat rooms for non-party members 
Intra-/Extranet Computer games/quizzes/gimmicks 
Feedback option on text articles Lotteries 
Online petitions/protest mails Tax calculator 
E-cards Bulletin board/guestbook 
Sophistication 
Press accrediting Search engine 
News archive 
Home page icon on lower levels of the 
website 
Photo archive Toolbar 
Imprint Back button 
Offers of post Upward button 
Hotline Photos 
Email contact Graphics 
SMS service Animated icons/banner 
E-shop Audio/video streams 
English version 
Online subscription/use of party 
publications 
Text-only version of articles Download of party paraphernalia 
Print option for text articles Internet packages 
Email option for text articles Download of party broadcasts 
Download option for text articles Download of party billboards 
Offers of additional software Web radio/podcasting 
Site map/index   
Information tour   
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Appendix 2: List of instruments for data collection and 
analysis 
The following exhibits 11 instruments employed in the collection and analysis of 
empirical evidence in this study. References to those instruments can be found in 
section 3.7 and 3.8. Also note that the instruments are ordered according to the 
sequence that they appear in this thesis. 
1. Interview protocol 
2. Information sheet 
3. Consent form 
4. Interview notes 
5. Coding framework for the first research question 
6. Analytic memos for the first research question 
7. Matrices for displaying the primary data for the first research question 
8. Analytic memos for the second research question 
9. A priori codes for the second research question 
10. Matrices for displaying the primary data for the second research question 
11. Diagrams for displaying the primary data for the second research question 
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